The 1992-93 Georgia-Abkhazia War: A Forgotten Conflict

Alexandros Petersen is Southeast Europe Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and Adjunct Fellow with the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. He concurrently serves as Senior Associate Scholar with the Center for European Policy Analysis.

Abstract

The 1992-93 Georgia-Abkhazia War, in which ethnic Abkhazians effectively extracted northwestern Georgia from Tbilisi’s control, is a conflict largely forgotten in the West, despite its high profile re-ignition in August 2008. Historical arguments can be made both for Abkhazia’s unity and autonomy from Georgia, but the conflict cannot be solely blamed on Soviet ‘ethno-federalism’. It must, however, be understood within the context of Georgian independence. Ethnic tension between Abkhazians and Georgians was a necessary but not sufficient cause for the conflict. It took an unstable transition in Moscow, and chaotic Russian involvement in the run-up to the conflict, to turn tension into violence. Russia’s one-sided role in ending hostilities meant that the conflict’s causal issues were left frozen, only to be violently thawed fifteen years later.

Keywords: Georgia, Abkhazia, Russia, ethnic conflict, Caucasus

Introduction

As one of many conflicts precipitated by the breakup of the Soviet Union, the 1992-93 conflict between Georgia and the region of Abkhazia distinguishes itself as one of the bloodiest, most consequential and most unresolved. It caused tens of thousands of casualties and led to the displacement of about 250,000 people.[1] It is a dispute that persisted without major incident as a ‘frozen conflict’ until 2008, when large-scale Russian military intervention across Georgia re-ignited hostilities and led to Moscow’s unilateral recognition of Abkhazia as an independent state.

The following article posits that the 1992-93 Georgia-Abkhazia War is what can be termed as a ‘forgotten conflict’. Therefore, the paper will attempt to explain the context surrounding the war, explore the dynamics of the politics and the ‘fighting’ of the conflict by looking at the roles of the three main groups involved: Georgians, Abkhazians and Russians, and craft an argument throughout for why the war took place when it did. Although the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict is still unresolved, this paper will focus on the events leading up to, and the ‘initial violent phase’, namely from August 1992 to October 1993.[2]

According to the Red Cross, the conflict claimed between 10,000 and 15,000 lives and left over 8000 wounded.[3] Other sources, emphasizing ethnic cleansing, cite the figure for deaths as between 25,000 and 30,000.[4] Yet other conflicts during this period, such as the wars in the former Yugoslavia, have received much more attention, popularly and academically, than the 1992-93 Georgia-Abkhazia War. Apart from a handful of specialist works, centered around the same group of scholars, analysis of the war available in English is limited to unprofessional and highly biased accounts from one side or the other. In the United States and Western Europe at least, there is little, if any popular knowledge about the war. Therefore, it would seem appropriate to label the 1992-93 Georgia-Abkhazia conflict a ‘forgotten conflict’.

Two major reasons account for the lack of knowledge and absence of mainstream study of the conflict: there was little coverage of events during the conflict, and there has been little exploration of the conflict since. In contrast, the comparatively brief developments of the August 2008 re-ignition of the war were broadcast as rolling news on the BBC, CNN and other international outlets, while the significance of Russia’s intervention led to a global debate on the limits of Western integration in the Black Sea and Caspian regions. Even then, academic and popular historians largely neglected the initial conflict for a number of reasons. It is seen by many as yet another confusing ethnic conflict in a confusing part of the world. As the noted historian of Georgia Ronald Suny observed, ‘From afar the ethnic and civil warfare in Georgia often looks to casual observers like the latest eruption of “ancient tribal conflicts” or irradicable primordial hatreds’.[5] Others view the 1992-93 war as an internal Georgian issue that never became heinous enough to warrant international concern or as an issue to be discussed only in the context of the ‘Russian orbit’.

Part of the reason for this neglect comes from the conflict occurring at the same time as tumultuous events in Moscow and other parts of the just-broken-up Soviet Union. However, for those involved, the 1992-93 war is far from forgotten, not least because a resolution has not yet been found. A 1999 Red Cross study found that 90 percent of Abkhazians and 42 percent of Georgians say they experienced ‘negative effects’ of the conflict, including the killing or rape of relatives, the looting or destruction of homes, or being taken prisoner.[6] Therefore, the 1992-93 Georgia-Abkhazia War can more accurately be described as a ‘forgotten conflict’ for those in the U.S., or more broadly, the ‘West’, but certainly not for those in the region.

Context

In exploring the 1992-93 Georgia-Abkhazia War, it is important to avoid a common fault of many examinations of obscure conflicts, that is, diving right in and drawing conclusions without having understood the wider context into which the war fits. When considering an ethnic conflict in a region with a history as rich and complex as that of the Caucasus, it is especially necessary to understand the conflict’s background in order to understand the conflict itself. Accordingly, the first section of this paper will focus on the history behind the conflict; the situation, ethnic and otherwise, in the region before the conflict; and the immediate events leading up to the conflict.

For many in the U.S. and Western Europe - even after the events of August 2008 - Georgia, in the South Caucasus, south of Russia and north of Armenia, is an obscure country. Even more obscure for those unfamiliar with the region are Georgia’s breakaway territories: Abkhazia in the northwest, South Ossetia in the north, and until 2004, Ajaria in the southwest. Ethnically distinct, Abkhazia and South Ossetia managed to effectively secede from Georgia through separate wars in the early 1990s. Since then, they existed with most of the governmental trappings of independent state-lets, including parliaments, presidents and militaries, and administrated their own affairs with significant Russian support, divorced from Tbilisi’s control.[7] This situation was maintained largely due to Russian ‘peacekeepers’ on their ‘borders’ with Georgia. After Russia’s military intervention in Georgia in August 2008, the ‘peacekeeping’ contingents in both territories were significantly augmented and, in Moscow’s terminology, shifted to a status of forces hosted by the so-called independent states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Historically, Georgia has had within its borders a number of regionally-tied ethnic minority groups, including Armenians, Avars, Azeris, Greeks, Ossetians, Russians and Abkhazians.[8] It was this situation that led the Soviet physicist and dissident, Andrei Sakharov, to describe Georgia as a ‘little empire’, just before the Abkhaz war.[9] In 1989, ethnic Georgians made up 70.1% of the population of Georgia, or the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR), while ethnic Abkhazians made up only 1.8%.[10] In what was then the Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR), ethnic Georgians made up 45.7% of the population, while Abkhazians only numbered 17.8%.[11] The remainder of the population of Abkhazia was largely made up of Armenians, Greeks and Russians.

Abkhazians have historically had a nebulous relationship with Georgians and Russians. Since early Byzantine times, Georgianized Abkhaz princes ruled their region with varying degrees of autonomy.[12] Although the Abkhaz language was linguistically distinct from Georgian, related to the languages of North Caucasian peoples such as the Circassians, Georgian was the official language of governance and the nobility.[13] As Byzantium’s control slipped in the 9th Century, the rulers of the Abkhaz Kingdom began efforts to unify their dynasty with that of their Georgian neighbours. In 1001 the royal lines were combined, creating what is known as the unified Georgian Kingdom. This entity lasted until the 16th Century when the Ottomans established suzerainty over the area that is modern Abkhazia.[14]

Until the late 17th Century, however, when the Ottomans began converting the Abkhazians to Islam, the Abkhaz princes remained mostly influenced by Georgian culture and political affinities. As Georgians and Russians fought the Ottomans and their Muslim allies in the North Caucasus in the ensuing centuries, many Abkhazians routinely shifted between Muslim identities and Orthodox Christian identities, as the politics of the day required.[15] Even during the Ottoman period, various Abkhaz princes were either unified with or served as vassals to different Georgian princes.[16] So, as Alexei Zverev puts it, ‘both unity with Georgia and autonomy can be argued on historical grounds’.[17]

The Abkhazians became a minority in their own land through waves of mass emigration to the Ottoman Empire in the 19th Century, as Russia slowly took control of the Caucasus.[18] After failed anti-Russian rebellions in 1866 and 1878, Abkhazians all but disappeared from the Abkhaz capital, Sukhumi.[19] The majority of Abkhazians still live outside of their homeland, most of them in Turkey and the Middle East.[20] In March 1921, Abkhazia was given the status of an independent Soviet Socialist Republic within the USSR, but was joined with Georgia in a treaty of union later in the year. In 1931, Abkhazia’s status was ‘demoted’ to that of an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic within Georgia.[21] Under Stalin’s rule, Georgians were forcibly resettled in ‘empty’ parts of Abkhazia, leading to Abkhaz fears of losing their homeland. Abkhaz leaders petitioned Moscow in 1956, 1967 and 1978 to sever Abkhazia’s connection to Georgia and incorporate it into Russia.[22]

Tension between Georgians and Abkhazians simmered in the 1970s as Moscow pressured Tbilisi to push Abkhaz farmers to lower prices for their fruit and wines, famous throughout the Soviet Union.[23] Instead of granting separation from Georgia in response to Abkhaz petitions and complaints, however, Moscow gradually increased preferential policies toward the Abkhazians, so that by 1988, the minority Abkhaz lived better than the average Georgian, held most of the powerful positions in Abkhazia and even had their own television and radio stations, independent of Tbilisi.[24] This situation led to Georgian resentment of Moscow’s treatment of the Abkhazians and increased ethnic tension.[25]

It is developments such as these that have led analysts such as Christoph Zurcher to assert that the ‘mechanism of Soviet ethno-federalism’ is responsible for the Georgia-Abkhazia war, as well as the several other ethnically-based conflicts that broke out in the former Soviet space.[26] Zurcher argues that although the Armenian and Azeri minority populations in Georgia were substantially bigger than the Abkhaz and Ossetian groups, the former two did not seek independence from Tbilisi’s control because the Soviet federal system had delineated regional autonomy, and the identity and symbolism that came with it, for only the Abkhaz and Ossetians, not for the other minorities in Georgia.[27] This argument, however, ignores the broader historical picture. The Soviet ethno-federal system, for the most part reflected the ethnic realities of the region, in place centuries before the USSR. Furthermore, the Armenians and Azeris in Georgia could be seen as ‘spill-over’ populations from their respective neighboring sovereign homelands. Many returned to Armenia and Azerbaijan during the periods of strife in Georgia. Other large minority groups, such as the Avars in north-eastern Georgia were ‘traded’, under an agreement with Daghestan, for Georgians living in that Russian autonomous region.[28] The Abkhazians, however, had no such option of ‘return’. Their historical geographic homeland was entirely within Georgia.

Similarly, in his paper comparing the breakaway areas of Abkhazia and Ajaria, Georgi Derluguian claims that Abkhazia was destined to secede from Georgia, while Ajaria was not, because, due to the Soviet policy of demarcating ethnic distinction based on language rather than religion, Moscow had deemed the former, but not the latter, worthy of a distinct identity.[29] Again, this argument ignores the basic ethnic realities of the Caucasus. The Abkhazians are a distinct ethnicity, linked linguistically and culturally to peoples of the North Caucasus, such as the Chechens.[30] The Ajarians are an ethnic Georgian sub-group (of which there are at least seventeen), their main contemporary distinction being that the majority are Muslim, converted by the Ottomans.[31] As will be discussed below, the Abkhaz link to the North Caucasus played an important part in the events of the 1992-93 conflict.

Historically, in fact, it seems that ethnic problems in Georgia, and specifically between the Georgians and Abkhazians, were exacerbated when leadership in Moscow underwent a period of transition or significant policy shift. Ethnic tensions increased in the period immediately following the 1917 Russian Revolution and at times in the 1970s during detente.[32] The break-up of the Soviet Union and the summer of 2008 presented other such periods of transition or policy shift – in the latter case, a full-scale intervention in Georgia not long after Vladimir Putin handed over the Russian presidential reins to Dmitri Medvedev.

The following examination will reveal that the 1992-93 Georgia-Abkhazia war was inextricably tied to the wider political and military events surrounding Georgian independence. Therefore, in order to accurately understand the war in question, this paper examines developments in Georgia during and after the break-up of the Soviet Union, as well as the events of the civil war in Georgia that occurred simultaneously, between January 1992 and November 1993. In an attempt to keep the focus on the Abkhaz war, this paper will not extensively address the events of the Georgian war with South Ossetia, which ended in July 1992, a month before the beginning of the war in Abkhazia.

