FACT SHEET ON UNOMIG

Source: United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)

Date: 15 Jan 2003

Headquarters: Sukhumi
Sectors: Gali and Zugdidi
Separate Patrol: Kodori Valley
Liaison Office: Tbilisi
Military Observers: 114
Authorized: 136
Budget (2002-2003): $31,700,000
Special Representative of the Secretary-General: Ms. Heidi Tagliavini (Switzerland) Since July 2002
Chief Military Observer: Major General Ashfaq Ahmed (Bangladesh) Since May 2002
Mandate: Security Council resolution 858 (August 1993) established UNOMIG. Following the Moscow Agreement of 14 May 1994, resolution 937 (July 1994) expanded the mission’s mandate to: (i) monitor a "security zone" (no military presence) and a "restricted weapons zone" (no heavy weapons) on both sides of the cease-fire line along the Inguri river; (ii) patrol the Kodori Valley, a remote mountain area in Abkhazia under Georgian control, and (iii) observe the operation of the CIS peacekeeping force within the framework of the implementation of the Moscow Agreement. The mandate was last extended in resolution 1427 (July 2002) and will expire on 31 January 2003.

Operations: UNOMIG conducts daily patrols in its area of responsibility. For security reasons, it patrols only in pairs of mine-protected vehicles and on main roads connecting major populated areas.

Political process: Since the beginning of the conflict, in exercise of the Secretary-General’s good offices, the Special Envoy and later the Special Representative undertook efforts to bring the parties together in substantive negotiations. In these efforts, the UN is assisted by the Russian Federation, in its capacity as facilitator, as well as by the Group of Friends of the Secretary-General. To facilitate meaningful negotiations between the parties, former Special Representative Boden with the support of the Group of Friends prepared a paper on "Basic principles for the distribution of competences between Tbilisi and Sukhumi". In resolution 1393 of 31 January 2002, the Security Council welcomed and supported the finalization of the paper and of its letter of transmittal as positive elements for launching the peace process between the sides. In resolution 1427 of 29 July 2002, the Council recalled its support to the document. Efforts to submit the paper to the parties are ongoing.

Consultation mechanisms: In 1997, the Coordinating Council was established to promote cooperation between the parties. The Council has three Working Groups on: security issues, return of refugees and displaced persons, and social and economic issues. The Council has not met since January 2001. Working groups on security matters and displaced persons last met in July 2002 and working group on social and economic issues in November 2002. On the ground, there are weekly quadripartite meetings of local representatives of the parties in the conflict zone, the CIS peacekeeping force and UNOMIG to discuss operational issues.

Observer contributing countries: Albania (3), Austria (2), Bangladesh (7), Czech Republic (5), Denmark (5), Egypt (3), France (3), Germany (11), Greece (5), Hungary (7), Indonesia (4), Jordan (7), Pakistan (9), Poland (4), Republic of Korea (7), Russian Federation (3), Sweden (3), Switzerland (4), Turkey (5), Ukraine (5), United Kingdom (7), United States (2), Uruguay (3).

Key documents:

Agreement on a Cease-Fire and Separation of Forces, 14 May 1994 (S/1994/583, Annex 1)

Resolution 937 (S/RES/937 (1994))

Declaration on measures for a political settlement of the Georgian/Abkhaz conflict, 4 April 1994 (S/1994/397, Annex 1)

Quadripartite agreement on voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons, 4 April 1994 (S/1994/397, Annex 2)

Joint Assessment Mission to the Gali district, 20-24 November 2000 (S/2001/59, Annex 2)

Yalta Declaration of the Georgian and Abkhaz sides, 15-16 March 2001 (S/2001/242) DPKO/ELAD/15.01.03

UNOMIG PROLONGED – BUT WILL IT BE EFFECTIVE?

On 13 February 2009, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1866 (2009) on extending the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia for a new period terminating on 15 June 2009. The document recalled previous resolutions on this issue from April and October 2008. The four-month extension period accentuated the provisional character of the mission; before the August war, the mission was renewed in six-month cycles. While the shortened period and the discussions held on the eve of expiration are not allowing for long-term period planning, keeping UNOMIG in Abkhazia can still be considered a success.

Obviously, the mission helps to maintain the conflict on the international community’s agenda. It must be remembered that UNOMIG is the only mission that is allowed to function inside the borders of the internationally unrecognized Republic of Abkhazia and is, from a humanitarian perspective, playing role of a watchdog. The presence of military observers is helping to provide security for the local Georgian population, which would be even more vulnerable without UNOMIG’s eyes on the ground, while also reducing tension between the conflicting sides.

UNOMIG was originally established in August 1993 to monitor the July 1993 ceasefire agreement between the Government of Georgia and the Abkhaz authorities. However, after fighting resumed, the Mission was given an interim mandate. The actual shape of the Mission is based on the Agreement on Ceasefire and Separation of Forces signed in Moscow on 14 May 1994. The February mandate reduplicates these commitments.

In accordance with the mandate, the Mission is going to monitor the 12-kilometer security zone and the 12-kilometer restricted weapons zone (RWZ) on both sides of the administrative borders. Heavy military equipment like artillery, tanks and armored transport vehicles are not allowed in the RWZ, however, the zones really only exist on paper because they are not respected by the Abkhazian and Russian forces. In August, Russia brought heavy weaponry into the area and is maintaining a strong presence there. Respect for the zones is thus dependent on Russia’s goodwill.

Another issue is the status of Russian soldiers in Abkhazia. The Moscow Agreement allowed for deploying the Collective Peace Keeping Forces (CPKF) of the Commonwealth of Independent States in the area. The CPKF in Abkhazia were always purely Russian, and all tasks performed by Russian peacekeepers were undertaken under the authority of this organization. In line with its mandate, UNOMIG was closely cooperating with the CIS peacekeeping forces and recognized these as a legitimate partner. However, even before the August war, the mandate of the Russian peacekeepers was disputable. In October 2005, the Georgian Parliament passed a resolution calling Russian peacekeepers to operate in line with their mandate and international standards. Tbilisi asked Moscow to demonstrate such an approach by June 2006. However, in the beginning of 2006, in spite of Georgian protests, Russia decided to keep Sergey Chaban as commander of the CPKF. On 18 July, the Georgian Parliament passed a resolution on the withdrawal of Russian forces from Abkhazia (as well as from South Ossetia). On 25 July, Tbilisi sent troops to Abkhazia's Kodori Gorge and established an alternative Abkhaz administration there, severely complicating the dialogue between the CPKF and UNOMIG. Finally, in October 2007 Georgia withdrew its support for the PKF mandate and then withdrew from the CIS after the August war.

