Think Again: Child Soldiers

What human rights activists never tell you about young killers.

"Child Soldiering Is a Human Rights Issue."

MUSTAFA ABDI/AFP/Getty Images

Exploited and dangerous: Child soldiers are more than just a moral hazard.

It's much more than that. It is also a geostrategic and development issue. Child soldiers are usually depicted as victims. That's accurate: Exploited, torn from their families, deprived of their education, and forced into battle, child soldiers are truly casualties of war.

But they're also assailants. Child soldiers are cheap and efficient weapons in asymmetric warfare. Accounts from the field tell of soldiers who are near free to recruit, cheap to feed, and quick to follow orders. They aptly learn how to employ brutal tactics. The Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a rebel group operating in Sierra Leone from 1991 to 2002, for example, was notorious for raping and mutilating the civilian population. It was often coerced children, and often high or drunk ones, who perpetrated the acts. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, fighting for independence from Sri Lanka, relied on children for their suicide bombing missions during their decades-long campaign. At times, they found that children could much more easily penetrate targets than their adult counterparts.

Trained and educated in the ways of guerrilla war, many child combatants grow up in a world where brutality is the norm. The result is a violent gift that keeps on giving -- today's Taliban leaders reputedly cut their teeth in the field as child soldiers fighting the Soviets. In addition to inducing psychological trauma, a violent childhood reduces healthy educational opportunities, leaving militancy the only viable career path in later years. War becomes a way of life.

"There Are 300,000 Child Soldiers in the World."

Who knows? No one has ever made a serious attempt at surveying the world's child soldier population. This popularly cited number was touted by members of several child advocacy groups in the mid-1990s as a way to attract attention to the plight of child soldiers. But if this figure was ever true, it isn't now. Wars employing child soldiers, such as those in Angola, Liberia, and Nepal, have ended; the numbers have surely shrunk to match.

What would be more useful than a global number, however, would be an individual assessment by country -- through which local and international policymakers could assess the associated needs and threats. Having 300,000 child soldiers in a world of 6.8 billion matters far less than having 15 percent of a particular country's adolescent population engaged in soldiering. Child soldiers have constituted more than a quarter of all belligerents in many conflicts, including at least nine in Africa over the last two decades.

Not even close. You can forget about the popular image that the phrase "child soldier" evokes: a pre-adolescent African boy, perhaps doped, wielding an AK-47 with anger burning in his eyes. Many child soldiers are not armed combatants. They include messengers, porters, spies, and sex slaves. So great is the diversity of tasks that many advocates now prefer the less punchy but more accurate term, "children associated with fighting forces."

Nor does the gender distinction hold water. Recent studies estimate that girls represent as high as 40 percent of fighters in some armed groups. Girls have fought in nearly 40 wars in the last two decades. Like their male counterparts, girls do at times serve as combatants, just as both genders are recruited for sexual enslavement.

Certainly, child soldiering is a global phenomenon, not simply an African one. More than 70 military organizations in 19 countries around the world recruited and used them in armed hostilities between 2004 and 2007. Burma is among the largest users of child soldiers, with the government and rebel groups recruiting tens of thousands of children between them. In Colombia, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, child soldiers have taken to the battlefield. In fact, both Britain and the United States also recruit 17-year-olds, technically still children, on the grounds that they are not allowed into combat (though both have admitted to putting under-18s on the front lines in Afghanistan and Iraq). Australia, Austria, Canada, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and New Zealand all have similar policies.

"Globalization Created Child Soldiering."

Wrong. Child soldiering is often portrayed as something new -- a product of the post-Cold War flow of cheap guns and money to the world's most failed states. In fact, child soldiers have been around for millennia. The Spartans of ancient Greece, for example, relied heavily on boys as young as seven. Later, the British Navy recruited young lads to serve as cabin boys and cannon-prepping "powder monkeys" throughout the 18th and 19th centuries. Large numbers of children fought on both sides in the U.S. Civil War.

What has changed is our awareness of child soldiers, boosted by monitoring, reporting, and even Hollywood spectacle. And this has coincided with a dramatic change in the perception of childhood, at least in the industrialized West, where early years are seen as a sacred time reserved for innocence, learning, and play. The West's view of children as needing nurture is an outlier in much of the rest of the world, where children are also an economic resource -- on farms and in households, markets, and factories.

As for the role of the small-arms trade, although an adolescent brandishing an AK-47 is certainly terrifying, most child soldiers never touch a weapon. Besides, in many recent wars the old-fashioned machete was preferred to the gun.

"Child Soldiers Are No Match for Western Militaries."

Only in conventional combat. Asymmetrical conflicts, however, are another story. Take suicide bombing, which child soldiers have carried out in the Palestinian territories, Iraq, Sri Lanka, and Chechnya. There is little that trained soldiers can do other than guess that a nearby child is in fact a suicide bomber. In Afghanistan, a 14-year-old was responsible for the first killing of a NATO soldier -- likely just one of the estimated 8,000 child soldiers who do or have worked as part of the Taliban's forces.

Face to face with child soldiers in battle, Western military forces are often befuddled as to what to do. Should they engage, retreat, surrender, or attempt to disarm? The U.S. Army's war manual, for example, offers no guidance on rules of engagement. The British Army only recognized the problem after one of its patrols was captured by child RUF soldiers in Sierra Leone, having been hesitant to attack the under-15-year-olds. Britain later used pyrotechnics and loud explosions in that conflict to induce panic among the ill-trained youngsters, many of whom would simply run away.

"Our Current Approach to Ending Child Soldiering Is Working."

You wish. The international community primarily deals with child soldiers through deterrence (prosecuting the adult recruiters) and demobilization (taking away the children's guns and sending them home). Neither approach goes far enough.