As the consequences of Gorbachev’s policies of perestroika and glasnost tore at its seams, the Soviet Union began to disintegrate in the late 1980s. In 1988, emboldened young lower-level communist officials and intellectuals in both Abkhazia and Georgia began organizing nationalist political campaigns, frequently directed against each other.[33] In June 1988, fifty-eight Abkhaz officials sent a letter to the Nineteenth Party Congress in Moscow, demanding support for secession from Georgia.[34] As the Georgian nationalist movement grew, the Georgian Communist Party, struggling to stay in power, published a series of ‘Georgianization’ laws beginning in December 1988, including the ‘State Program for the Georgian Language’, which replaced Russian with Georgian as the public sector language and established a Georgian language test for higher education.[35] This was a direct slight towards Abkhazians, most of whom did not speak Georgian.[36

On March 18, 1989, a mass assembly of 30,000 Abkhaz separatists, including over 5000 Armenians, Greeks, Russians and some ethnic Georgians met at the village of Lykhny, the historical seat of Abkhazia’s princes. Here they signed a declaration demanding the restoration of Abkhazia’s 1925 constitution, upgrading its status to a sovereign Soviet Republic, effectively seceding from Georgia.[37] The publication of this declaration in local newspapers immediately sparked furious anti-Abkhazian mass demonstrations in Tbilisi. Many of those who took part were ethnic Georgians living in Abkhazia, but as they continued for weeks, the demonstrations began to take on a wider, pro-independence character.[38] What had initially begun as a rally against Abkhaz secession from Georgia, turned into a rally for Georgian secession from the Soviet Union. This mixture of sentiments would characterize much of the developments to come.

On 9 April, 1989, Soviet troops waded into the mass of demonstrators in Tbilisi, attacking them with sharpened digging tools and toxic gas.[39] Nineteen people were killed, mostly young women, and hundreds were injured. Fearing they would be overthrown, the Georgian Communist leadership had asked Moscow for aid in putting down the demonstrators. The 9 April ‘Tbilisi massacre’ is viewed as the event that tipped the scales in favour of Georgian independence.[40] Many would contend that from here, the nationalist movement and conflict with Abkhazia were irreversible.

Meanwhile, Abkhaz demonstrations were decidedly pro-Soviet, and Abkhaz leaders tried to ‘project an image of loyal Soviet citizens resisting anticommunist Georgian nationalism’, by lobbying Moscow for support.[41] In July of 1989, the first inter-ethnic violence erupted in Abkhazia. The Georgian faculty at Sukhumi University refused to work with the Abkhaz and Russian faculties and established a separate branch of Tbilisi State University, which was then attacked by Abkhaz nationalists, resulting in 16 deaths.[42] As what became known as ‘Tbilisi syndrome’ gripped the Soviet leadership in Moscow, Georgia was left to its own devices, and the so-called ‘war of laws’ ensued between the Georgian Supreme Soviet and its Abkhaz counterpart.[43]

In concessions following the 9 April massacre, the Georgian Supreme Soviet released Zviad Gamsakhurdia, a longtime Soviet dissident and Georgian nationalist leader, originally from Mingrelia, a Georgian province bordering Abkhazia from which most of the Georgians in Abkhazia also originated.[44] In November 1989, the body officially condemned Soviet Russia’s annexation of Georgia in 1921 and announced that it would not recognize any Soviet law that contravened Georgian interests.[45] In March 1990, it declared Georgia a sovereign nation and legalized opposition parties.[46] In response, the Abkhaz Supreme Soviet declared Abkhazia to be a sovereign union republic within the Soviet Union.[47] In turn, a rail blockade led by Gamsakhurdia’s nationalist group pressured the Georgian Supreme Soviet to adopt a law outlawing regionally-based parties for the upcoming Georgian parliamentary election, effectively eliminating Abkhazia and South Ossetia from play.[48]

28 October, 1990 saw victory for Gamsakhurdia’s nationalist group in Georgia’s first parliamentary elections free of Soviet control. Gamsakhurdia was elected chairman of the Supreme Soviet and made it clear that his intention was to lead Georgia to full independence and to deal with Abkhazia and South Ossetia as he saw fit.[49] In December 1990, Vladislav Ardzinba, a hard-line Abkhaz separatist, (who remained ‘president’ of Abkhazia until 2005), was elected chairman of the Abkhaz Supreme Soviet, and the body moved to hold separate parliamentary elections for Abkhazia.[50] In March 1991, with war raging between Georgia and seceding South Ossetia, Gamsakhurdia proclaimed Ardzinba a traitor and tool of Moscow, but had almost no effective control over Abkhazia.[51]

That same month, Abkhazians participated in the Soviet referendum on whether to preserve the unity of the state, while Georgians were forbidden to do so by the Tbilisi government.[52] In response, Gamsakhurdia threatened to abolish Abkhaz autonomy, and by extension its Supreme Soviet, while Ardzinba countered by arranging for a Russian airborne assault battalion to deploy in Sukhumi.[53] The stage was set for violent conflict. On 9 April, 1991, exactly two years after the Tbilisi massacre, the Georgian parliament declared Georgia fully independent. A month later, in an election boycotted by the Abkhazians, Gamsakhurdia became president of the new Georgia, with 86.5 percent of the vote.[54]

Perhaps due to Ardzinba’s new close relationship with Russian commanders in the area, as well as increasing pressure from political rivals in Tbilisi, not to mention war in South Ossetia, Gamsakhurdia decided to attempt a compromise with the Abkhaz separatists. In August 1991, a power-sharing deal was reached for the makeup of the new Abkhaz parliament based on ethnic quotas, where ethnic Abkhaz, 17.8% of the population, were guaranteed 28 of the 65 seats, while ethnic Georgians, 45.7% of Abkhazia’s population, were guaranteed only 26 seats.[55] Tbilisi’s support for this configuration would not last, however, as Gamsakhurdia’s erratic policies led to the mutiny of the Georgian National Guard he had created for the war in South Ossetia. In December 1991, five hundred National Guard soldiers laid siege to the parliament building in Tbilisi, forcing Gamsakhurdia into exile.[56]

To gain legitimacy, the new forces in power invited former Soviet foreign minister and Georgian party boss, Eduard Shevardnadze to lead the transitional State Council.[57] Shortly after, Gamsakhurdia slipped back into Georgia, to Mingrelia, where forces loyal to him, the so-called ‘Zviadists’, began an insurgency in the Georgian province bordering Abkhazia.[58] Expecting war at any moment, Ardzinba and the Abkhaz leadership continued to collect allies wherever they could. In addition to cultivating local Russian commanders, the Abkhaz reached out to the Council of Russian Cossacks and the newly formed ‘Confederation of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus’, an unofficial parliament and military organization of various related ethnic groups in the North Caucasus, including Circassians, Ossetians and Chechens.[59] Ardzinba also traveled to Turkey to try to garner support, but returned empty-handed.[60]

In May 1992, Georgian deputies in the Abkhaz parliament began boycotting proceedings, complaining of discrimination. This was followed by a Georgian strike in Sukhumi and an attack by Abkhazia’s National Guard on the Abkhaz Ministry of Internal Affairs, the last outpost of Tbilisi’s authority in the region.[61] After an increase in Russian support for secessionists in South Ossetia, including Russian helicopter attacks on Georgian villages, Shevardnadze was forced into a cease-fire in July 1992.[62] On 23 July, the Abkhaz Supreme Soviet passed a resolution, without the participation of the Georgian deputies, restoring the 1925 Abkhaz constitution and Abkhazia’s status as a sovereign republic within what was then the Soviet Union.[63] Then, on 11 August, a high-ranking delegation from Tbilisi, including the minister of the interior and the national security advisor, was kidnapped by Gamsakhurdia’s forces in Mingrelia while trying to negotiate with them.[64] It was alleged that the hostages were taken into Abkhazia. On 14 August, 1992, full-blown violent conflict broke out between the Abkhaz National Guard and the Georgian National Guard, sent to Abkhazia ostensibly to retrieve the hostages.[65]

War

Instead of looking for hostages, Georgian tanks rolled into Sukhumi and engaged with Abkhaz forces defending the city. It is thought that Abkhaz forces fired on Georgians first at the village of Ilovi, 50 kilometers outside the capital.[66] The Georgian government claimed that it had notified Ardzinba of Georgian plans to enter Abkhazia, but he denied this.[67] Depending on the source, between 2000 and 5000 Georgian National Guard troops crossed the border and headed for Sukhumi, while another 1000 troops landed in Gagra, in northwestern Abkhazia, to seal off the border with Russia.[68] Abkhaz resistance proved much stiffer than anticipated and heavy fighting broke out in and around Sukhumi.

However, a cease-fire was negotiated on 15 August while Russian troops evacuated tourists from the resorts along the Black Sea and Georgian forces withdrew from Sukhumi.[69] On 18 August full hostilities resumed and Georgian forces re-took Sukhumi, forcing Ardzinba and the separatist Abkhaz leadership to flee to Gudauta, the site of a Russian base in western Abkhazia.[70] Georgian National Guard units occupied the Abkhaz parliament and a military administrative council of 8 officers was set up.[71] Shevardnadze declared on television that, ‘Now we can say that Georgian authority has been restored throughout the entire territory of the republic’.[72]

Achieving that goal was to prove slightly more difficult. If any tactical objectives are to be ascribed to the Georgian operation, they seem to have been to secure the main northwest-to-southeast road running through Abkhazia and to seal off the mountain passes to the North Caucasus.[73] These objectives were never met, resulting in a resilient Abkhaz resistance able to move about the territory, as well as a steady stream of North Caucasian fighters moving southwards to supplement it, over 1000 by September 1992.[74] On 3 September, talks between Shevardnadze, Yeltsin and Ardzinba were held in Moscow where the Abkhaz leader signed a document authorizing the presence of Georgian troops in Abkhazia. The talks fell through, however, when Abkhaz forces recaptured Gagra in October 1992.[75]

As hostilities continued, the conduct of undisciplined forces on both sides towards civilians grew worse. Villages were routinely looted and burned, and civilians were slaughtered or taken hostage.[76] Troop numbers swelled, as both sides enacted emergency conscription measures and a host of ‘volunteers’, from Transnistrian Russians to Islamist terrorist Shamil Basayev’s ‘Chechen Battalion’, joined the Abkhaz cause.[77] Groups of bandits, some tied to one or more of the several sides involved, roamed remote areas with impunity. As another attempted cease-fire fell apart in November 1992, Abkhaz forces began shelling Sukhumi.[78] In February 1993, the situation grew chaotic, as Gamsakhurdia’s Zviadist insurgents began raids on the Georgian rear and Russian planes bombed Sukhumi.[79] Early July 1993 saw an amphibious landing of Abkhaz forces near Sukhumi and a renewed attack on the city, prompting Zviadist fighters to come to the aid of regular Georgian forces.[80]

On 27 July, another Russian-brokered cease-fire was signed by the belligerent parties in Sochi, just across the Russian border, that led to the withdrawal of Georgian troops from positions in Abkhazia. Thinking the conflict was over, Georgian civilians returned to Sukhumi, while Georgian troops staggered back into Mingrelia, many of them joining Gamsakhurdia’s insurgency.[81] As Zviadist attacks on regular Georgian and Abkhaz forces grew in early September 1993, the Abkhaz forces launched their largest offensive of the war, breaking the terms of the cease-fire and capturing Sukhumi on 27 September.[82] Shevardnadze’s pleas for Russian help produced only condemnation and nominal sanctions of the Abkhazians, as they routed the remaining Georgian forces and drove some 200,000 Georgian civilians across the Inguri River into Georgia proper.[83]

The Georgian civil war continued through October and November of 1993, as Zviadist forces captured the Black Sea port of Poti and blocked food supplies from reaching Tbilisi. Fearing the complete dismemberment of Georgia, Shevardnadze enlisted Russian support to quell the insurgency.[84] It is thought that around this time, as Georgian forces surrounded a remote hamlet in Mingrelia, Zviad Gamsakhuria died in mysterious circumstances.[85] The consequences of Russian support were that Georgia had to join the Commonwealth of Independent States, effectively re-entering the Russian orbit, and negotiate basing agreements allowing Russian troops to remain on Georgian soil.[86]

Russia’s Role

So far, this article has looked at the entire time period targeted. However, the analysis has focused mainly on the Abkhaz and Georgian roles in the 1992-93 war. As it has been alluded, however, Russia played a significant role in the conflict in a variety of ways. It was mentioned earlier that historically, increased ethnic strife in the Caucasus coincided with periods of transition or policy shift in Moscow. Dmitri Trenin seems to bolster this assertion when he posits that the 1992-93 Georgia-Abkhazia war took place during a period of transition in Russian foreign policy, from a rejection of ‘empire-building’ and a view towards Western integration in 1991, to a reassertion of geopolitical concerns and a traditional view of control in Russia’s ‘near abroad’ by 1993.[87]

In general, as Trenin observes, during the Abkhaz war, ‘Russia’s aim appears to have been to try to restore its influence throughout the region, on all sides, in every conflict, in order to prevent developments from slipping out of control and so opening the floodgates to outside interference’.[88] However, although Russian elements were involved on all sides of the conflict, the amount of control Moscow exerted over their actions is unclear. Local Russian military commanders certainly had a personal stake in the war: to protect their sanatoria and dachas in Abkhazia.[89]

In her comprehensive examination of Russia’s role in the conflict, Oksana Antonenko reveals that before the Georgian National Guard initially moved into Abkhazia in August 1992, Russian units in the region transferred substantial amounts of military hardware to the Georgians, including over 100 tanks.[90] It seems that Yeltsin and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs were sympathetic towards Shevardnadze’s efforts, while Defense Ministry officials were split down the middle in their loyalties, and Russian commanders on the ground were almost all sympathetic to the Abkhaz cause.[91] Regional Russian officials even played a part in training and equipping the Abkhaz North Caucasian allies.[92]

As the war grew into a stalemate, official Russian policy aligned more closely with the opinions of Russian forces in the region. It seems that Moscow sanctioned the transfer to the Abkhazians of large amounts of armaments from the Russian base at Gudauta, while Russian commanders continued to supply Abkhaz forces with intelligence and planning support.[93] Interestingly, at one point, when Russian planes and pilots were bombing Sukhumi, other Russian units continued to supply Georgian forces with weaponry.[94] Overall, whatever the strategy Moscow was attempting to implement, it seems that Russian policy during the violent phase of the conflict manifested itself in what Trenin has called ‘chaotic involvement’.[95] This gave way to a decidedly anti-Georgian stance in the ‘frozen’ phase and finally the full re-ignition of the conflict in 2008.