August 2009 was a turning point for the status of the Russian forces in Abkhazia. After the invasion, the Kremlin has sought acceptance for the Russian military presence and a change of UNOMIG’s status in order to bring about international recognition of Abkhazia. In every previous resolution on UNOMIG’s extension, the UN Security Council (UNSC) has praised the role of the CPKF. This has become the price for avoiding a veto on UNOMIG and a legitimization of the Russian peacekeeping mission. However, in October 2008, the UNSC passed a resolution on extending UNOMIG without legitimating the Russian presence in the area. In the same month the CIS Council of Foreign Ministers took a formal decision on the termination of the CPKF in Abkhazia. Russian troops in Abkhazia are thus no longer present there as peacekeepers. Kremlin officials stated that the armed forces of the Russian Federation are stationed in Abkhazia on the basis of an agreement with the Russian-recognized Abkhaz authorities.

Without the presence of the CPKF, UNOMIG lost its legitimate cooperation partner. The CPKF HQ in Sukhumi was closed down, and formal communication with Russian forces became impossible. A chance to overcome the problem came with the Geneva talks. The visible result of the talks is an agreement on a joint incident prevention and response mechanism. If all parties agree on detailed terms of such cooperation, such a mechanism could be established within the next two months. The participants of the Geneva talks also agreed on the need to establish a working communication platform. Agreements made in Geneva gave UNOMIG a chance to establish formal communications on the ground with the Russian forces. If both the mechanism and the line are established, chances for respecting the ceasefire in the area will be improved.

