Georgia-Ossetia: fragile frontline

I just returned from Georgia, where I managed to get to the Georgian-Ossetian/Russian frontline. Peace is incredibly fragile there. Nothing separates the Georgian military police from the Russian and Ossetian troops. No peacekeepers, no natural barriers, and no man-made fortifications. Just a few checkpoints and small sandbag fortifications. The checkpoints of the two conflict parties in Ergneti are just a hundred meters from each other. And nothing else.


The relative calm rests almost exclusively on the lack of any (current) interest for renewed hostilities from either Russia or Georgia. Russia has a military victory in its pocket, and an economic crisis on its hands. Georgia is deterred by Russia’s military presence. The EU Monitoring Mission might have some psychologically restraining effects on the conflict sides. But here is little else that would prevent renewed hostilities should any of the parties become interested in stirring them. And they might be. If not now, then in the future. If not by Russia and Georgia, than by South Ossetia.

Russia has huge problems in monitoring how Russian reconstruction funding is spent by the South Ossetian authorities, who refuse any kind of scrutiny. Already a couple of Russian appointed officials to South Ossetia have resigned after apparent pressure from the local government who refuses any degree of transparency. Former Russian appointed officials to South Ossetia such as former prime minister of the region Morozov and former secretary security council Barankevich have criticised Kokoity for corruption and embezzlement of Russian money. Russia seems to exercise pressure on the South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity who tries to keep under his control all the money that flow into the region. To diffuse Russian pressures, Kokoity might have an interest in growing security tensions on the ground. Changing Kokoity against the background of security tensions could be too risky.

Some EU member states seem to have their doubts about the need to have a prolonged EU peace-monitoring presence on the ground. But withdrawing the EU monitoring mission from Georgia would be folly. It might need to stay there, in this or that form, for long. Without it, both EU’s interests in the South Caucasus and EU-Russia relations could be severely tested again. As they were in August 2008