Conclusion

The 1992-93 Georgia-Abkhazia war can best be understood as stemming from parallel movements for national liberation that contradicted one another. The Georgians asserted their independence from Russian control. Simultaneously, the Abkhazians sought closer ties with the Russians in order to assert their independence from Georgian control. Although both sides had attempted these actions in the past, the tumultuous break-up of the Soviet Union, characterized by a significant transition and policy shift in Moscow, tipped historical tensions over the edge, into armed conflict.

Stephen Jones posits that the freedoms of perestroika changed Georgian nationalism, ‘from a force for liberation and democratization to one of ethnic hegemonism and anti-pluralism’.[96] Given the outlook of Zviad Gamsakhurdia and the mandate he received in Georgia’s first post-Soviet elections, this assertion seems accurate. However, a similar statement can also be made about Abkhaz nationalism at the time. Both ethnic groups gravitated towards increasingly uncompromising positions, as manifested in the ‘war of laws’ that preceded the war of arms. The ethnic history of the region explains why this move was possible for both sides, but not why it occurred at that moment. Moscow’s chaotic involvement during a time of unstable transition, however, provides an explanation for the outbreak of war in August 1992.

Georgia Releases Evidence on War's Start

The New York Times published on September 15 details of evidence, which Georgia handed over to U.S. and European intelligence agencies, purporting to show that some Russian forces crossed into breakaway South Ossetia via Roki Tunnel a day before Georgia attacked Tskhinvali late on August 7.

The evidence in question, which was also handed over to the New York Times by the Georgian authorities, involves intercepted cellphone calls between a South Ossetian militiaman, supposedly a border guard, at the Roki Tunnel and his superior at headquarters in Tskhinvali.

According to a separate article run by the International Herald Tribune - part of the New York Times Company – Georgia’s eavesdropping operation was made possible because both South Ossetian militiamen were using a Georgian mobile operator, Magti.

In the first phone conversation, intercepted at 3:41am on August 7, the South Ossetian border guard at the Roki Tunnel, by the name of Gassiev, tells his supervisor in Tskhinvali that a Russian colonel had asked Ossetian guards at the tunnel to inspect military vehicles that “crowded” the tunnel. “The B.M.P.’s and other vehicles were sent here and they’ve crowded there. The guys are also standing around,” the guard at Roki Tunnel says, according to the NY Times.

In a separate conversation logged at 3:52am on August 7 the superior from Tskhinvali asks Gassiev: “Has the armor arrived or what?”

“The armor and people,” the guard replied. Asked if they had gone through, he said, “Yes, 20 minutes ago; when I called you, they had already arrived.”

The NY Times, however, says the recordings do not explicitly describe the quantity of armor or indicate that Russian forces were engaged in fighting at that time.

When asked why more than a month passed before the conversations came to light, Georgian Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili told the NY Times that the file with the recordings was lost during the war when the surveillance team moved operations from Tbilisi to Gori.

The NY Times says that at issue is new intelligence, “inconclusive on its own, that nonetheless paints a more complicated picture of the critical last hours before war broke out.”

Although Russia has not disputed the veracity of the phone calls, the NY Times reported, it downplayed the significance of the intercepted conversations.

Gen. Lt. Nikolai Uvarov of Russia, who served as a Defense Ministry spokesman during the war, told the NY Times that troop movements to South Ossetia before the war erupted were part of the normal rotation and replenishment of the Russian peacekeeping forces in South Ossetia.

The NY Times, however, notes that “at a minimum, the intercepted calls, which senior American officials have reviewed and described as credible if not conclusive, suggest there were Russian military movements earlier than had previously been acknowledged, whether routine or hostile, into Georgian territory as tensions accelerated toward war.”

NY Times: Georgia Claims on War Called Into Question

After publishing in September the Georgian side’s evidence on the August war’s start, through which Tbilisi claimed it acted in self-defense in response to advancing Russian military, the New York Times published on November 6 “newly available accounts by independent military observers” which it said called into question Tbilisi’s assertions.

The NY Times report is based on accounts of OSCE military observers on the ground. The newspaper says that the accounts “are neither fully conclusive nor broad enough to settle the many lingering disputes over blame in a war... But they raise questions about the accuracy and honesty of Georgia’s insistence that its shelling of Tskhinvali, the capital of the breakaway region of South Ossetia, was a precise operation.”

It says that the observations by the monitors, including a Finnish major, a Belarusian airborne captain and a Polish civilian, have been the subject of two confidential briefings to diplomats in Tbilisi - one in August and the other in October. Summaries were shared with The New York Times by people in attendance at both. Details were then confirmed by three Western diplomats and a Russian, and were not disputed by the OSCE mission in Tbilisi, according to the NY Times.

OSCE observers on the ground saw large numbers of Georgian artillery and grad rocket launchers massing on roads north of Gori at 3 p.m. on August 7, according to these accounts.

In the evening of August 7 President Saakashvili announced a unilateral ceasefire; few hours later, however, fire was exchanged. The Georgian officials say that South Ossetian separatist forces broke the ceasefire and launched heavy shelling of the Georgian villages. Zaza Gogava, who at the time was chief of staff of the armed forces, told the Georgian parliamentary commission studying the August events: “On August 7, 2008 at 11:35pm, I have received a phone call on the secured line from the Commander-in-Chief. He told me that developments went beyond all the limits and gave me three orders: 1. Stop all type of military coming into Georgia from Russia; 2. Suppress firing positions from where the Georgian peacekeepers and interior ministry’s posts, as well as the Georgian villages were fired constantly; 3. Protect interests and security of the civilian population while implementing these orders.”

The NY Times said it its article that according to the monitors, however, no shelling of Georgian villages could be heard in the hours before the Georgian bombardment. “At least two of the four villages that Georgia has since said were under fire were near the observers’ office in Tskhinvali, and the monitors there likely would have heard artillery fire nearby,” the newspaper said based on the OSCE observers’ accounts.

It said that the observers made a record of the rounds exploding after Georgia’s bombardment began at 11:35 p.m on August 7. At 11:45 p.m., rounds were exploding at intervals of 15 to 20 seconds between impacts, they noted. By 12:35 a.m. the observers had recorded at least 100 heavy rounds exploding across Tskhinvali, including 48 close to the observers’ office, which is in a civilian area and was damaged, the NY Times writes.

Zaza Gogava, a former chief of army, and Alexandre Lomaia, the Secretary of National Security Council told the Georgian parliamentary commission on the August events, that the Georgian side used GRAD rockets only to suppress the South Ossetian forces’ firing positions in the Verkhny Garadok district of Tskhinvali, which, they said was not a civilian area. They have also claimed that precision targeting weapons, in particular DANA self-propelled artillery guns, were used to target firing positions in the Tskhinvali centre. The Georgian senior officials also said that the separatists forces were also using civilian installations to hide their artillery and from where the Georgian villages were targeted.

The NY Times writes, that the Georgia’s accounts were disputed by Ryan Grist, a former British Army captain who was the senior OSCE representative in Georgia when the war broke out. Grist said, according to the article, that he was in constant contact that night with all sides, with the office in Tskhinvali and with Stephen Young, the retired British military officer who leads the monitoring team.

“It was clear to me that the attack was completely indiscriminate and disproportionate to any, if indeed there had been any, provocation,” Grist said. “The attack was clearly, in my mind, an indiscriminate attack on the town, as a town.”

In August Grist gave a briefing to diplomats from the European Union that drew from the monitors’ observations and included his assessments. He then soon resigned under unclear circumstances, the NY Times said.

A second briefing was led by Stephen Yong in October for military attachés visiting Georgia. At the meeting, according to a person in attendance, the NY Times writes, Young stood by the monitors’ assessment that Georgian villages had not been extensively shelled on the evening or night of Aug. 7. “If there had been heavy shelling in areas that Georgia claimed were shelled, then our people would have heard it, and they didn’t,” Young said, according to the person who attended. “They heard only occasional small-arms fire.”

The Georgian officials reject those accounts. “That information, I don’t know what it is and how it is confirmed,” Giga Bokeria, Georgia’s deputy foreign minister, told the NY Times. “There is such an amount of evidence of continuous attacks on Georgian-controlled villages and so much evidence of Russian military buildup, it doesn’t change in any case the general picture of events.”

Georgia vs. Russia na Abhkazia

Newshour: Breaking Away (Abkhazia)

Filmed just hours before the outbreak of war between Russia and Georgia, this report provides a rare look inside one of the two breakaway regions at the center of the conflict.



Fonte: PBS

Editorial

Hello everyone!

I know this may be a little bit different for you guys, but we got an very interesting e-mail this week of Abkhaz World and we would like to share their opinion with you. But, first, let's clear some things:

1. We provide information of all sides, so there will be pro-Georgian posts in this blog, pro-Russia, pro-Abkhazia and "neutral" analysis. It is an educational event and we want you to have all the information available because we trust in you ability to know right from wrong or left from right in cases where nobody is entirely right.

2. We loved that Abkhaz World took the time to try to elucidate aspects of the post (this one) that they did not agree on which they are entitled. This team really appreciates the debate inherent to these issues, so we just want to make it clear: we are not offended, we were actually thrilled. However, we do not think the original post was inappropriate because it was an existing perspective worth debating.


Here is their e-mail:

"

Dear Madam / Sir,

I just read a page about Georgian - Abkhazian War in 1992-93. [http://mirinpucrio.blogspot.com/2009/04/georgia-and-abkhazia-1992-1993-war-of.html]

Unfortunately it's including a lot of mistakes.

First of all it was Georgia that STARTED the war. As for the government, it was installed right after the war with Georgia - Putin was not there or even on the political horizon. There was pro-Georgian Yeltsin who together with Georgia put Abkhazia under sanctions and Yeltsin actually gave Shevardnadze the green light to attack Abkhazia on 14th August 1992.

****
Quote:

In February 1992, the provisional Georgian Military Council announced Georgia’s return to its 1921 constitution. The Abkhaz Supreme Soviet was concerned that Abkhazia’s status was not adequately taken into consideration and so a draft treaty outlining plans on federal relations was sent to Tbilisi. Tbilisi did not respond and in July 1992 the Abkhaz Parliament reinstated the 1925 Abkhaz Constitution.

On 14 August 1992 Georgian armed forces entered the Gali region of Abkhazia...

...From summer 1992 to summer 1993, Georgian troops controlled much of Abkhazia, including Sukhum(i). [I edited as 'Sukhum(i)'see my explanation and related maps about Sukhum]

Source: http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-the-fco/country-profiles/europe/georgia?profile=politics&pg=7

See ''Historical Maps: Abkhazia at various times in history''‏‏

http://gallery.abkhazworld.com/#4.60

The maps included here give an idea of the frontiers of Abkhazia at various times in history. The Abkhazians call their capital /Aqw'a/, but it is more usually known in other languages as Sukhum (Sukhum-Kalé or Sukhum-Kaleh in the period of Turkish influence along the Black Sea's eastern coast; /soxumi/ in Georgian). The ending -i in the form /Sukhumi/ represents the Georgian Nominative case-suffix, and it became attached to /Sukhum/ from the late 1930s when (Georgian) Stalin and his Mingrelian lieutenant in Transcaucasia, Lavrent'i Beria, began to implement a series of anti-Abkhazian policies. Abkhazians today, for obvious reasons, resent the attachment of this element from the language of a people they see as oppressors.