Historical Chronology

18-19 May 2009	The fifth round of Geneva talks on Georgia will take place.
9 April 2009	Protests began calling for Georgian President Mikhail Saakshvili to resign.
13 February 2009	The Council adopted resolution 1866 extending the mandate of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) until 15 June.
20 January 2009	Russia warned that it would impose “special economic measures” against countries supplying weapons to Georgia.
16 January 2009	A Georgian policeman was shot and killed while on duty near the South Ossetian administrative boundary line.
15 January 2009	Greece, which had taken over the OSCE chair on 1 January, presented a new initiative to Russia aimed at keeping the OSCE in South Ossetia.
9 January 2009	The US and Georgia signed a bilateral charter on a strategic partnership aimed at increasing cooperation in defense, trade and energy. The agreement provides a roadmap for cooperation including US assistance to Georgia’s military to help it qualify for NATO membership.
1 January 2009	The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mission in Georgia began shutting down
Early December 2008	Irakli Alasania resigned as Georgia's ambassador to the UN. He issued a statement on 24 December accusing Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili of precipitating the armed conflict in August and calling on all "decent and patriotic persons" to join forces to avert the impending "crisis" and restore security, stability and prosperity.
15 October, 18 November and 17-18 December 2008	Three rounds of Geneva internationally mediated talks focusing on security and stability and repatriation of refugees were held in line with the 12 August 2008 ceasefire agreement, jointly chaired by the UN, EU and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
9 October 2009	The Council agreed on a four month technical rollover for UNOMIG through resolution 1839.
26 August 2008	Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed decrees recognising South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states.
22 August 2008	The Council held closed consultations and discussed the Russian and French draft resolutions.
20 August 2008	Russian halted military cooperation with NATO.
20 August 2008	Russia formally circulated its draft resolution (S/2008/570).
19 August 2008	The French circulated a second draft resolution.
19 August 2008	NATO ministers called on Russia to observe the ceasefire and withdraw its troops immediately.
15 August 2008	Russia and Georgia signed a ceasefire plan containing six principles.
12 August 2008	French President Nicolas Sarkozy joined French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner and Finnish Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb in Moscow to propose a plan for a ceasefire. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev endorsed six principles to end the conflict and ordered a halt to Russian military operations but said Russian troops will remain in current positions in Georgia.
11 August 2008	Russian ground forces from Abkhazia were reported to be in the vicinity of Senaki, well inside Georgia. The European Commission called on Russia to halt military activity on Georgian territory and NATO Secretary-General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, said he was concerned about the disproportionate use of force. The Group of 7 (US, UK, Italy, France, Germany, Canada and Japan) also urged Russia to accept an immediate ceasefire and accept international mediation. Georgia accepted a ceasefire proposal by French Foreign Minister Kouchner and Finnish Foreign Minister Stubb. The Council held a closed meeting, during which Mulet and Pascoe briefed the Council. The French circulated a first French draft resolution.
10 August 2008	French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner on behalf of the EU presidency, together with Finnish Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb, in his capacity as OSCE chairman, flew to Tbilisi and presented proposals to Georgia. On 10 August, the Council held an open debate with Georgia’s participation and was briefed by Under Secretary-General B. Lynn Pascoe and Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Edmond Mulet (S/PV.5953) after having had private consultations.
9 August 2008	The Georgian parliament declared a state of war for 15 days. The fighting also spread to Abkhazia as Abkhaz separatists launched air and artillery strikes on Georgian forces in the Kodori Gorge. The UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) withdrew its observers from the Upper Kodori Valley in Abkhazia after the Abkhaz de facto authorities said their safety could no longer be guaranteed. The presidents of Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania issued a joint statement as former Soviet bloc nations expressing their deep concern over Russia’s actions and called on NATO and the EU to stand up to Moscow.
8 August 2008	Russia attacked Georgia's military in South Ossetia.
7 August 2008	Georgia complained that Ossetian separatists were attacking Georgian police and patrols and deployed a large force into South Ossetia.
4 August 2008	Russia complained that Georgia was resorting to force in South Ossetia and the South Ossetians accused Georgian forces of killing at least six people.
29 July 2008	The Council held consultations on the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) to discuss the latest UNOMIG report (S/2008/480).
21 July 2008	The Council held a private meeting (S/PV.5939) on the situation in Georgia convened at the request of Georgia.
16 July 2008	Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice discussed the situation in Georgia during a telephone conversation.
15 July 2008	Georgia's parliament unanimously approved an increase of its armed forces by 5,000 soldiers and a 26.8 percent rise ($209 million) in annual military spending. These increases brought the armed forces to 37,000 and the total military expenditure for the year to $989.3 million.
15 July 2008	NATO said that it was “concerned” by Russia's statement that its military aircraft deliberately overflew Georgian territory and that the action raised questions about Russia’s role as a peacekeeper in Abkhazia and facilitator of talks between Tbilisi and Sukhumi.
10 July 2008	Georgia wrote to the president of the Council to request, in accordance with article 35 of the UN Charter, a meeting of the Council with the participation of the Georgian representative to discuss the overflight of Russian military aircraft in Georgian air space.
10 July 2008	Russia admitted its fighter jets had flown over the breakaway Georgian territory of South Ossetia two days earlier.
8 July 2008	Russian military aircraft lew over Georgian airspace.
7 July 2008	The Secretary-General condemned the explosions of 5-6 July 2008 and called for an immediate and thorough investigation of the incidents.
5-6 July 2008	A series of explosions took place in Abkhaz-controlled territory as well as near the ceasefire line on Georgian territory. Four people were killed and sixteen injured. One staff member of UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) was killed and another injured.
17 June 2008	Georgia arrested four Russian soldiers suspected of transporting weapons without proper documentation.
mid-June 2008	The US, UK, Germany and France met to discuss ways of encouraging dialgoue.
5 June 2008	Georgia suspended flights of unmanned aerial vehicles over Abkhazia but reserved the right to restart them.
early June 2008	EU ambassadors called for a resumption of dialgoue without preliminary conditions.
early June 2008	Javier Solana, the EU's High Representative, visited Tbilisi and Sukhumi and encouraged resumption of direct Georgian-Abkhaz talks.
31 May 2008	Russia deployed a military unit to repair Abkhazia's rail and road infrastructure. Georgia saw this action as preparation of infrastructure for possible military intervention. Russia described it as a humanitarian action aimed at improving people’s lives. The Russian action drew criticism from the US and NATO.
30 May 2008	The Council met at the request of Georgia to discuss the UNOMIG report on the downing of an unmanned aerial vehicle on 20 April.
26 May 2008	UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) released a report of its independent investigation of the downing of a Georgian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) over Abkhazia on 20 April. A video taken by the drone before it was destroyed showed a fighter jet firing a missle at it. The report determined that the fighter jet was either a Russian-made MiG-29 or a Su-27.
21 May 2008	Georgia held parliamentary elections. Mikheil Saakashvili's party won 60 per cent of the vote. The opposition has complained of violations at the polling stations.
15 May 2008	The General Assembly adopted a resolution (14 in favour, 11 against and 105 abstaining) upholding the rights of Georgian refugees and internally displaced persons to return to Abkhazia.
12 May 2008	Irakli Alasania, Georgia's UN ambsaddor, held direct talks with Abkhaz leaders in Sukhumi.
early May	US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, Matthew Bryza visited Sukhumi to encourage both sides to rejuvenate the peace process.
late April 2008	Russia increased its peacekeeping force in Abkhazia to 2500 citing a build up of troops on the Georgia-Abkhaz border. Georgia denied any troop buildup and voiced unhappiness with not being informed of the Russian troop increase.
20 April 2008	An unmanned Georgian aerial vehicle was downed over Abkhazia.
15 April 2008	The Council adopted resolution 1808 on 15 April extending the mandate of UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) until 15 October 2008.
25 March 2008	Dmitry Medvedev, Russia's incoming president, spoke out against NATO membership for Georgia.
21 March 2008	The Russian Duma adopted a non-binding declaration asking the Russian government to consider the "expediency of recognising the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia".
13 March 2008	Russia's Duma recommended that the Russian government open "missions" in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and Transdnestr.
7 March 2008	Abkhazia called on Russia, the UN, the EU and the OSCE to recognise its independence.
6 March 2008	Russia withdrew from the CIS sanctions regime that had been established in 1996 by the Executive Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States to put pressure on Abkhazia.
