Georgia and Russia - in 2003

Georgia’s political crisis, which climaxed in the forced resignation of President Eduard Shevardnadze on 23 November 2003, is not over yet and could still lead to violence and the country’s disintegration. Georgia, in other words, is still pre-conflict, not post-conflict, and exceptional international action is required to contain the potential for chaos. Washington, which quietly supported what U.S. media called the “Rose Revolution”, has promised aid for organisation of the presidential election on 4 January 2004, as has the European Union; other donors should follow suit, and the international community should maintain this support through the equally important and potentially more contentious legislative elections in the spring.

The immediate cause of the crisis was the massive rigging of the 2 November 2003 parliamentary elections, which caused a deep reservoir of broad popular discontent to bubble over. The electoral abuse took place despite concerted international pressure on the Shevardnadze government to observe democratic standards. While significant progress was made in electoral laws, they were simply not implemented on the ground. Some parties accepted the government-declared results, but others, led by outgoing speaker of parliament Nino Burjanadze and opposition party chieftains Mikheil Saakashvili and Zurab Zhvania, refused and launched street protests that demanded official recognition of their victory.

In less than a week, these protests were transformed into a revolt. President Shevardnadze, who had displayed supreme self-assurance until the opening of parliament on 22 November, was overnight forced to resign: the crowd occupied his office, the security forces did not intervene, and Washington, and especially Moscow (with a flying visit by Foreign Minister Ivanov), played an important part in concentrating his mind. The Supreme Court invalidated the fraudulent election, thus keeping the old parliament alive. Now that the regime has collapsed, Georgia has to find a way through a risky transition period, in which the interim president, Burjanadze, and the full term president to be elected in January must work with that body until new legislative elections can take place.

In the next days, finding temporary compromises with the former ruling elite will be a top priority for the new authorities, in order to ensure state continuity. Any deep purge in the administration at this stage should be avoided. The viability of the state is at stake. Georgia, which already lost the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions, apparently permanently, in the early independence years, is now in danger of losing the autonomous region of Ajara. Negotiations and compromise with these regions are essential, as is a Western effort to persuade Russia to cooperate constructively in supporting Georgia’s territorial integrity – not Moscow’s highest priority in the past.

The next challenge for the interim leadership is to ensure that the coming presidential and parliamentary elections are free and fair. For that to happen, it will need strong support from the international community. Donors should cooperate with the Georgians to set up an Emergency Elections Task Force (EETF), under the aegis of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), to supervise those elections, especially the parliamentary vote, which is likely to be the occasion when all political forces will be most tempted to pull out every stop to ensure their position in the new constellation. All external powers should be involved, including the Russian Federation.

Georgia needs a strong and genuinely popular government to deal with the country’s difficult economic and social situation and to re-establish its territorial integrity. A stable Georgia is in the interests of all, including Russia and other neighbours, and the EU and the U.S. The opportunity now on offer must not be missed.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To International Donors and the OSCE:

1. Dedicate substantial emergency aid for the presidential and parliamentary electoral processes.

2. Establish an OSCE mandate and obtain the agreement of the Georgian authorities to set up and fund an Emergency Elections Task Force (EETF) chaired by the OSCE/ODIHR to assist with management of the 2004 presidential and parliamentary elections, composed of the acting minister or deputy minister of interior, the Central Elections Commission (CEC), the prolonged International Technical Working Group on the 2003 November elections (including the Russian Federation), and the Council of Europe.

3. Ensure that Russian staff are included in the OSCE personnel assigned to the Task Force so that the Russian Federation can play a constructive role in international efforts to assist the electoral processes.

To the Georgian Government:

4. Establish a specific budget line in the budget to fund the Task Force and the elections administration and strictly respect all deadlines set by the Task Force.

To the Interim President of Georgia and the President to be Elected in January 2004:

5. Avoid any political violence and move cautiously with changes in the bureaucracy at least until a new parliament has been elected and seated in order to prevent instability in the country.

6. Ensure that the Central Elections Commission (CEC) responsible for the presidential election in January 2004 and the subsequent parliamentary election fairly reflect all political parties and groups contesting those elections.

7. Ensure that due process of law is observed if members of the Shevardnadze government are charged with abuses relating to their time in power and likewise for any changes in administration in the various regions of the country.

8. Pursue an open dialogue, without inflammatory rhetoric, with the Ajarian authorities in order to prevent the de facto secession of the region.

To the Georgian Parliament:

9. Pass quickly the necessary legislation for parliamentary elections to be held in spring 2004.

To the Emergency Elections Task Force (EETF):

10. Hire a substantial international staff (up to 3,000 personnel) for a sufficient period and with a sufficient range of skills to assist the Georgian authorities in conducting free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections, including by:

(a) supervising the operations of the CEC and the various district and precinct electoral commissions;

(b) setting deadlines for every step in the election processes, especially publication of voter lists based on the computerised lists prepared for the 2003 parliamentary elections (no later than 15 December 2003 for the presidential election, and updated no later than one month before the parliamentary elections);

(c) providing mechanisms and procedures for citizens to ensure they are properly registered until election day and otherwise to voice complaints about the processes and have them considered in a timely manner, for example through a hotline service; and

(d) deploying special working groups to particularly difficult districts such as Kvemo Kartli and Ajara to maintain close contacts with the authorities, train voters and civil servants, and otherwise guard against fraud.

To the Russian Federation, U.S. and EU:

11. For Russia, U.S. and EU: issue a common statement (trilateral or jointly sponsored within the OSCE) expressing support for restoration of Georgian government authority over the country’s full territory, including early peaceful resolution of the differences between Ajara and the central authorities.

12. For Russia and the EU (the latter acting through its special envoy for the Caucasus): offer jointly or severally to facilitate resolution of the differences between the Georgian interim leadership and the Ajarian authorities within the spirit of the above statement of support for the country’s territorial integrity.

To the Next Georgian President:

13. Develop a proposal for constitutional reform, possibly including the creation of the position of prime minister, responsible for forming a government holding the trust of a majority in parliament and for proposing bills on behalf of that government, and present that proposal, including a careful explanation of the division of executive powers between the president and the government, to the parliament to be elected in spring 2004.

Tbilisi/Brussels, 3 December 2003