**************

And please see here to read about Abkhazia: http://www.abkhazworld.com/abkhazia/apsny.html

or

Sitio oficial de la Misión Permanente de la República de Abjasia en Venezuela

http://www.abjasia.org.ve/

*****************

Declaration of the Revolutionary Committee of the SSR of Georgia on Independence of the SSR of Abkhazia - 21 May 1921

In 1921, Abkhazia and Georgia became Sovietized. On 31 March 1921, an independent Soviet Republic of Abkhazia was proclaimed. On 21 May 1921, the Georgian Bolshevik government officially recognized the independence of Abkhazia. But the same year, under pressure from Stalin and other influential Georgian Bolsheviks, Abkhazia was forced to conclude a union (i.e., confederative) treaty with Georgia. Abkhazia still remained a full union republic until 1931, when its status was downgraded, under Stalin's orders, from that of Union Republic to that of an Autonomous Republic within Georgia. This act of incorporation of Abkhazia into Georgia was conducted without the approval and against the will of the Abkhazian people and caused mass protests in Abkhazia. Thus the creation of the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic within Georgia was not the result of the granting by the Bolsheviks of autonomous status to one of the republic's minorities, as it is often alleged, but was rather the forced convergence of two neighbouring states by the incorporation of one of them, Abkhazia, into the other, Georgia.

Vladislav Ardzinba, first president of Abkhazia, stated: “In 1931 Abkhazia was transformed into an autonomous republic within the Georgian SSR. Seemingly it was the only republic whose political status changed under pressure from Stalin not upwards but downwards”. (See Pravda, newspaper, 14 July 1989).

-----------------------------

DECLARATION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE OF THE SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF GEORGIA on Independence of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia.

21 May 1921

The Menshevik’s power, being bourgeois by its nature, oppressed the revolutionary movement of the national minorities and bred the antagonism between the certain minorities residing in Georgia throughout the centuries.

Soviet power has a different approach to this issue, advancing the principle of fraternal relations and equality between all workers.

The right to self-determination declared by the Great October Revolution is recognized as the best remedy for the eradication of national prejudices and the strengthening of relations between the workers.

On this basis, the Revolutionary Committee of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia recognizes and welcomes the establishment of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia and believes that the relations between the Georgian SSR and the Abkhazian SSR will be decided at the first Congress of the workers and peasants of Abkhazia, as well as of Georgia.

Let the workers of both socialist republics decide the forms of close and fraternal cooperation.

Revcom of the Georgian SSR

http://www.abkhazworld.com/articles/reports/190

**************

When most of Abkhazia was denuded of its native population in the wake of (a) the end of the Great Caucasian War in 1864 and (b) the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, the question arose as to who would make the most appropriate substitute-population. One of the leading Georgian intellectuals of the time, the educationalist Iakob Gogebashvili, wrote an interesting article in Tiflisskij Vestnik in 1877 entitled /vin unda iknes dasaxlebuli apxazetshi?/ (Who should be settled in Abkhazia?). In this article he argued that the neighbouring Mingrelians would make the best /kolonizatorebi/ (colonisers)... And this is precisely what they subsequently became.

The mass-immigration of Kartvelians (mostly Mingrelians) goes back to the late 1930s. Abkhaz's script was then altered from a roman to a Georgian base. Abkhaz-language schools were summarily closed in 1945-6, following by a ban on broadcasting and publications. The Abkhazians as a nation were due to face transportation (like the numerous other peoples transported by Stalin from the Koreans in the late 1930s through to Abkhazia's Greeks in the late 1940s), and, as a 'scholarly' justification for that, the literary-historian Pavle Ingoroqva was commissioned to argue in print that the Abkhazians only arrived in Abkhazia in the 17th century, conquering the 'original' Abkhazians of history, who were thus a 'Georgian' tribe. This calumny was revived in the heady days of Georgian nationalism from 1988 AND IS WIDELY BELIEVED BY MANY ORDINARY KARTVELIANS, who for this reason still regard the Abkhazians as unentitled to be living in Abkhazia

See please: Demographic change in Abkhazia 1897–1989
http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/georgia-abkhazia/graph2.php

The Georgian general leading the invading forces in the autumn of 1992, Gia Qarqarashvili, stated on TV that he would sacrifice 100,000 Georgians to kill all 97,000 Abkhazians, if that is what it took to keep Georgia's borders inviolate', and a similar threat came from the head of Georgia's wartime administration, Giorgi Khaindrava, on the pages of Le Monde Diplomatique in April 1993. Goga (Giorgi) Khaindrava, told the correspondent from Le Monde Diplomatique that "there are only 80,000 Abkhazians, which means that we can easily and completely destroy the genetic stock of their nation by killing 15,000 of their youth. And we are perfectly capable of doing this."

If you were an Abkhazian, would you welcome back your former Kartvelian neighbours, knowing how many of them think Abkhazians should not be in Abkhazia?

And it was no accident that the Abkhazian research-institute and archives were torched (after cherry-picking) in Nov 1992 -- it was done to try to erase documentary proof of the Abkhazians' presence over the centuries (not to say millennia) on Abkhazian soil. See related article: Abkhazia's archive: fire of war, ashes of history & Related Video (YouTube)

Also, when it comes to the fate of refugees and their right to return home, what is to be said of those Abkhazian descendants (over 300,000) of those more or less forced to leave Abkhazia, when it was populated virtually exclusively by Abkhazians, in 1864?

For some 60 years Abkhazia was forced to accept the unwelcome status of being a mere autonomous republic with Soviet Georgia (thanks to the ruling of the Georgian dictator Stalin – ‘Iosif Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili’). For daring to defend our interests in the face of Georgian nationalist aggression, we were subjected to 14 months of savagery. In alliance with our allies from the Abkhazian diaspora or Abkhazians’ cousins in the North Caucasus, we succeeded in ejecting the invader and winning the war. All that Georgia under its various leaders/governments has been willing to offer us by way of a settlement is a return to the ‘status quo ante’— the sudden offer by Misha Saakashvili of asymmetric federation produced on the eve of the recent NATO summit in Bucharest was clearly aimed more at impressing the Western alliance than at appealing to Sukhum.

How many examples are there in history where a people after being invaded, losing 4% of their population, and yet finally winning the war have meekly resigned themselves to accepting the selfsame subordinate status they had before the tragedy of a war inflicted upon them? This is something that the Georgian side and their international backers (who have no interest in the fate of minorities but think solely of the ‘big picture’ of preserving territorial integrity, of finding allies in an unstable part of the world, and of securing the flow of oil) would do well to remember. The Georgians lost Abkhazia in 1993. They should be told by their EU, NATO and US ‘friends’ to accept this fact, find a ‘modus vivendi’ with their neighbours (big and small alike), and then contribute to the creation of stability and prosperity for the Caucasus region as whole. We can all then get on with our lives in the peace that we all deserve.

Best regards,

Administrator of AW"

We thank Abkhaz World for giving the delegates more mechanisms of research on the subject. Moreover, we hope they feel that this time their side of the story was more rightfully told.

Best wishes,


Bloggers of MIRIN

Volunteers fight for Abkhazia against Georgia

1992 - 93 Georgian-Abkhazian War

Still unresolved, the war in Abkhazia 1992-1993 is largely overlooked. At the time nationalism was rampant throughout the Caucasus. Georgia, reeling from an internal squabble between its first elected president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, and the head of the National Guard, Tengiz Kitovani and his ally Dzaba Ioseliani, launched an ill-fated attempt to solidify central government control over separatist minded Abkhazia.

The Georgians were finally driven out a year and a half later (September 1993) by Abkhazian forces strengthened, if not spearheaded, by hundreds of North Caucasus volunteers, among them future Chechen field commanders Shamil Basayev and Ruslan Galayev. Basayev actually received the Hero of Abkhazia medal and was credited for, among other military feats, liberating the northern city of Gagra and pushing the Georgians across the Psou River into Russia proper, where they were repatriated to Georgia via the ports at Poti and Batumi.

Although it took place early in the conflict, the Battle for Gagra was a turning point in the war. Georgian forces had made an amphibious landing to seize Gagra during the first weeks of the war, intending to then push southward and squeeze Abkhazian forces in a pincer movement between a second Georgian force moving north from Sukhumi. The Georgian forces failure to hold the strategic northern city, let alone use it as a base to launch further attacks southward, severely hampered its efforts to impose its will against the Abkhazian separatist movement.

Finally, there has been much written about Russias involvement in Abkhazia. Most analysis insists that without Russian support Abkhazia would not have been able to break free (In fact, believing Abkhazia to be another Transdeniester, hundreds of Ukrainian volunteers fought on the Georgian side). However, there are problems with this analysis. First, most of the foreign fighters involved in Abkhazia were not Russian soldiers but, like Shamil Basayev, independent minded fighters from the north Caucasus. Others came from the Abkhazian diaspora, primarily from Turkey. Second, complaints of Russian armor and aircraft involved in the fighting as proof of Russian complicity is problematic, as all armor and aircraft on both sides of the conflict was of Russian/Soviet origin. Georgian officials have even claimed publicly that they themselves rented Russian tanks and their crews for combat missions by the day or even by the hour, more accurately suggesting that rather than an instrument of policy, the Russian army, in a state of flux in 1992, was open to the highest bidder.

(The Battle of Gagra - by Dodge Billingsley (www.combatfilms.com)

Russian-Georgian War in Western Georgia

The Kremlin policy of Chauvinism, racism and genocide towards indigenous Caucasian -- Ibero-Caucasian ethnic groups remained unknown to the democratic world and human right defense circles during the years of 1990-1994. Only the heroic resistance of Chechenian people to Kremlin aggression forced the some of Western politicians to pay attention to the fate of Caucasian nations, which were contemptuously named as the "individuals of criminal Caucasian nationality", speaking on "Caucasian dialect, language" by the Russian chauvinist mass-media.

The aim of the present report is to show on the example of Georgia (Megrelia and Svanetia), that the Chechenian tragedy appears to be the consisting part of Kremlin's policy in Caucasus (in a wider range in the whole ex-Soviet territory). It just happens to be the last and obvious demonstration of this policy, however the similar events have earlier taken place in Samachablo, Ingushetia, Abkhazia (in Armenia and Azerbaijan as well).

Unfortunately the World community did not provide the evaluation of these events then and did not point on the main reasons and the one, who carried the guilt. This fact encouraged Kremlin on the new brutalities in Chechenia.

***

There is a large library of the official documents of Legal Authorities of Georgia (President, Parliament, Cabinet of Ministers) as well as of opposition mass media, on this problem -- part of them are published even in Western media and are accessible for Western scientists -- but newer were used by them. Instead always are used lie of Kremlin press and agents of influence.

Main ideological and big part of bloody armed attacks from Kremlin side during so called 'perestroika' and 'demokratizatsiya' were against Georgia, Georgian Nation (National Independence movement), and reasons:

• Georgians have most developed and institutionalized national self-determination and mass-motivation:
  • Culture (highly sophisticated Christian traditions and ideology, poetry, music, literature, etc.)
  • Ancient national independent (statehood) tradition;
• Has high intellectual potential;
• High rating among nations and nationalities of ex-USSR;

• Key geopolitical standing in Caucasus and all South ex-USSR.

On this reasons in Georgia (most dangerous colony) Kremlin had carefully grown powerful agents network. Lenin: "Bolshevik organization of Georgia is most fighting [powerful] among all". Among members of CPSS only Armenians and Jews had higher proportion than Georgians. Nucleus of these agents is NOMENCLATURAL elites - party-administrative, scientific, cultural, sports, etc. This elites and nomenclature networks (organizations) not disappeared after 'perestroika'. Even more, having get financial and market powers they become even more powerful and have new grounds for consolidation.

Historic overview

In terms and sense of Georgian civilization and national self-determination: term, sense of 'ethnos' and 'nation' = "eri" is not completely the same as European. Thais the attempts to analyze situation in Georgia on the same grounds as in Europe (and even more in Americas, Africa etc.) are anti-sociological.

Georgia as nation mainly was established from 4th century (when Christian religion become state religion), and reached his highest (desired forever) level in 12th on the basement of Christian ideology, civilization -- when main nation-building factor was Georgian (and more widely Caucasian) Christian culture, spiritual sphere.