21 February 2008	Saakashvili and Putin met ahead of the informal Commonwealth of Independent States summit.
18 - 19 February 2008	The Group of Friends met in Geneva.
12 December 2007	The Secretary-General called for "calm and restraint" in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict.
6 December 2007	The ban on the private television station Imedi (part-owned by Rupert Murdoch and Badri Patarkatsishvili, a leading critic of Saakashvili's government and a candidate in the presidential elections) was lifted.
5 December 2007	Lado Gurgenidze, the interim prime minister appointed after the state of emergency, cited social tensions as a major factor in the demonstrations that led to the state of emergency. He downplayed earlier allegations of a Russian role in the rallies.
29 November 2007	Georgian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs George Manjgaladze met the permanent representatives of the Secretary-General's Group of Friends of Georgia (France, Germany, Russia, the UK, the US and in New York, Slovakia) in Tbilisi and provided information on the return of internally displaced persons and refugees.
25 November 2007	Saakashvili resigned as presdient in order to run in elections scheduled for 5 January 2008.
7 November 2007	Demonstrations led to a crack down and state of emergncy being imposed until 16 November.
25 October 2007	The first high-level contact between Tbilisi and Sukhumi (the Abkaz capital) took place when David Bakradze, the Georgian state minister for conflict resolution issues, and David Bakradze, the Abkhaz de facto foreign minister, met to discuss the 20 September clash.
15 October 2007	The Security Council adopted resolution 1781 extending the mandate of UNOMIG until 15 April 2008. It urged "all parties to consider and address seriously each other's legitimate security concerns" and "refrain from any acts of violence or provocation."
20 September 2007	A clash between Georgian Ministry of the Interior units and an Abkhaz military unit reportedly left two dead, several wounded and a number taken prisoner. A Joint Fact-Finding Group led by UNOMIG was set up to investigate the incident.
5 September 2007	Georgia complained to the Council about military exercises conducted by Abkhaz troops in Abkhazia.
August 2007	Georgia, in a letter, called for a meeting of the Security Council stating that a Russian missile had impacted its territory on 6 August 2007. Subsequently, on 9 and 16 August, the Council had two informal briefings on the missile incident in Georgia.
26 July 2007	The Council held consultations on Georgia and was briefed by Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hédi Annabi on the Secretary-General's latest report (S/2007/439).
29 June 2007	The Group of Friends met in Germany under the auspicies of Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guehenno.
18 June 2007	The leaders of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova met in Baku at a summit of the Organisation for Democracy and Economic Development (ODED, more commonly known as GUAM). The creation of a joint peacekeeping force which could be deployed in the breakaway regions was among the issues discussed.
Early June 2007	The Abkhazians and South Ossetians adopted a joint statement stating that they have as much right to independence as Kosovo. The Transdniester Republic, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh in mid-June signed a joint declaration on "principles for peaceful and just settlement" of their respective situations.
10 June 2007	At the Russian and Georgian leaders meeting ahead of the informal summit of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) leaders, Russia agreed to lift sanctions on Georgian products on a "step-by-step" basis.
4 May 2007	Three Georgian students detained by the Abkhaz authorities for illegally crossing "Abkhaz borders" on 1 March were released. In return, Sergey Bagapsh, the de facto Abkhaz leader, called on Georgia to release Abkhaz official Davit Sigua, but so far there has been no response.
18 March 2007	Run-off elections were held in Abkhazia after a 4 March parliamentary election failed to form a government when only 18 members were elected in the 35-seat parliament.
March 2007	Tense relations between Georgia and Russia were further strained when, according to Georgian officials, three Russian helicopters had fired into the Kodori Gorge. Russia denied this. A fact-finding team was sent to the Upper Kodori Valley.
12-13 January 2007	In Geneva, the Group of Friends (France, Germany, Russia, the UK, the US and, in New York, Slovakia) met with representatives from Georgia and Abkhazia. The two parties were urged to engage on security issues in the northwest and cooperate to reduce tensions.
11 December 2006	The de facto Abkhaz authorities suspended border crossings and threatened to cut off hydroelectric power to Georgia after the arrest of the de facto head of the Gali district administration for alleged drug trafficking.
26 October 2006	UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) investigated reports that three rockets had been launched from Abkhazia into the upper Kodori Valley.
13 October 2006	The Council in resolution 1716 encouraged the resumption of joint patrols on 12 October by UN Observer Mission in Georgia and Commonwealth of Independent States peacekeepers in the upper Kodori Valley.
22 September 2006	In his speech to the General Assembly, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili said that the current framework for negotiation and peacekeeping in Abkhazia and South Ossetia needed to be replaced. He also proposed the demilitarisation of the conflict zone, direct dialogue between parties on the ground and the establishment of an international police presence.
18 July 2006	The Georgian parliament passed a resolution asking the government to suspend Commonwealth of Independent States peacekeeping operations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and for the withdrawal of the Russian armed forces.
July 2006	Jean Arnault of France was appointed as the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Georgia and Head of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia , succeeding Heidi Tagliavini of Switzerland.
22 February 2006	At high-level meeting, the Group of Friends agreed on a document listing elements for the peaceful settlement of the conflict.
15 February 2006	The Georgian parliament adopted a resolution recommending the internationalisation of peacekeeping in South Ossetia.
31 January 2006	President Vladimir Putin of Russia is reported to have linked the situation in Georgia with that in Kosovo and warned that Russia would move to recognise the independence of Abkhazia (and the other Georgian breakaway region of South Ossetia.)
31 January 2006	The Council adopted a technical rollover of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia. It was triggered by Russian objections to standard UN language reaffirming the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia and supporting a political solution for the inclusion of Abkhazia within Georgia's boundaries.
January 2006	Georgia accused Russia of deliberately cutting natural gas supplies causing energy crisis in Georgia.
11 October 2005	The Georgian parliament adopted a resolution criticising the performance of Russian peacekeepers and threatened that Georgian consent for the presence of the Russian forces may be withdrawn by 15 February in the case of South Ossetia, and 15 July in the case of Abkhazia.
July 2005	The Russian Federation began the phased handover of military facilities to Georgian authorities.
May 2005	A protocol on strengthening the 1994 ceasefire was signed.
January 2005	Sergei Bagapsh was elected de facto president of Abkhazia.
May-August 2004	Tensions increased with breakaway South Ossetia.
March-May 2004	Tensions arose between Tbilisi and the de facto autonomous region of Ajaria, culminating with the resignation of Ajarian leader Aslan Abashidze.
January 2004	Mikhail Saakashvili was elected president of Georgia.
August 2003	Georgia sent troops to Iraq.
May 2003	Construction of the Georgian section of the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline began.
September-October 2002	Renewed tensions over Chechen fighters on Georgian soil emerged. The Russian Federation warned of possible military action. Russian special forces launched cross-border raids without approval from Tbilisi.
December 2001	The "Basic Principles for the Distribution of Competencies between Tbilisi and Sokhumi" was submitted to the parties.
October 2001	Renewed fighting between Abkhaz separatists and Georgian paramilitaries. Russia accused Georgia of harbouring Chechen forces. A UN helicopter was shot down in the Kodori Valley, Abkhazia.
1996	Georgia and South Ossetia, with the participation of Russia, the Republic of North Ossetia and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), signed the 1996 Memorandum on Measures to Provide Security and Strengthen Mutual Trust between the Parties to the Georgian-Ossetian conflict.
April-May 1994	The Moscow Ceasefire Agreement and the quadripartite agreement were signed. As a result, Commonwealth of Independent States peacekeeping troops were deployed and UNOMIG's mandate was expanded. Agreement was also reached on practical measures on topics such as transport and communications.
September 1993	The ceasefire collapsed. Georgia became a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States and agreed to the establishment of three Russian military bases on its soil.
August 1993	The UN Observer Mission in Georgia was established to monitor the ceasefire.
July 1993	A new ceasefire was reached under the Sochi Agreement.
October 1992	The ceasefire collapsed, and interethnic fighting in the Russian North Caucasus erupted.
September 1992	Both parties signed a ceasefire and peacekeeping plan.
August 1992	Conflict between Georgian troops and Abkhaz separatist forces began.
April 1991	Georgia became independent after a popular referendum. The Abkhaz population, however, voted to remain part of the Soviet Union.
1990	South Ossetia declared independence, seeking unification with North Ossetia, Russia.
1978	The Abkhaz Autonomous Socialist republic sought unsuccessfully to secede from Georgia and join the Russian Republic.
1931	Abkhazia was incorporated into Georgia by Soviet authorities.
1921	Georgia became part of the Soviet Union.

