UNOMIG PROLONGED – BUT WILL IT BE EFFECTIVE?

On 13 February 2009, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1866 (2009) on extending the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia for a new period terminating on 15 June 2009. The document recalled previous resolutions on this issue from April and October 2008. The four-month extension period accentuated the provisional character of the mission; before the August war, the mission was renewed in six-month cycles. While the shortened period and the discussions held on the eve of expiration are not allowing for long-term period planning, keeping UNOMIG in Abkhazia can still be considered a success.

Obviously, the mission helps to maintain the conflict on the international community’s agenda. It must be remembered that UNOMIG is the only mission that is allowed to function inside the borders of the internationally unrecognized Republic of Abkhazia and is, from a humanitarian perspective, playing role of a watchdog. The presence of military observers is helping to provide security for the local Georgian population, which would be even more vulnerable without UNOMIG’s eyes on the ground, while also reducing tension between the conflicting sides.

UNOMIG was originally established in August 1993 to monitor the July 1993 ceasefire agreement between the Government of Georgia and the Abkhaz authorities. However, after fighting resumed, the Mission was given an interim mandate. The actual shape of the Mission is based on the Agreement on Ceasefire and Separation of Forces signed in Moscow on 14 May 1994. The February mandate reduplicates these commitments.

In accordance with the mandate, the Mission is going to monitor the 12-kilometer security zone and the 12-kilometer restricted weapons zone (RWZ) on both sides of the administrative borders. Heavy military equipment like artillery, tanks and armored transport vehicles are not allowed in the RWZ, however, the zones really only exist on paper because they are not respected by the Abkhazian and Russian forces. In August, Russia brought heavy weaponry into the area and is maintaining a strong presence there. Respect for the zones is thus dependent on Russia’s goodwill.

Another issue is the status of Russian soldiers in Abkhazia. The Moscow Agreement allowed for deploying the Collective Peace Keeping Forces (CPKF) of the Commonwealth of Independent States in the area. The CPKF in Abkhazia were always purely Russian, and all tasks performed by Russian peacekeepers were undertaken under the authority of this organization. In line with its mandate, UNOMIG was closely cooperating with the CIS peacekeeping forces and recognized these as a legitimate partner. However, even before the August war, the mandate of the Russian peacekeepers was disputable. In October 2005, the Georgian Parliament passed a resolution calling Russian peacekeepers to operate in line with their mandate and international standards. Tbilisi asked Moscow to demonstrate such an approach by June 2006. However, in the beginning of 2006, in spite of Georgian protests, Russia decided to keep Sergey Chaban as commander of the CPKF. On 18 July, the Georgian Parliament passed a resolution on the withdrawal of Russian forces from Abkhazia (as well as from South Ossetia). On 25 July, Tbilisi sent troops to Abkhazia's Kodori Gorge and established an alternative Abkhaz administration there, severely complicating the dialogue between the CPKF and UNOMIG. Finally, in October 2007 Georgia withdrew its support for the PKF mandate and then withdrew from the CIS after the August war.

August 2009 was a turning point for the status of the Russian forces in Abkhazia. After the invasion, the Kremlin has sought acceptance for the Russian military presence and a change of UNOMIG’s status in order to bring about international recognition of Abkhazia. In every previous resolution on UNOMIG’s extension, the UN Security Council (UNSC) has praised the role of the CPKF. This has become the price for avoiding a veto on UNOMIG and a legitimization of the Russian peacekeeping mission. However, in October 2008, the UNSC passed a resolution on extending UNOMIG without legitimating the Russian presence in the area. In the same month the CIS Council of Foreign Ministers took a formal decision on the termination of the CPKF in Abkhazia. Russian troops in Abkhazia are thus no longer present there as peacekeepers. Kremlin officials stated that the armed forces of the Russian Federation are stationed in Abkhazia on the basis of an agreement with the Russian-recognized Abkhaz authorities.

Without the presence of the CPKF, UNOMIG lost its legitimate cooperation partner. The CPKF HQ in Sukhumi was closed down, and formal communication with Russian forces became impossible. A chance to overcome the problem came with the Geneva talks. The visible result of the talks is an agreement on a joint incident prevention and response mechanism. If all parties agree on detailed terms of such cooperation, such a mechanism could be established within the next two months. The participants of the Geneva talks also agreed on the need to establish a working communication platform. Agreements made in Geneva gave UNOMIG a chance to establish formal communications on the ground with the Russian forces. If both the mechanism and the line are established, chances for respecting the ceasefire in the area will be improved.