Narrow lingual and ethnic grounds are not main and even more the lonely factors for national determination for Georgians (after occupation of parts of Georgia by Muslim empires and musulmanization of population, even factor of religion was not important, i.e. Adjarians-muslims and Ingilo-muslims are the same Georgians) - the main factor always was and is civilization entity, union.

This factor is recognized (non directly) even by Kremlin ideology: "Individuals of Caucasian nationality" who are speaking on "Caucasian dialect".

In Europe the processes of nationalization was happen in 17-18 and even in 19 century on the main grounds of market civilization and pure ethnic/lingual basement.

***

Georgian ethnos is a part of Ibero-Caucasian ethno-cultural integrity, civilization and consequently part of (small) Caucasian race. Other representatives of Ibero-Caucasians are Abkhazians, Abazins, Adiges, Kabardos, Vainakhs (Chechens and Ingushs), Dagestanian people (Lezgins, Tabasarans etc.) of North Caucasus and Azerbaijan.

Until the XVII century Ibero-Caucasians inhabited practically whole North Caucasus and South Caucasus (except for part of Azerbaijan and Armenia).

It is important to know that wars on ethnic grounds and ethnic cleanses are fundamentally unknown for Caucasus (not as in Europe with permanent wars against each-other). Caucasian nations (states) were always tolerant and traditionally supported each other during often wars against aggressive empires.

***

The start of Russian Empire expansion to the North caused the so-called Caucasian Wars - ethnic cleansings and nation slaughter first in North Caucasus, later in South Caucasus. By the beginning of XIX century the vast North Caucasian territories (Stavropol region, Krasnodar) were cleaned from Ibero- Caucasians (mainly from Kabardos and Adiges) and inhabited (colonized) by Russians.

***

It is important to know directions of Russian expansion on Caucasus. It happens mainly using two ways: in North Caucasus -- from NORTHWEST to South and South-West, after true Dariali to the South -- to Georgia; in the Sought Caucasus -- to South-East along Black sea shore.

During this invasion most severe, bloody and prolonged pressure was on Abkhazian-Adige, Kabardo ethnoses (who were occupied North-Eastern part of Caucasus), big part of them was exterminated and part migrated to SOUTHEAST (mainly to Georgia and even to Turkey). Thais i.e. Abkhazian tribes loose 80% of lands and were pushed to the territory of Georgia. Attacks on Chechens and Dagestan were initiated after, mainly after occupation of Georgia and Armenia-Azeri.

In 17-18 sent. to Georgia were emigrated also Ossetians who were under pressure of Kozaks and loose big part of there agriculture lands (so called 'khizans' -- 'refugees') who were find land under prince Machabeli (in Samachablo) and some Chechens (who are living till today in Kakheti -- 'Kists'). Above mentioned factors are covered by Kremlin propaganda and there agents of influence.

***

The process of colonization, ethnic cleansing and nation slaughter (genocide) of Ibero-Caucasians in North Caucasus was carried out by the Russian Empire mainly with a help of Cossacks. It also used the artificially provoked conflicts in Caucasus between the nations of North and South Caucasus. Under the Russian pressure the living space of indigenous Caucasian population lessened catastrophically, the tough interior rivalry and internal contradictions showed up. Russian forces took advantage of the fact.

In XIX century ethnic cleansings subverted South Caucasus - mainly Kuban, where actually the whole Abkhaz-Adige population was exterminated. Between XVII-XIX centuries Russia exterminated about 2,5 million individuals of Ibero-Caucasian race.

***

The capture of Caucasus by Russia was not only demographical disaster, but the environmental as well. For example, in North Caucasus (especially in Ingusheti and Chechnya) about 60 % of woods were burnt out, which made the war against the disobedient and struggling Caucasian tribes even easier. Instead of environmentally safe, multi profile and balanced agriculture, so traditional for local people, Russia established the monoculture economy, which brought an enormous damage to sensitive alpine ecosystem.

***

Czarist Russia never concealed the nature of its policy in Caucasus and widely used the terminology like "Capture of Caucasus", "Conquer of Caucasus", "Colonization of Caucasus", "Russification of Caucasus". Even the corresponding orders and medals had been issued.

The nature of Kremlin's policy in Caucasus has not changed since Bolsheviks seized the power in Russia, only the terminology has become different: "Friendship of nations", "International communication language", "Internationalism" - behind those terms was hidden the same superpower, chauvinistic, colonialist policy. Bolshevik Kremlin has committed the monstrous crimes against Chechens, Ingushs, Georgians and other Caucasian nations.

Lenin was writing: "We need Caucasus - oil of Baku oil and Georgian magnum".

Bolsheviks even more effectively completed the colonization (russification) process of Caucasus. The development of industry (mainly extraction and primary processing of minerals) and colonial, monoculture type of agriculture has considerably changed the demographic structure of the population of USSR national autonomies - so-called Russian-speaking population predominated in these regions.

Kremlin has extracted from the bowls** of Caucasian earth millions of tons of oil, marganez and other ores and plundered milliards of cubic meters of gas. It turned the vast territories of national autonomies (which actually happened to be like for the local ethos’s, mostly in North Caucasus) into the economic and environmental disaster zones. Many national autonomies (like Chechenia, Ingushetia etc.) were on the lowest levels of social-economic, cultural-educational development and health care. This was a policy of hidden, indirect genocide and ethnic cleansing.

***

The "post perestroika" Kremlin policy maintained the same aggressive, bloody and hard line. The events in Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Ingushetia and Chechenia are the evidence of it.

The events in Western Georgia and the fate of Megrels and Svans during 1992-93 are the part of the common tragedy of Caucasian nations in the new era; when Kremlin tries to create a new, market Empire of plunder. This is the era of the new Nation Slaughters.

Ethno-historical review

Georgian ethnos consists of two historical branches - Western-Georgian (ancient Kolkhs) and Eastern-Georgian (ancient Iberians).

Descendants of Kolkhs, historical Chans-Zans-Lazs, Sans-Svans, nowadays consist of two sub ethnic groups. The first is Megrels-Zans (i.e. Megrels) and Lazs, the second - Svans.

Both these sub ethnoses have the own language, which belongs to the Georgian group of languages. Laz and Megrel languages are the close dialects. There are three languages (Kartuli=Georgian, Megruli=Megrelian, Svanuri=Svanian) in Georgian group of Ibero-Caucasian language family and tens of dialects. Each sub ethnic branch of Georgia covers the certain, generally geographically determined (a valley and neighbor mountains) historical province. As well as in many European countries, there are tens of such provinces in Georgia: Abkhazia, Samurzakano, Megrelia, Svanetia, Racha, Lechkhumi, Imereti, Guria and etc.

***

Lazs are compactly inhabited on their historical motherland - on the Southeastern coast of Black Sea, from Trabzon to Hopa (today in Turkey). They are the indigenous population there.

***

Megrels are the indigenous population of Western Georgia. From the ancient times they have been living on both sides of Enguri River, on the territory from Sochi to river Rioni. Name of Megrels and their country comes from the name of the river Enguri-Eⁿg^urⁱ-Egr, Egr-isi, M-egr-el, and M-egr-el-ia.

The total amount of Megrels in Georgia is about 1.2 mln. They are orthodox Christians. Christianity spread over Western Georgia in II-III centuries. The amount of Lazs living in Turkey reaches 1.5-2 mln. Up to XVI-XVII centuries they were orthodox Christians, but have been Muslimized since then.

Megrels and Lazs lived on the ancient trade crossroads and actively participated in world trade. They were marked with high economic activity, practiced navigation, multicultural-multi profile agriculture and stock-breeding.

Megrelia has given to Georgia many prominent personalities in science, culture and sport, politicians and clergymen; Megrelia participated actively in the creation of Georgian nation.

Megrels living in Abkhazia normally considered themselves as 'Abkhazians' (on the basis of territorial factor) and spoke the Megrelian language. They used to call Abkhazs - "Apsua", "Absar", "Apsni" and etc. Thus, the name "Abkhaz" was the common one for all the indigenous inhabitants of Abkhazia, for Georgians and Abkhazians as well.

***

Svans are mountaineers. They inhabited compactly the upper sides of Kodori River (Mountainous Samurzakano - "Abkhazian Svanetia") and Enguri River. The name of their country is 'Svaneti', Svanetia, total amount - about 200.000, orthodox Christians. They are distinguished with fighting skills and traditional, patriarchal way of life. Like many Western European mountaineers practiced seasonal work.

Svaneti has always been a backup, stronghold and citadel for Georgia. Never has been conquered by foreign occupants before XIX century.

***

Abkhazs belong to the Abkhaz-Adige ethnic group; their language belongs to Abkhaz-Adige group of Ibero-Caucasian language family. In more common sense to Northern group of these languages, which points on their real origin (Southern Caucasian languages are Georgian languages).

They practice mainly cattle-breeding. Historically Abkhaz-Adiges inhabited the mountain canyons and foothills of Western Caucasus, southern and the northern part of it.

During the Russian colonization of Northern Caucasus and particularly after the defeat of Imam Shamil (XII-XVIII cc.) the Black Sea coast Muslim tribes of Abkhaz-Adige were almost totally exterminated. Part of them had no choice but to immigrate to Turkey (for example Ubikhs).

Abkhaz tribes living on Georgian territory, remarkably avoided this terrible fate by two main reasons:

• They were under the political protection of Georgia
• Majority of them were Christians (at last formally and not Muslims at all)

It is a very important issue, that impressive part of Abkhazs (about 60 %) is very close to Megrels ethnically and culturally, part of them are the descendents of Kolkhs. They have Megrelian surnames and speak Megrelian as fluently as Abkhazian. The total amount of Abkhazs is about 95.000.

Georgians always treated Abkhazs with respect and as their relatives. Georgian poets and writers dedicated many of their works to the nobility, honesty and courage of Abkhazs. Among those are Akaki Tsereteli and Konstantine Gamdakhurdia. Many Abkhaz men of literature were the true patriots of Georgia.

***

Political problems connected with Abkhazia might be truthfully studied and solved only by taking into an account the presence of two authentic ethnoses there - Abkhazs and Georgians (Megrels and Svans), the political rights of which should be equal. By this very reason the legal authorities of Georgia, President Gamsakhurdia proposed the formula of two indigenous nations on the same territory, to prevent the war in this region which could brake the process of independence.

Under Stalin and post-Stalin regime in the USSR Megrels and Abkhazs were continuously persecuted and repressed (for example the well known "Megrelian Case" in Georgia, beginning of 50-es). The aim of these persecutions was to break Georgian nation apart; to provoke Megrelian and Abkhazian separatism; to weaken the impact of Megrels (one of the strongest and the most freedom-minded sub ethnic groups of Georgia) on the Georgian global political climate.

In order to break apart the common anti-imperial struggle of Caucasian nations, Kremlin has been systematically provoking Abkhazian-Georgian conflicts (as well as Osetian-Georgian, Osetian-Ingush conflicts) and so it does even nowadays.

***

The problems of Megrels and Svans and violation of their human and ethnical minority rights touch the demographic aspects. That's why we would like to underline the following:

• Georgians generally (Megrels and Svans particularly) belong to the category of small nations, with a very low birth rate, which did not exceed 0,11% during 1965-85 and was systematically reducing. From this point Georgians differ radically from the other neighboring Caucasian and Near East nations.
• Georgians are extremely strongly attached to their homeland and one of the most consolidated nations, not only among the former USSR nations, but worldwide.
• Georgians, with a total amount of over 3.5 mln, have lost 150.000 lives during the World War I and about 250.000 in World War II (i.e. ~ 10 % of the population in each war). The amount of wounded was twice as big and absolute majority of them were men (as the military actions did not take place on Georgian territory), who were invalid for reproduction.
• Georgians, at least formally, are the most educated nation of the world - they take the first place by the percentage of high education graduates.

Taking into account all the above mentioned, it is easy to realize, that the condition of Georgian ethnos generally and Megrelian and Svan ethnoses in particular, is critical and any kind of cataclysms might lead to the annihilation of ethnos, nation, race and the corresponding civilization.

Ethno-political geography of Abkhazia

Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia was created on March 1921 within the borders of Georgian SSR. It was the example of Stalin strategy of border intermix and creation of ethnic conglomerates. This is one of those political 'slow-effect mines', which are used for provocation of ethnic conflicts in the suitable for Kremlin time.