Georgia Releases Evidence on War's Start

The New York Times published on September 15 details of evidence, which Georgia handed over to U.S. and European intelligence agencies, purporting to show that some Russian forces crossed into breakaway South Ossetia via Roki Tunnel a day before Georgia attacked Tskhinvali late on August 7.

The evidence in question, which was also handed over to the New York Times by the Georgian authorities, involves intercepted cellphone calls between a South Ossetian militiaman, supposedly a border guard, at the Roki Tunnel and his superior at headquarters in Tskhinvali.

According to a separate article run by the International Herald Tribune - part of the New York Times Company – Georgia’s eavesdropping operation was made possible because both South Ossetian militiamen were using a Georgian mobile operator, Magti.

In the first phone conversation, intercepted at 3:41am on August 7, the South Ossetian border guard at the Roki Tunnel, by the name of Gassiev, tells his supervisor in Tskhinvali that a Russian colonel had asked Ossetian guards at the tunnel to inspect military vehicles that “crowded” the tunnel. “The B.M.P.’s and other vehicles were sent here and they’ve crowded there. The guys are also standing around,” the guard at Roki Tunnel says, according to the NY Times.

In a separate conversation logged at 3:52am on August 7 the superior from Tskhinvali asks Gassiev: “Has the armor arrived or what?”

“The armor and people,” the guard replied. Asked if they had gone through, he said, “Yes, 20 minutes ago; when I called you, they had already arrived.”

The NY Times, however, says the recordings do not explicitly describe the quantity of armor or indicate that Russian forces were engaged in fighting at that time.

When asked why more than a month passed before the conversations came to light, Georgian Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili told the NY Times that the file with the recordings was lost during the war when the surveillance team moved operations from Tbilisi to Gori.

The NY Times says that at issue is new intelligence, “inconclusive on its own, that nonetheless paints a more complicated picture of the critical last hours before war broke out.”

Although Russia has not disputed the veracity of the phone calls, the NY Times reported, it downplayed the significance of the intercepted conversations.

Gen. Lt. Nikolai Uvarov of Russia, who served as a Defense Ministry spokesman during the war, told the NY Times that troop movements to South Ossetia before the war erupted were part of the normal rotation and replenishment of the Russian peacekeeping forces in South Ossetia.

The NY Times, however, notes that “at a minimum, the intercepted calls, which senior American officials have reviewed and described as credible if not conclusive, suggest there were Russian military movements earlier than had previously been acknowledged, whether routine or hostile, into Georgian territory as tensions accelerated toward war.”

CS negocia prolongar missão da ONU na Geórgia

O Conselho de Segurança (CS) das Nações Unidas iniciou hoje as negociações para renovar o mandato da missão de observadores da ONU na Geórgia (Unomig), que se encontra na região separatista da Abkházia.

O embaixador russo Vitaly Churkin, que ocupa a Presidência rotativa do principal órgão da ONU, assegurou que a reunião foi "positiva" em relação à preparação de um projeto de resolução que amplie o mandato dos observadores internacionais, que expira em 15 de junho.

Ele assinalou que as conversas dentro do conselho giraram em torno das recomendações apresentadas pelo secretário-geral da ONU, Ban Ki-moon, em seu último relatório sobre a Unomig.

"Acho que nos proporcionam um bom ponto de partida, embora isso não queira dizer que vamos adotar cada uma das recomendações sem modificá-las", completou.

Já o embaixador da Geórgia perante a ONU, Alexander Lomaia, considerou que o relatório de Ban é um "passo para trás", fruto da "chantagem" de Moscou.

"O relatório ignora o mais óbvio, que é que milhares de militares, tanques e artilharia pesada russa estão estacionados em nosso país", apontou em coletiva de imprensa o diplomata.

Lomaia acusou a Rússia de ameaçar a ONU em vetar o projeto de resolução sobre a Unomig caso o relatório não fosse de seu agrado.

"É lamentável que o secretário-geral se prenda à chantagem russa", reiterou.

A Geórgia considera que a Unomig deveria contar com um contingente militar e policial forte que possa impor a ordem em sua área de responsabilidade.

"O que interessa aos russos é uma missão frágil ou, no melhor dos casos, inexistente", acrescentou.

A Unomig conta na atualidade com 129 observadores militares, 16 policiais e 105 empregados civis, que se encontram sob as ordens do enviado especial da ONU para a Geórgia, o belga Johan Verbeke.

EFE - Agência EFE - Todos os direitos reservados.

NY Times: Georgia Claims on War Called Into Question

After publishing in September the Georgian side’s evidence on the August war’s start, through which Tbilisi claimed it acted in self-defense in response to advancing Russian military, the New York Times published on November 6 “newly available accounts by independent military observers” which it said called into question Tbilisi’s assertions.

The NY Times report is based on accounts of OSCE military observers on the ground. The newspaper says that the accounts “are neither fully conclusive nor broad enough to settle the many lingering disputes over blame in a war... But they raise questions about the accuracy and honesty of Georgia’s insistence that its shelling of Tskhinvali, the capital of the breakaway region of South Ossetia, was a precise operation.”

It says that the observations by the monitors, including a Finnish major, a Belarusian airborne captain and a Polish civilian, have been the subject of two confidential briefings to diplomats in Tbilisi - one in August and the other in October. Summaries were shared with The New York Times by people in attendance at both. Details were then confirmed by three Western diplomats and a Russian, and were not disputed by the OSCE mission in Tbilisi, according to the NY Times.

OSCE observers on the ground saw large numbers of Georgian artillery and grad rocket launchers massing on roads north of Gori at 3 p.m. on August 7, according to these accounts.