When Abkhazian ASSR was founded within the borders of Georgian SSR, the Abkhazian territories from Sochi up to river Psou were granted to Russian SFSR. On the other hand Georgian historical province Samurzakano, situated on the eastern side of Enguri, but never included in Abkhazia before, was then granted to Abkhazian ASSR (now, even most extremist Abkhaz separatists, agree that Gali region does not belongs to Abkhazia).

From ethno-geographical point of view the territory of Abkhazia has been traditionally divided between Abkhazs and Georgians: Abkhazs (historical mountaineer cattle-breeders) occupied the mountain canyons and the mountainous sea-cost region Gudauta: Megrels (historical valley agriculturers) occupied the sea-cost valleys and plains on the whole territory of Abkhazia.

The situation has changed since 30-ies, after the development of tourist-resort socialist economy in Abkhazia, inculcation of colonial cultures of tea and citrus plants, and particularly after the World War II, when the railway Moscow-Tbilisi was built through Abkhazia. All this altered political, social-economic and geopolitical role of Abkhazia. At the same period of time Abkhazs descended from the mountainous parts and big amounts of Russians, Armenians, Greeks flowed to Abkhazia.

The northern mountainous part of Samurzakano was occupied by Svans (mountaineer cattle-breeders), the southern sea-cost part - by Megrels. Thus, historically and up to the Abkhazian war the 95% of Samurzakano population consisted of Georgian sub ethnic groups.

On the Abkhazian territory itself (i.e. outside of Samurzakano), Georgians inhabited compactly the regions of Leselidze-Gagra, Sokhumi, Gulripshi and most¦nbsp; parts of Ochamchire. In these regions they were a majority historically and up to the Abkhazian war.

The population of Abkhazian ASSR before the Abkhazian war made 540.000. Georgians were 45,7% of population - 246.800, Abkhazs 17.5% - 94.500. It means, that in Abkhazian ASSR there lived three times more Georgians than Abkhazs. The rest of the population i.e. 36,8% - consisted of Russians, Armenians, Greeks and etc. The territory of Abkhazian ASSR is 8.600 km2, which makes the 12,4 % of the whole Georgian territory.

Thus, Georgians occur to be an ethnic, national majority in Abkhazia and therefore the ethnic cleansing and genocide towards Georgians in Abkhazia during the Abkhazian war, is in fact the ethnic cleansing and genocide towards the national, ethnic majority

***

Among the pro-Kremlin Abkhaz-specialized agents of influence, who were preparing the ideological grounds for the war in Abkhazia is prof. B.G.Hewitt, see his "Abkhazia: A problem of identity and ownership", Central Asian Survey, (1993) 12(3), pp.267-323 where he gives incorrect, false data on proportions of Abkhaz and Georgian population in so called Abkhazia. He not gives objective data, that territory 'Abkhazia' was changed from census to census. That territory of Abkhazia including Sochi was attached from Abkhazian ASSR and that territory of Samurzakano was given to Abkhazian ASSR. And this is the only one fact of pro-Kremlin false leaded to the preparation of ethnic cleanses of Georgians in Abkhazia.

***

The same tendency might be observed in Chechenia. Besides the genocide against Chechens and the attempts to evict them from Northwestern part of the republic, Kremlin threatens regularly to take away northern regions of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. These regions are mainly inhabited by "Kazaks/Kozaks". According to other threats 30.000 of "specialists" (i.e. Russians) will be populated to Grozny and industrial-transportation points of Chechenia or the powerful strategic defense frontier zone (i.e. military bases and militarized Russian settlements) will be created.

Political grounds of Abkhazian War

As we already mentioned above, the strong background of Abkhazian War was already built by Kremlin during the creation and establishment of Abkhazian ASSR and its frontiers.

***

One of the worst political-ideological factor, preparing war in Abkhazia and Samachablo was the idea of Andrey Sakharov that "Georgia is Minor Empire and that it must be departed" [1, 2, 3].

***

In the mid of 80-ies Abkhazian conflict was provoked and escalated (simultaneously to the events of Nagorni Karabakh. The fact indicates that these events have been coordinated and planned).

At the same time the 'Confederation of Mountainous people of Caucasus' (CMPC aka KGNK) was founded and officially registered in the Russian SFSR as a public organization. The aim of it was to cover up the direct involvement of Kremlin in the future wars against Georgia and Ingushetia.

In 1990-91 the CMPC was turned into the paramilitary organization, which was activity and secretly supplied with different types of weapons (heavy artillery included) from the depots of Soviet Army in North Caucasus and was generously financed by Kremlin for maintenance of guerillas and mercenaries.

It is significant, that except the Kremlin-provoked wars in Abkhazia and Ingushetia, CMPC took no interest in any other conflicts within North Caucasus. CMPC has not contributed for the self-determination and independence fight of North Caucasian people - Chechens, Ingushs and others.

It is fact that, the government of Ardzinba closed relations with KGNK and with 'ideas of KGNK ("CMPC")' as soon as relations between Moscow and Grozny sharpened.

It is important, that by Kremlin Chechnya was planned as one of 'fortress' of KGNK as Abkhazia, and in terms of Kremlin Grozny was planned as second capital of KGNK (after Sokhumi). Really in Grozny in some moments was located 'staff', 'parliament' and 'government' of KGNK and were concentrated main armed forces from all Caucasus - who were intensively supplied by the arms of Russian Army in North Caucasus (it is the secret of loses of arms in North Caucasus). From Chechnya, this armed groups and even part of heavy weapons (including tanks and Grad launchers) were openly -- using auto-roads and railways of Russia -- were transported to Abkhazia. Only afterwards, mainly after war in Abkhazia, Dudayev's forces captured part of these arms.

During 1991-1993 in Grozny was situation of 'two-governments'. One was government of Dudaeyv, who begin to build more and more independent politics from Moscow. Second was government of KGNK (who during the period of Abkhaz war gained big political influence, power and money).

For the end of 1992 and the beginning of 1993 KGNK become so powerful that they begin open attacks on Dudayev. The Putch in Grozny of spring 1993 "Theater Square Putch" was the attempt of KGNK ceased all power in Chechnya. But this attempt failed, 'strongholds' of KGNK in Chechnya were stormed by Dudayev's forces, big part of armaments seized, first leader of KGNK Yusup Soslambekov (Head of Parliament of KGNK, Head of Commission for Foreign Affairs of Chechen Parliament) -- who was 'second' person in Chechnya - was appointed by the Congress of Chechen People (most powerful public organization in Chechnya) as the 'Traitor' and was emigrated to Moscow. So -- this Putch was actually the war in Chechnya between the KGNK and Chechnya and at the same time it was the finish of KGNK in Chechnya.

In the same time big part of fighters of KGNK in Abkhazia (among them were some three hundred Chechens) become to the idea that this war was not war against regime of Shevardnadze for independent Abkhazia, but was the war against Georgian people and for occupation of Abkhazia by Kremlin. Big part of them come back to Chechnya and joined Dudayev's army. In popular Chechen song are the words: "I have gone to Abkhazia as internationalist fighter of KGNK, but come back as Chechen patriot and nationalist".

Chechenian war revealed more clearly the pro-Kremlin nature of CMPC. This so called powerful paramilitary organization, which managed to "defeat totally Georgian military forces" in Abkhazia, occurred to be paralyzed, forceless and did not render to the Chechen Republic not only the military but even the political or moral assistance. It proves that CMPC is just a curtain to cover the military interference of Kremlin against Georgia.

The Russian neoimperialistic plan was to use CMPC to tear away from Georgia the territories of Abkhazian ASSR and Samachablo and create their pro-Kremlin military-strategic enclaves during the collapse of USSR (like Pridnestrovje and Gagauzia in Moldova; Krimea in Ukraine; Nagorni Karabakh in Azerbaijan and etc.). Where the role of Abkhazians and Ossetians belongs to so called 'Russian language population'

Kazaks/Kozaks (Kazachestvo) played an unattractive part in Caucasian conflicts and particularly in Abkhazia. The original (true) Kazaks, hostile to socialism, as strata of kulaks, were exterminated by Bolsheviks during 20-ies and 30-ies. In Perestroika era the fraud Kazachestvo has been created - paramilitary pro-Kremlin organizations, which consisted mainly of the Soviet Army demobilized officers kept in a secret service.

These Paramilitary groups were generously financed and armed by Kremlin and they participated most actively in the wars of Moldova, Samachablo, Ingushetia and Abkhazia. The same "Kazaks" are intensively used against Chechenia.

It is very important to understand that for Kremlin it is very effective to use 'ethno conflict' mask, Thais it gives opportunity to commit highest level of cruelty, bloodshed and not to be responsible directly. International mass media always is describing it as 'tribal cruelty' of 'nationalists' but not Kremlin cruelty.

It was the result of the Kremlin propaganda to call the Russian-provocated wars in the Caucasus 'tribal wars'. See for example 'Newsweek', Jan. 4, 1992 -- "The Year of Fratricide - 1992, Hate Thy Neighbor: TRIBAL BATTLES". There is evident false that wars in Georgia are 'tribal wars'. Such an information helped ewer much Kremlin to kill hundred thousand child, women, and old man in Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Ingushetia etc.

Situation was changed slightly after 1995 and especially after the endless Chechen war, when the problem of oil sharpened -- Russia was not able, failed to make his plans of building 'new CONTINUOUS political territory for oil transportation' in the given period of time.

War have give more realistic impulse. Some researchers begin to write more real picture of political situation in the Caucasus, but still manipulating of slander.

See for example "OIL POLITICS IN THE CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA", by Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., (Senior Policy Analyst, The Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder No. 1065, January 25, 1996):

"The world now faces a choice between the cooperative exploitation by the East and West of natural resources or a wasteful struggle that could cost a fortune in blood and treasure. Regional conflicts in the Caucasus and Central Asia threaten to deny Western access to the vital oil and gas reserves the world will need in the 21st century. The wars in Chechnya, between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and in Georgia were started or exacerbated by the Russian military [why not by politicians? - B.G.], and the outcome of these wars may determine who controls future pipeline routes. Moscow hopes that Russia will. Powerful interests in Moscow are attempting to ensure that the only route for exporting the energy resources of Eurasia will pass through Russia."

"The Drama in Georgia. Another conflict affecting potential oil routes is occurring in the Caucasus republic of Georgia. Russia wants to prevent oil from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan from going the "Western" route through Georgia to Turkey. Moscow's support of civil strife in Georgia is directly connected to its goal of perpetuating conflict in the Caucasus.

From 1991 through the end of 1993, Georgia was in the midst of a bloody civil war, which pitted the supporters of Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze [pro-Kremlin agentura - B.G.] and ousted President Zviad Gamsakhurdia against each other [against Kremlin - B.G.]. Political violence became chronic. Eventually, the defeated Gamsakhurdia either committed suicide or was murdered under mysterious [the same about Dudayev] circumstances in 1993. But even after his victory over Gamsakhurdia, Shevardnadze faced challenges from warlords and militias.

In exchange for crucial Russian support, Shevardnadze finally was forced [it was his aim - B.G.] to join the CIS in October 1993, a move he had bitterly opposed. When he attempted to read a press release announcing this step, Russian diplomats took it out of his hands and gave him a Moscow-authored text to read [pure Shevy - B.G.]. Such was the degree of independence enjoyed by Shevardnadze at the hands of his Russian patrons.

In 1995, Moscow brought pressure on Shevardnadze not to build a pipeline for Azeri oil through Georgian territory. The Georgians wanted to bring oil to the Georgian port of Supsa (between Poti and Tbilisi), from which it then would be exported by tanker to Turkey. However, the Russians demurred. Soon after Shevardnadze refused to cancel the pipeline plan, he was injured in an assassination attempt [i.e. by Kremlin, pure Shevy - B.G.] when a car bomb exploded next to his vehicle on August 29, 1995.

Shevardnadze has insisted repeatedly that Russia was behind this attempt on his life. The suspected culprit - Shevardnadze's security chief, Igor Georgadze - has escaped to Russia and continues to threaten Shevardnadze's life.

Shevardnadze demanded that the Russians extradite the suspect, and the Russian Prosecutor General's Office issued an order for his arrest. However, the Russian Interior Minister refused the extradition, and Georgadze is still at large [but Zviadists are given to Tbilisi - B.G.].

The Fighting in Abkhazia. Another dangerous conflict is smoldering in Abkhazia, a breakaway region in Georgia. The bitter war in Abkhazia, which began in 1992, has claimed over 35,000 lives. It was precipitated by the Russian military [Kremlin - B.G.] backing the Abkhaz separatist minority [pro-Kremlin - B.G.] against the Georgian [pro-Kremlin - B.G.] government in Tbilisi.