In the evening of August 7 President Saakashvili announced a unilateral ceasefire; few hours later, however, fire was exchanged. The Georgian officials say that South Ossetian separatist forces broke the ceasefire and launched heavy shelling of the Georgian villages. Zaza Gogava, who at the time was chief of staff of the armed forces, told the Georgian parliamentary commission studying the August events: “On August 7, 2008 at 11:35pm, I have received a phone call on the secured line from the Commander-in-Chief. He told me that developments went beyond all the limits and gave me three orders: 1. Stop all type of military coming into Georgia from Russia; 2. Suppress firing positions from where the Georgian peacekeepers and interior ministry’s posts, as well as the Georgian villages were fired constantly; 3. Protect interests and security of the civilian population while implementing these orders.”

The NY Times said it its article that according to the monitors, however, no shelling of Georgian villages could be heard in the hours before the Georgian bombardment. “At least two of the four villages that Georgia has since said were under fire were near the observers’ office in Tskhinvali, and the monitors there likely would have heard artillery fire nearby,” the newspaper said based on the OSCE observers’ accounts.

It said that the observers made a record of the rounds exploding after Georgia’s bombardment began at 11:35 p.m on August 7. At 11:45 p.m., rounds were exploding at intervals of 15 to 20 seconds between impacts, they noted. By 12:35 a.m. the observers had recorded at least 100 heavy rounds exploding across Tskhinvali, including 48 close to the observers’ office, which is in a civilian area and was damaged, the NY Times writes.

Zaza Gogava, a former chief of army, and Alexandre Lomaia, the Secretary of National Security Council told the Georgian parliamentary commission on the August events, that the Georgian side used GRAD rockets only to suppress the South Ossetian forces’ firing positions in the Verkhny Garadok district of Tskhinvali, which, they said was not a civilian area. They have also claimed that precision targeting weapons, in particular DANA self-propelled artillery guns, were used to target firing positions in the Tskhinvali centre. The Georgian senior officials also said that the separatists forces were also using civilian installations to hide their artillery and from where the Georgian villages were targeted.

The NY Times writes, that the Georgia’s accounts were disputed by Ryan Grist, a former British Army captain who was the senior OSCE representative in Georgia when the war broke out. Grist said, according to the article, that he was in constant contact that night with all sides, with the office in Tskhinvali and with Stephen Young, the retired British military officer who leads the monitoring team.

“It was clear to me that the attack was completely indiscriminate and disproportionate to any, if indeed there had been any, provocation,” Grist said. “The attack was clearly, in my mind, an indiscriminate attack on the town, as a town.”

In August Grist gave a briefing to diplomats from the European Union that drew from the monitors’ observations and included his assessments. He then soon resigned under unclear circumstances, the NY Times said.

A second briefing was led by Stephen Yong in October for military attachés visiting Georgia. At the meeting, according to a person in attendance, the NY Times writes, Young stood by the monitors’ assessment that Georgian villages had not been extensively shelled on the evening or night of Aug. 7. “If there had been heavy shelling in areas that Georgia claimed were shelled, then our people would have heard it, and they didn’t,” Young said, according to the person who attended. “They heard only occasional small-arms fire.”

The Georgian officials reject those accounts. “That information, I don’t know what it is and how it is confirmed,” Giga Bokeria, Georgia’s deputy foreign minister, told the NY Times. “There is such an amount of evidence of continuous attacks on Georgian-controlled villages and so much evidence of Russian military buildup, it doesn’t change in any case the general picture of events.”

Armed Conflict

Written by George Nikoladze
Saturday, 30 June 2007 21:21

A violent coup in Tbilisi, which ousted President Gamsakhurdia in favor of the interim Military Council from December 20, 1991 to January 6, 1992, marked the start of the civil war in Georgia. Gamsakhurdia fled Georgia, but his armed supporters continued their resistance to the new regime, especially in Mingrelia (Samegrelo), and enjoyed significant support among the Georgian population in Abkhazia. In March 1992, the Military Council was transformed into the State Council of the Republic of Georgia led by the ethnic Georgian ex-Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Eduard Shevardnadze.

Once again, tensions began to fuel in Abkhazia. The Abkhaz separatist politicians led by Ardzinba were determined to use the opportunity of the unrest in Georgia to reinforce their power in the region and not to allow either of the conflicting Georgian parties to gain a foothold in Abkhazia. In violation of the previous power-sharing agreement, the Abkhaz team gradually began to take control of all major posts in the autonomous structures. An internal division within the Georgian faction did not allow the Georgians to effectively counter these moves.

By summer 1992, the split-up in the local authorities and public institutions of Abkhazia into ethnic Georgian and ethnic Abkhaz groups created a kind of dual authority in the autonomous republic. The predominantly ethnic Georgian members of the Supreme Council – the “Democratic Abkhazia” faction headed by Tamaz Nadareishvili – blamed Ardzinba and his team for raising ethnic tensions in the region and boycotted the Council’s sessions. In the aftermath, a number of Georgian laws were nullified in Abkhazia and a paramilitary force, the Abkhaz National Guard, was created and placed directly under the command of the Presidium of the Abkhazian Supreme Council. The ethnic Georgians responded to these measures by requesting from the central Georgian government to take additional measures for their defense.

Soon a Georgian National Guard detachment under the command of Colonel Giorgi Karkarashvili entered Abkhazia and proceeded to the northern border with Russia, but the unprepared Abkhaz militias avoided offering any resistance and the Georgian force left the region. This demonstration of force proved to be ineffective, however. In a counter-move, on June 24, 1992, the Abkhaz National Guard, under orders from Ardzinba, stormed the Abkhazian Interior Ministry office, which was headed by ethnic Georgians, and took control of local police and security units.

At the same time, the Abkhaz separatists secured the assistance from the Confederation in the case of an armed conflict, and intensified their contacts with the Russian military leaders and hardliner politicians. Prior to that, Ardzinba had arranged for the redeployment of a Russian Airborne battalion from the Baltic States to Sokhumi. According to the Russian historian Svetlana Chervonnaya, a number of Russian security servicemen arrived in Abkhazia as "tourists" during that summer.

According to another Russian expert, Evgeni Kozhokin, director of the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies, prior to the outbreak of hostilities, Abkhaz guardsmen had been supplied with weaponry by Russia’s 643rd anti-aircraft missile regiment and a military unit stationed in Gudauta, Abkhazia. Ardzinba had major supporters in Moscow as well, particularly among the hardliner right-wing circles, including Vice President Alexander Rutskoy and the Chechen speaker of the Russian State Duma, Ruslan Khasbulatov. It should also be noted, that just before the conflict, Georgia also received its limited share of the heritage of the former Soviet military under the Tashkent Agreement of May 15 1992.

At the same time, Ardzinba’s rhetoric mounted, as he claimed that Abkhazia would ready to fight Georgia. In the breach of the 1990 agreement, he initiated a practice of replacing ethnic Georgian officials with Abkhaz, frequently accompanied by violence and humiliation.

On July 23, 1992, the ethnic Abkhaz members of the Supreme Council – twenty eight of the sixty-five deputies - abrogated Abkhazia's functioning constitution and restored the 1925 constitution of the Abkhazian SSR. Abkhazia proclaimed itself a sovereign state, the Republic of Abkhazia, and declared its intention to conduct its relations with Georgia on the parity basis. The Georgian government condemned the decision and Abkhazia's Georgian population went on strike. The region was on the verge of the war.

On August 14, 1992, some 3,000 Georgian National Guard troops and police forces under Tengiz Kitovani entered Abkhazia, their official purpose being the protection of rail communications from Gamsakhurdia’s supporters operating in the region and gain the release of several Georgian governmental officials, including Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Kavsadze, who had been detained by the deposed president’s forces. Abkhaz leaders claimed this was in violation of the agreement of April 1992 whereby Georgian troops could enter Abkhazia with the permission of the Abkhazian government. Although the local Abkhazian authorities had already disintegrated, Shevardnadze still informed Ardzinba about the forthcoming "anti-terrorist operation." However, when Kitovani’s force moved to Sokhumi, the Abkhaz National Guards offered resistance, firing on the Georgian echelons at Ochamchire and Sokhumi. The Abkhaz militias were defeated and they engaged into a scattered guerilla actions. The Georgian forces entered Sokhumi and marched up to the Russian border, forcing the separatist government to leave, on August 18, Sokhumi for Gudauta, which was a home to the Soviet-era Russian military base. Ardzinba declared Gudauta Abkhazia's "temporary capital" and called in the North Caucasian Confederates to interfere.

The Abkhazians' military defeat was met with a hostile response by the self-styled Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, an umbrella group uniting a number of pro-Russian movements in the North Caucasus, Russia (Chechens, Cossacks, Ossetians and others). Hundreds of volunteer paramilitaries from Russia (including the then little known Shamil Basayev) joined forces with the Abkhazian separatists to fight the Georgian government forces.

Regular Russian forces also reportedly sided with the secessionsts. In September, the Abkhaz and Russian paramilitaries mounted a major offensive after breaking a cease-fire, which drove the Georgian forces out of large swathes of the republic. Shevardnadze's government accused Russia of giving covert military support to the rebels with the aim of "detaching from Georgia its native territory and the Georgia-Russian frontier land". The year 1992 ended with the rebels in control of much of Abkhazia northwest of Sokhumi.

In March 1993, the anti-Georgian coalition forces launched mass offensive against Georgian-held Sokhumi, accompanied by heavy civilian casualties. The attackers were actively supported by the regular Russian navy and aviation. The Russian Defense Minister Grachev claimed that the Georgians bombed themselves in order to cast a shadow on Russian military. Shortly after this absurd statement, Georgian army brought down a Russian jet piloted by Major Shipko of Russian Air Force, a fact that was confirmed by international observers who investigated the incident. The March offensive turned a disaster to the separatists and their allies. The Georgian artillery destroyed their major military group at the Gumista River. The Abkhaz-North Caucasian forces exhausted and faced an imminent catastrophe. However, under Msocow’s strong pressure Georgian government was forced to sign a truce.

The conflict remained stalemated until July 1993, when the Abkhaz separatist militias launched yet another abortive attack on Sokhumi. The capital was surrounded and heavily shelled, with Shevardnadze himself trapped in the city. Although the Georgian army retained control of the city, the situation was very dangerous as many of the surrounding settlements had been captured by the Abkhaz.

Although a truce was declared at the end of July, this collapsed after a renewed Abkhaz attack in mid-September. Most of Georgian hardware, under the Russian supervision, had already been withdrawn from Sokhumi, and the defenders of the city found themselves undermanned. At the same time, all equipment ceded by the Abkhaz militants to the Russian mission as part of the ceasefire accord, were returned back to the separatists. After ten days of heavy fighting, Sokhumi fell on 27 September, 1993. Eduard Shevardnadze narrowly escaped death, having vowed to stay in the city no matter what, but he was eventually forced to flee when separatist snipers fired on the hotel where he was residing. Abkhaz, North Caucasians militants and their allies committed one of the most horrific massacres[16] of this war against remaining Georgian civilians in the city known as Sokhumi Massacre. The mass killings and destruction continued for two weeks, leaving thousands dead and missing.

The separatist forces quickly overran the rest of Abkhazia as the Georgian government faced a second threat: an uprising by the supporters of the deposed Zviad Gamsakhurdia in the region of Mingrelia (Samegrelo). In the chaotic aftermath of defeat almost all ethnic Georgian population fled the region by sea or over the mountains escaping a large-scale ethnic cleansing initiated by the victors. Many thousands died — it is estimated that between 10,000-30,000 ethnic Georgians and 3,000 ethnic Abkhaz may have perished — and some 250,000 people were forced into exile.

During the war, gross human rights violations were reported on the both sides (see Human Rights Watch report[17]), and the ethnic cleansing committed by the Abkhaz forces and their allies is recognised by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Summits in Budapest (1994)[18], Lisbon (1996)[19] and Istanbul (1999)[20]

Georgia conflict: Pro-Kremlin enclaves surround Russian borders

A necklace of pro-Kremlin enclaves around Russia's fringe stands at the forefront of Moscow's rearguard efforts to fend off encroachment from the West.