One purpose of the Russian intervention was to weaken Georgia and curb Turkish and Western influence in the region. But more important was the Russian goal of controlling access to oil. By acting as it did, Russia gained de facto control over the long Black Sea coastline in Abkhazia.

Moscow also was protecting the Russian Black Sea ports of Novorossiysk and Tuapse and moving closer to the Georgian oil exporting ports in Poti, Supsa, and Batumi. In August 1995, Georgia's beleaguered President Shevardnadze agreed to place four Russian military bases on Georgian soil, thus assuring Russia's control of the oil exporting routes via the Black Sea coast.

As Russia became entangled in Chechnya in 1994-1995, and word of Chechen commando training camps operating from Abkhazia spread [why not camps for Chechens in Chechnya, have not land, money? - B.G.], Moscow began to show less support for the Abkhaz rebels, who are allies [how much support for Chechnya, give some data? - B.G.] of the Chechens.

But Russia also has refused either to close the border with Abkhazia or to deny the separatist government in the Abkhaz capital, Sokhumi, financial and military support. Shevardnadze had hoped that this would be a Russian 'quid pro quo' for his agreement to permit Russian military bases on Georgian territory."

As reader can see, even in this more realistic article we can see animosity towards national independent movements of Georgia and Chechnya and support of Shevardnadze regime.

It is to be mentioned that Legal Authorities of Georgia from the very beginning -- in 1991 have given to the West the real situation on oil factor and on boycott from Kremlin's side. Was initiated independent plan of construction of transportation complex Baku-Poti including the reconstruction of pipe line Baku-Batumi, was initiated negotiations between Georgian and Azeri Governments. In state budget of 1992 were already given the finances of this project.

But the some Western politicians have being in corruption negotiations with Kremlin and Georgian nomenclature; begin anti-Georgian propaganda and preparing of cup in Georgia. Even more till 1994 West make secret of this "Oil deal of century".

***

Legal authorities of Georgia with President Gamsakhurdia at lead, on the contrary of Kremlin policy in Abkhazia, has been leading soft, balanced political line of federalism: the autonomous republic has been granted large political and economic independence; Abkhazians (i.e. national minority) have been given majority quota in Abkhazian Parliament. These political measures helped legal authorities of Georgia to maintain peace and stability in Abkhazia.

***

The main reason of Abkhazian war and its cessation from Georgia was the criminal Putch and military coup d'etat in Tbilisi 1991-92, carried out simultaneously with the USSR collapse (Belovezh plot) by the Kremlin intelligence and directed by E.Shevardnadze.

Kremlin propaganda pictured the overthrow of legal authorities in Georgia and the victory of Russian-army-backed criminals as a "victory of democratic forces". The Western mass media, pro-Shevardnadze intelligence agents eagerly supported this thesis, betraying the principles of democracy and Human Rights.

E.Shevardnadze, then head of the "Military Council/State Council of Georgia", usurper and a good friend of mobs - was allowed to the signing of Helsinki Documents. Only this fact profanes those documents.

Georgia was the first on the former USSR territory, where the criminal nomenclature came to power, in other words the communist Party activists mixed with mafia (KGB general E.Shevardnadze + well known mob J.Ioseliani) and backed by the chauvinistic (jingoistic) forces of Russia and the super-power Kremlin officials. Legal authorities of Georgia have been warning the World democratic community and Human Rights organizations on the danger of spreading of criminal-nomenclature anarchy from Georgia to all the other former USSR regions and even to the West. However Western political circles persistently advertised the myth of "the overthrow of dictator Gamsakhurdia and the victory of democratic forces in Georgia".

"Democratic" criminal-nomenclature Putch and military coup d'etat in Georgia was the first and the most successful performance of this bloody scenario all over the former USSR and even the West. This trick of Kremlin has worked and because the World democratic community and Human rights circles ignored the brutal violations of democracy and human rights the series of similar "democratic" putches followed in Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Chechenia. However in Chechenia the government and people had already realized what happened in Georgia in 1991-1992 and this scenario did not work. That's why there was no other way left but to use Russian Army openly.

With the overthrow of all legal governmental branches of Georgia (President, Government, Supreme Council, Regional Governments), abolishment of current constitution and acceptance of the Constitution from 1921 (where the status of Abkhazia is not mentioned at all), the pro-Kremlin forces of Georgia under leadership of E.Shevardnadze guaranteed Kremlin the best possible ground for the defeat of Georgia in a coming Abkhazian war:

• Georgia had been deprived the legal, constitutional rights on Abkhazia;
• The contradiction occurred between illegal authorities in Tbilisi and legal authorities in Abkhazia.
• During Putch the Kremlin hit men have destroyed the kernel (main body) of Georgia's patriotic armed forces, which were the guarantee of territorial integrity of the country.
• Later on, during the process of division of USSR Black Sea Navy, Georgia did not get even single military vessel and was totally helpless in the coming Abkhazian war.

***

The most important international aspect of Abkhazian War (as well as of other political and "ethnic" conflicts in Georgia) is, that Georgia has always been and will be a very important geopolitical and geo-strategic junction (point) for Russian empire.

Preparation of Abkhazian War

After the overthrow of legal, democratically elected authorities in Tbilisi, the rule of Shevardnadze's criminal-military junta failed to spread all over Georgia. The local legal structures have been maintained in Western Georgia, particularly in Megrelia, Abkhazia and Adjaria (in Abkhazia and Adjaria - all branches of power). The powerful center of disobedience and resistance to Shevardnadze's regime has been created in this region. Especially Abkhazia was under of full control of Legal Government (of Gamsakhurdia). In Abkhazia, newspapers of supporters of Gamsakhurdia were printed.

In 1992-93 Shevardnadze's regime carried out three large punitive campaigns in disobedient Megrelia. During these campaigns the Mkhedrioni gangs under the leadership of Shevardnadze's friend and deputy, well-known mob J.Ioseliani, hundreds of civilians have been killed, including children, women and old people, hundreds of houses were burnt and robbed, thousands of families assaulted.

Mass media carried massive anti-Megrelian propaganda; Eastern Georgia, Tbilisi was put into opposition to Western Georgia, Megrelia; Almost fascist idea of "original Tbilisi resident", "original city-resident" was cultivated, as if the residents of Tbilisi were the supreme (highest) ethno-cultural substratum, meant to rule over the whole Georgia; Supporters of legal authorities were called "provincials, common people, stinking aboriginals, primitives and goyemes".

However the punitive measures against Megrelia caused the counter-effect. Population of Megrelia intensively started to furnish themselves with arms; not only political, but also armed resistance was organized as well. It helped the supporters of legal authorities in Megrelia and Abkhazia to defend themselves successfully from Mkhedrioni attacks.

The most disturbing factor for Shevardnadze's regime was the high activity of legal authorities' supporters in Abkhazia. The demonstrations of protest have been held in Sokhumi center since the day when Putch started and lasted for 200 days (until the war in Abkhazia).

Besides, the supply channel for Megrelia lay through Abkhazia. Shevardnadze's regime was failing to suffocate Megrelia by means of economic and information blockade. Abkhazia was a good rear for Megrelia and a bridge of communication with the rest of the world.

There was one more reason why Shevardnadze's regime planned the war in Abkhazia: this war could pull them out of deep political crisis. Not long before the war Tbilisi media published Shevardnadze's threat: "If Megrelia does not calm down, Georgia will suffer even more severe fiasco, than in Samachablo".

Thus, by provoking the war in Abkhazia, Shevardnadze's regime and Kremlin were planning to achieve the following goals:

• To give Kremlin a ground for tearing away Abkhazia from Georgia, its occupation and annexation by Russian army
• To punish population of Megrelia and particularly Megrelians in Abkhazia
• To destroy the resistance center in Western Georgia
• To strengthen the regime of criminal nomenclature and mafia in Georgia

But, for example 'Radio Liberty' Georgian staff till today are give misinformation that war in Abkhazia was began by Gamsakhurdia.

The first stage of Abkhazian War

Shevardnadze's regime, which broke to power by violence and did not even have any formal juridical or legal basis, was handed the impressive amount of light and heavy weapons from Soviet Army armory.

From the very beginning this war had carried openly criminal and brutal character. From the very first days excessive amount of personnel had been put into use - about 3.000 men and lots of heavy military equipment - about 150 tanks and other armored vehicles, hundred barrels of large-caliber artillery, tens of planes and helicopters, rocket (missile) settings for volley-fire. The equipment and artillery was used not against Abkhazian military forces (which consisted of several hundred of fighters and almost no heavy equipment), but against the peaceful population - destroying towns and villages.

Gangs of Shevardnadze's regime were more involved in robbery than military actions. They were robbing, assaulting Abkhazians and Georgians. It is significant to note, that on the earlier stage of the war Georgian population of Abkhazia not only stayed neutral, but also in many cases showed an armed resistance to the gangs of J.Ioseliani and T.Kitovani.

In order to create bestial hostility between Abkhazians and Georgians (Megrelians), which used to live in peace and mutual understanding, criminals of Kitovani and Ioseliani (majority of them drug-edicts) provoked unconcealed and unwitnessed in Georgia cruelty towards Abkhazians. On the other hand, Abkhazian ultra and CMPC hit men demonstrated even more of it.

In his letter to the World community President Gamsakhurdia had been warning, that the aim of Abkhazian war provoked by pro-Kremlin regime of Shevardnadze and separatists of Ardzinba is the genocide of Georgian population of Abkhazia.

Legal Authorities of Georgia and Dudayev's government from the very beginning of the war initiated peace process: was sent mixed delegation to Sokhumi and negotiations began, but Kremlin failed it. Dudayev from the first days of the war proclaimed that Chechnya is not to send troupers to Abkhazia and criticized sharply the Kremlin and Shevardnadze politics in Abkhazia, several times initiated peace negotiations.

The seize-fire

The first stage of Abkhazian war was over after the loss of Gagra and signing of capitulate (for Georgian side) Sochi agreement between Shevardnadze and Ardzinba. According to the agreement, Georgian military forces in Abkhazia were deprived of heavy weapons and had to leave the all territory of Abkhazia. Thus, the Georgian population of Abkhazia occurred to be the hostages in the hands of Abkhazian extremists, CMPC and "Kazaks".

By that time the armistice-line was drawn across the river Gumista (right near Sokhumi). The Georgian population over the western side of this line had already been totally exterminated or managed to escape.

The Georgian population of Gagra and its surroundings was circled and executed with exceptional cruelty by Russian hit men, "Kazaks" and Abkhazian extremists. Several thousands of Gagra residents, majority of them children, women and old people were executed within several hours. Mountains of corpses were buried in mass-graves with bulldozers or drown in the sea.

The first flow of refugees from Abkhazia, about 15.000-20.000 people reached Megrelia. It made the poor social-economic conditions of the region even worse.

***

The obvious fiasco of Shevardnadze's regime in Abkhazia caused the waves of protest all over Georgia.

The Megrelian resistants captured considerable amount of light weapons and some of the heavy ones from the Shevardnadze's defeated gangs, which fled in panic from Abkhazia and passed through Megrelia.

By summer 1993 almost the whole territory of Megrelia has been under the control of National Guard of Georgia loyal to President Gamsakhurdia. The military forces of Shevardnadze's regime left in Abkhazia started to support openly the legal authorities.

In the beginning of September 1993 the legal Supreme Council and the Cabinet of Ministers started functioning in Zugdidi. The resistance region of Western Georgia had turned into the wider Region of Restored Legal Power from Sokhumi to the rivers Tskhenistskhali and Rioni.

Ethnic cleansing in Abkhazia

In the middle of September 1993, troubled by the strengthening of legal authorities in Western Georgia, Kremlin imperialistic forces provoked another splash of war in Abkhazia.

Shevardnadze took the preventive measures. He dismissed the obedient "parliament" and established dictatorship of one man. It was the signal of the new slaughter in Abkhazia.

It is also significant, that the final stage of Georgian population's genocide in Abkhazia was accurately synchronized with October armed coup d'etat (Putch) in Moscow.

Legal authorities addressed the World Community immediately and warned them, that the war in Abkhazia was going to be renewed and the genocide of Georgian population of Abkhazia was going to take place.

Indeed merciless massive bombardments of Sokhumi and Ochamchire region started in couple of days. The heavy artillery, planes and missiles were used. According to Sochi agreement Abkhazians should not possess this kind of military equipment, Kremlin guaranteed that.

Realizing that the Georgian population was under the threat of extermination President Gamsakhurdia left Grozny, Chechenia and arrived from exile to Zugdidi, Western Georgia in order to organize legal and military defense of Georgian population. This step included huge personal risk.

On his arrival Z.Gamsakhurdia visited the frontlines in Gali and Ochamchire region. He met the commanders of all Georgian armed forces (including those under Shevardnadze's regime) and urged them to organize united defense front in Ochamchire region (the fall of Sokhumi was unavoidable by that time). He also suggested creating a safety corridor until Sokhumi for the evacuation of encircled civilians.

The efforts of the President brought its results. The joint operation of Georgia's united military forces started successfully the very next day.

However a day later troops of Shevardnadze's regime committed a treachery. They followed the order from Tbilisi, hastily left the positions and marched to Kutaisi and Tbilisi. Legal authorities' military forces were encircled and fighted their way back to the other side of Inguri River and meanwhile did their best to protect the population.

The massive extermination of the defenseless Georgian population started on the whole territory of Abkhazia, from Sokhumi to Gali. Abkhazian extremists, CMPC hit men, 'Kazaks', Armenian ultras and Russian militaries carried out these massive executions of armless population. About 25.000 people have been shot and killed during the few days, many of them - children, women and old people.

"And out of group of 12 front line soldiers, 2 were Abkhazian, 2 were Armenian, 1 Armenian locally from Sukhumi, 1 from Yerevan who was too young to go fight the good fight in Karabakh, and the rest were either from the North Caucasus or from places like in Siberia. What were they motivated by? Looting. They had been promised houses with tangerine gardens. They had been promised cars." - 'Briefing on Current Situation in Georgia and Implications for U.S. Policy, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe Monday, October 25, 1993', p.7

The huge flow of refugees escaped to Megrelia. In alpine frost and snow thousands of them cleared their way through Kodori and Lia river ravines and the alpine passes. Many hundred did not survive frost and hunger.

Most of the refugees were not able to take with them any goods, clothing, valuables, money or documents. Many of them were robbed on their way by the mobs of the regime.

Kremlin's role

Regarding the results of Abkhazian war the following should be underlined

1. Before the fall of Sokhumi Russian military ships evacuated from Sokhumi and Gulripshi region only Russian-speaking population and opened the fire from machine-guns when Georgians, including children tried to approach the ships. Documental videotape on this event was given by Zugdidi television.

2. During the war in Abkhazia in several Russian military bases had been concentrated enough military forces for making peace in the region (Russia according Sochi agreement was guarantor of peace in Abkhazia). However not a single attempt of it was ever made.

3. Russian army not only supplied Abkhaz separatists and CMPC hit men with heavy military equipment, but also even assisted them regularly with fire and troops. It is well known also, that Russian military ships bombarded and shelled by rockets Ochamchire during the nights.

4. Ethnic cleansing as the final stage of the war was planned beforehand and it had to take place in the beginning of the winter. In winter conditions, which mean for Western Georgia plenty of snow, the population had no possibility to hide and survive in the mountain forests or foothills of Eastern Abkhazia or Samurzakano.

***

Thus, in spite of all political and military efforts of legal authorities of Georgia and the sacrifice of President Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the genocide and ethnic cleansing of Georgian population (Megrelians) in Abkhazia was carried out as the Kremlin and its puppets in Tbilisi planned it.

Russian imperial forces have committed the major violation of human rights ever since 1940:
Indigenous national minority of Abkhazia was exterminated to a considerable extent and deprived their native land.

This crime exceeded in its cruelty the crimes of Stalinism committed against Ingushs, Chechens and other Caucasian nations. The fact, that World community and political circles ignored these acts of vandalism, created a background for the genocide of Chechen people.

Defense of mountainous Samurzakano

In spite of the violent attacks, Abkhaz separatists, CMPC and Russian hit men could not manage to break through the alpine ravines of Kodori River and other territories of mountainous Samurzakano, which is inhabited mostly by Svans.

After Georgian military forces retreated, considerable amount of them concentrated in this region, some troops from other Abkhazian regions with fighting capacity stayed there and took up a defensive position. The bridges and tunnels near the ravines had been blown up. From the beginning of November it started snowing. All these turned the mountainous Samurzakano into an impregnable fortress.

In spite of the fact that during several months the region was under multiple attacks and massive bombardment from Russian "Grad" and "Uragan" missiles, in spite of hunger and frost, mountainous Samurzakano survived.

Refugee problem in Megrelia

Shevardnadze's regime did not succeed in subjugation of Megrelia, that's why it took not only punitive measures against this region. Since 1991 severe social-economic sanctions have been taken against Megrelia. The region occurred in a complete economic and informational blockade.

The blockade became stronger after the restoration of legal Authorities of Georgia. For the whole summer 1993 Megrelia had been deprived of corn, flour, other food products, medicines, fuel, cash (under the conditions of strong inflation 10-20 thousand per cent in a year!). The situation in the region was really difficult.

After the defeat in Abkhazian war the social-economical situation in Megrelia became even worse. Resident population of Megrelia makes about 450.000 people, while about 220.000 refugees fled to the region during several days. In the middle of October the amount of refugees in Zugdidi and Tsalendjikha was almost the same as the amount of local population.

The legal Authorities and the local population of Megrelia carried out several radical and effective measures in order to provide the refugees with food and shelter. None of them was left without a shelter. Some of the Megrelian families in Zugdidi region gave a refuge to more than 20 refugees. Megrelia's towns and villages did not suffer from the hot water and electricity supply during the period when the legal power had been restored in the region. The health care system, schools, railway, post, telegraph and regional TV had been functioning intensively.

It was unique experience in world scale -- region get refugees near 25% of total population, without any help from the side of world society.

It is quite significant that Shevardnadze's regime shamelessly concealed the existence of refugees in Megrelia. Mass media misinformed the whole world as if there was not a single refugee in Megrelia.

Because of the huge amount of refugees and the total blockade the social-economic situation in Megrelia became critical. People were starving, dangerous infectious diseases occurred in some places.

Legal authorities repeatedly applied to the World Community and pledged for help. The experts and representatives of UN and International Red Cross were informed about the situation in Megrelia. However no efficient assistance was provided.

***

Under these circumstances the legal authorities were obliged to take urgent measures to break through the blockade and take over the control on the nearest road and railway junctions.

Samtredia railway junction and Poti harbor were liberated without the fights. The considerable amount of food products and fuel were kept in these towns. After the liberation of Poti there was made an attempt to purchase flour, corn and fuel from Turkey.

These measures helped to save thousands of refugees and population of Megrelia from starvation and diseases. There was no single case of starving to death. Part of the flour and sugar was distributed among the population free of charge; part of it was sold for minimum price.

Kremlin and Shevardnadze mass media initiated propaganda that Zviadists blockade Poti seaport and Batumi-Tbilisi railway and it initiated the hunger in Armenia. Legal Authorities call Vice Premier of Armenia to Poti and made mixed commission to support transportation of Armenian freights - in several days all this freights were sent to Kutaisi (controlled by Shevardnadze).

But Moscow called international intervention to the Western Georgia of Russian, Ukrainian and Armenian armies (Azeri government refused) - to 'defense lines of international communications'.

Occupation of Megrelia

After the defeat (which was planned beforehand) in Abkhazia, Shevardnadze's regime was fully discredited in Georgia, army - demoralized and without the fighting capacity.

Tens of thousand of desperate refugees from Abkhazia demanded from the legal authorities to overthrow criminal regime of Shevardnadze, which had betrayed their interests and to start negotiations with Abkhazian side about the restoration of rights of Georgians and return of the refugees to their places of living. The population of Megrelia supported this demand.

Armed troops loyal to legal authorities, including the refugee troops of fighting capacity, started to move towards the East. They have liberated the regions of historical provinces of Imereti and Guria without fights and bloodshed. People greeted them as their liberators. There was no significant amount of Shevardnadze's troops up to Tbilisi.

However when the armed forces of legal authorities reached Kutaisi, the major town of Western Georgia, Shevardnadze asked for the Russian military help (this was supported by USA government**). B.Eltsin generously agreed to grant it (by the time Eltsin had already dispersed the Parliament and was practically a dictator).

Russia started open and massive involvement in the interior affairs of Georgia. Kremlin was cold-minded observer when tens of thousands of Georgians were exterminated in Abkhazia, but interfered immediately when the pro-Kremlin regime of Shevardnadze was put under the threat.

Armored carrier divisions were relocated from the Russian military bases in Kutaisi and Batumi all along the front-line (more than 30 heavy tanks). Russian navy has blocked Poti harbor. The huge Russian landing force under the leadership of admiral Baltin had been withdrawn from Sevastopol to Poti harbor.

It was a start of Russian military offence, which carried on two goals:

• To annihilate the legal authorities
• To accomplish the genocide of the population of Megrelia

Russian troops bombarded heavily not the front line of the legal authorities' troops, but the inhabited areas. As a result of Senaki bombardment with "Grad" missiles about 120 houses have been destroyed and hundreds of civilians killed or wounded.

Besides the military offences Russian special troops also carried out gendarme raids tracing the active political supporters of legal authorities.

Taking into the account the danger of extermination of the whole population of Megrelia, including the refugees, and the complete indifference of the World community towards the events in Georgia, legal authorities - President Gamsakhurdia personally made a decision to stop the military resistance.

Hordes of Shevardnadze's criminal regime covered up with Russian tanks rushed to Megrelia to rob and persecute the civilians.

In December 1993 it was proudly announced on Georgian TV that about 1200 "Zviadists" had been arrested with a help of Russian troops.

The severe repressions against the supporters of the legal authorities are still going on in Megrelia. Humanitarian aid meant for the refugees from Abkhazia is distributed among the mafia and criminal structures loyal to Shevardnadze.

Over 80.000 residents of Megrelia were forced to leave their place of living and seek for the shelter outside of Georgia. Megrelia has been without the electricity supply and transportation for months.

The refugees from Abkhazia are in awful conditions in the other parts of Georgia.

Shevardnadze's regime is doing its best to provoke the hostility between the local residents and the refugees in Megrelia. Separatist movements are encouraged as well.

Ethnic cleansing and genocide in Samurzakano

Svans and refugees from Abkhazia, which found a shelter in the mountains, managed to keep their land from the gangs of pro-Kremlin Abkhaz separatists and Russian hit men.

Svans managed to survive the severe conditions of winter 1993-94, spring and summer 1994 without any food or medical supply.

The villages and settlements of Mountainous Samurzakano were daily bombarded and shelled from November 1993 up to August 1994 with missiles.

Ethnic cleansing in Mountainous Samurzakano was accomplished by Russian "peacekeeping troops in Abkhazia" in the autumn of 1994. For the first time in many thousand years Mountainous Samurzakano was deprived of its indigenous population - Svans.

Summary

Ethnic cleansing of Mountainous Samurzakano was the last stage of the ethnic cleansing in whole Abkhazia and Samurzakano. First time for the thousands of years there is no Georgian population over the West side of the Enguri River. There are no representatives of Georgian sub ethnic groups, from which the name of the Enguri River comes.

As a result of this planned genocide Megrelian sub ethnic group has lost about 7% of the population, over 40% of residence territory, Svans - about 5% of population and 25% of the territory.

World democratic community, the Human Right Organizations, political circles and mass media did not properly evaluate genocide of Georgian population in Abkhazia, committed by Kremlin and Georgian pro-Kremlin forces. This fact made it easier to carry out the genocide of Chechenia and in a way determined the Russian turn-point to the policy of chauvinism and totalitarism.

Danger of new genocide in Megrelia

Kremlin and pro-Kremlin forces headed by Shevardnadze are planning the next stage of Megrelian population genocide and tearing apart the statehood of Georgia. It is a part of a plan of extermination of Georgian nation.

The conflicts are systematically provoked along the cost of Enguri River. The return of refugees to Abkhazia is delayed. Regarding the war in Chechenia Shevardnadze is holding the propaganda on mythological "military assistance to Dudaeyv from Abkhazia" etc.

The provocation of new military conflict in Megrelia is to be expected. The final goals of these conflicts are to cause the wave of Megrelian separatism. Non-Georgian ethnic groups outside of Georgia might also be involved in it.

Most certainly the population of Svanetia will also be involved in this conflict.

For Georgia it is very difficult period of history when the line of straggle between West and East (and dirty intrigues) is located on Georgia and his interests are ignored.

Bessarion Gugushvili
Prime Minister in-Exile of the Government of Zviad Gamsakhurdia,
Member of the Cabinet of Ministers of Chechen-Republic Ichkeria
of the government of Djokhar Dudaeyv

Vilnius, October 1994 - February 1995, Helsinki October 1966

On the base of Report for
UN High Commissar for Human Rights Mr. Lasso
"On the Condition of Sub ethnical groups of
Megrels and Svans as a Result of
1992 Criminal Coup d'etat in Georgia
and the War in Abkhazia", 1994