By Damien McElroy, Foreign Affairs correspondent
Last Updated: 12:55PM BST 09 Aug 2008

The origins of Russia's fight to control the "near abroad" goes back to the 19th century Tsarist expansion, but since 1991 a handful of statelets have sheltered under the Kremlin's wing and perpetuated the toxic legacy of the Soviet break-up.

The enclave of South Ossetia in Georgia sought Russian protection as far back as 1993. The Kremlin's troops, officially designated as peacekeepers, have since unofficially preserved the autonomy of a 70,000-strong population, more than 90 per cent Russian passport holders.

Georgia's attempts to join Nato made conflict over South Ossetia inevitable. Russia's determination to check the Atlantic alliance's eastern expansion has pitched an obscure power struggle to the centre of the global spotlight.

Observers had originally expected the flashpoint to arise in another Georgian enclave, Abkhazia on the Black Sea. A low level war of bombings and targetted assassinations recently stoked tensions with Tblisi, forcing the closure of all border crossings at the end of June.

Last month US State Secretary Condoleezza Rice used a visit to Georgia to warn Moscow to stop destablising the country's young democracy. She said: "It needs to be a part of resolving the problem and solving the problem and not contributing to it."

From the Russian perspective, the US-backed government of President Mikhail Saakashvili has already made disturbing advances since it came to power in a democratic Rose Revolution in 2003. Moscow effectively lost a third enclave, Adjaria - it had been an autonomous spot on the Turkish border - soon after Mr Saakashvili took power.

Grouped together, there are 10 separate pockets of frozen conflicts straddling both sides of the Russian border in the Caucuses. But the Russian campaign to maintain external influence stretches far beyond the troubled network of clans and tribes of the Caucasian mountains.

Along with South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, there is Crimea in the Ukraine, Transdniester in Moldova, Narva in Estonia, and eastern areas of Latvia. All still retain strong links with Moscow, while the greater European nations which they belong have forged ties with the European Union and NATO. The causes for the fault lines are historical and varied, but most of the enclaves are home to substantial populations of ethnic Russian speakers. Many moved there during the Soviet period of "Russification", when Moscow, seeking to ensure its political influence over its satellite republics, despatched large numbers of Russian settlers who then dominated economic and political life.

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the tables then turned, and the Russian-speakers found themselves minority populations in countries that by then wanted nothing to with Moscow ever again. For much of the 1990s, Russia's descent into chaos meant they looked like becoming historical irrelevances, but as Moscow has regained strength again thanks to the oil boom, they have become pawns in the Kremlin's bid to re-assert its territorial influence.

As well as the garrisons of Russian "peacekeeping" troops in the likes of Ossetia and Transdniester, Moscow has also encouraged the growth of organised pro-Kremlin youth movements, Red-hued version of the successive Rose and Orange Revolutions that saw Ukraine and Georgia break decisively from Russia grip in 2003 and 2004. Such movements are there to provide willing rent-a-mobs of agitators whenever the Kremlin deems it necessary, such as last year, when Russian-speaking youths rioted in Estonia over plans to remove a Soviet war memorial. The pointed message to all nations in Russia's "near-abroad" is that ethnic tensions remain a powerful trumpcard that Moscow is always willing to play.

SECURITY COUNCIL CONSULTS ON GEORGIA RESOLUTION

New York, Feb 10 2009  7:10PM
The Security Council today held consultations on a draft resolution on the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) whose mandate expires at the weekend, with the Council president voicing confidence that a new resolution would be adopted by then.

“I am very confident that the formal adoption will be taking place before the end of the week,” Ambassador Yukio Takasu of Japan, Council President for February, told reporters afterwards.

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon told the Council last week that <"http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unomig/">UNOMIG, which has been patrolling both sides of the ceasefire line between the Georgian Government and Abkhaz separatists in the country’s north-west since the end of fighting there 15 years ago, is in a “precarious” position which could quickly become untenable.

“There have been a considerable number of security incidents involving casualties on both sides and what little communication there was between the sides has largely broken down,” he said in a report, warning that “a further deterioration of the situation cannot be excluded.”

On the Abkhaz-controlled side of the ceasefire line, Russian troops have taken over positions previously held by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) peacekeeping forces, on which UNOMIG relied for security. Abkhaz heavy weapons and military personnel have entered the zone of conflict, he wrote.

For more details go to UN News Centre at http://www.un.org/news

Georgia-Russia conflict

Conflict in Abkhazia, which is located in a strategic position in the Black Sea (in the North-west region of the Republic of Georgia), began with social unrest and efforts of the local Authorities to separate the area from the Republic of Georgia; the whole situation resulted in an armed conflict and a series of serious incidents in the summer of 1992, when the Government of Georgia sent 2.000 men to Abkhazia to restore order. The conflict was vigorous, with 200 being killed and hundreds wounded. The leadership of Abkhazia withdrew from the capital, Sukhumi, to Gudauta City.

Following the 858/1993 U.N. Security Council Resolution, dated on the 24^th of August 1993, the U.N. Observers Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) was established to observe and verify whether the signatories complied with the Agreement on the separation of forces, signed in Moscow on the 14^th of May 1994. The task of the Mission is to:

• Investigate whether the Armistice Agreement, dated on the 27^th of July 1993, between the Government of Georgia and the Authorities of Abkhazia is implemented, with particular emphasis on the situation in Sukhumi city.
• Consider reports of violations of armistice between the parties.
• Submit a Report on U.N. Mandate implementation to the Secretary General, including violations of the Armistice Agreement

The initial strength of the Force amounted to 88 Military Observers from the following countries: Egypt, Albania, Austria, France, Germany, Denmark, Switzerland, Greece, USA, UK, Indonesia, Jordan, Korea, Bangladesh, Hungary, Ukraine, Uruguay, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Sweden, Turkey, and the Czech Republic.

Since the 5^th of September 1994, Greece has allocated five (5) cadres (two (2) from the Army, two (2) from the Navy and one (1) from the Air Force) to the Mission.

Following a U.N. demand that was accepted by the Hellenic MOD, a Transportation contingent was established for the area, consisting of 15 cadres, one (1) command vehicle and five (5) general purpose vehicles. This team will be sent to Georgia, if necessary, following a U.N. mandate.