In the first case, prosecutors hope to set an example for future would-be offenders. But most recruiters think they will not get caught. Others, knowing that only those who lose the fight get hauled before international courts, desperately employ child soldiers to avoid defeat. Still others assume they will be granted amnesty after a cease-fire. The Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda is a perfect example. Elusive warlord Joseph Kony has employed child soldiers since the 1990s without being captured, and Ugandan officials privately admit that they might need every carrot they can get (including amnesty) to negotiate a successful peace agreement.

Sending children home via disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs is another favorite method of post-conflict planners. These programs are meant to get children and adolescents out of armies and back where they belong -- in schools or in jobs. But here again, results are mixed. Many organizers make the mistake of excluding girls from their programs. They often fail to understand the local economy and therefore train children for the wrong professions. In Liberia, for example, too many ex-combatants were educated as carpenters and hairdressers. Nor do the programs target the roots of intergenerational violence that will long outlast the active fighting. DDR initiatives are often too short term to do much more than superficial training, as even officials from the U.S. Agency for International Development will admit.

The biggest challenge of all in ending child soldiering lies in the types of conflicts that employ the young. Children tend to be recruited in brutal, long-running civil wars, the kind that simmer for years or even decades. Unfortunately, these wars constitute the main form of armed conflict today. Until they stop, the recruitment of children never will.

Scott Gates is director of the Centre for the Study of Civil War at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, and a professor at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology.

Simon Reich is director of the Division of Global Affairs at Rutgers University. They are coeditors of the forthcoming book Child Soldiers in the Age of Fractured States.

Líder de oposição em Mianmar nega acusações em julgamento

A líder da oposição de Mianmar, Aung San Suu Kyi , negou no tribunal ter violado os termos de sua prisão domiciliar quando um americano visitou sua casa, em Yangun.

Suu Kyi, que foi levada a uma prisão no último dia 14 para aguardar o julgamento, disse que não se deu conta imediatamente da presença do intruso, mas foi informada mais tarde por uma assistente.

Numa rara concessão, o regime birmanês permitiu a presença de alguns diplomatas e jornalistas locais no tribunal.

A expectativa é de que Suu Kyi, detentora do Nobel da Paz em 1991, seja condenada a até cinco anos de prisão. O julgamento começou há pouco mais de uma semana.

O processo vem sendo criticado como sendo uma forma encontrada pelos militares para manter a líder da oposição presa até depois das eleições programadas para o ano que vem.

Esta foi a primeira vez que Suu Kyi prestou depoimento no processo. Ela foi acusada pelo governo militar depois que o americano John Yettaw passou a noite em sua casa, onde ela passou a maior parte dos últimos 19 anos em prisão domiciliar.

"Não fiquei sabendo (da visita) imediatamente. Fui informada às 05h00. Minha assistente me disse que um homem havia chegado", disse Suu Kyi no tribunal.

Ela contou ter dado "abrigo temporário" ao intruso, e disse que não informou as autoridades. Segundo Suu Kyi, o homem deixou sua casa às 23h45, no dia 5 de maio.

"Só sei que ele foi para o lado do lago. Não sei que direção ele tomou porque estava escuro."

Mas os generais do regime afirmam que o incidente foi planejado para constranger o governo.

Veredicto

Há sinais de que as autoridades querem dar um fim rápido ao julgamento.

O advogado de Suu Kyi, Nyan Win, disse na segunda-feira que a promotoria cancelou as últimas testemunhas, para que sua cliente fosse chamada a depor, mesmo sem ter tido a chance de conversar com ele antes.

Nyan Win disse ter "absoluta certeza" de que as autoridades estão tentando apressar o julgamento e que "pode ser que elas já tenham escrito o veredicto".

Há informações conflitantes sobre se o governo birmanês pensa ter o direito de manter Aun San Suu Kyi detida independente do resultado do julgamento.

Em um comunicado, o governo militar disse que a líder pró-democracia passou apenas quatro anos e meio em prisão domiciliar de um máximo de cinco anos, e por isso o regime pode legalmente estender sua pena por mais seis meses.

Mas um alto oficial da polícia disse que as autoridades vinham considerando libertar Suu Kyi, como um gesto humanitário, antes da visita do americano.

Já os advogados da líder da oposição dizem que sua sentença de cinco anos expira nesta semana.

Para mais notícias, visite o site da BBC Brasil

Protestos dos Monges Budistas da Birmânia

Dia 24 de setembro de 2007

Aung San Suu Kyi: The lady's not for Turning

Aung San Suu Kyi: The lady's not for Turning

Aung San Suu Kyi rarely receives visitors. Apart from the regular visits by her doctor and Special Branch police officers, there is only the occasional United Nations envoy, and on a rainy day in September 2007, hundreds of Buddhist monks who walked to her house chanting prayers in her honour before leading the biggest uprising in Burma since 1988.

Suu Kyi’s latest visitor came uninvited and, unwittingly, cast her from seclusion back into the center of Burma’s long drawn out political drama. An American called John William Yettaw swam across Inya Lake in Rangoon, spending two days as an unwelcome house guest with Suu Kyi. Authorities arrested Yettaw on his return journey on May 6. This bizarre incident became the pretext for the ruling military government to file charges against Suu Kyi for breaching conditions of her house arrest order, in force since 2003.

On May 14 Burmese authorities arrested the pro-democracy leader and 1991 Nobel Peace prize winner, along with her two maids. They are currently detaining the three in Rangoon’s squalid Insein prison. On May 18, she went on trial and faces a potential prison term of three to five years, even though many Burmese expected her house arrest to be extended for another year anyway. International condemnation was immediate and widespread, including from some of Burma’s southeast Asian neighbors and usual protectors.

Burmese authorities last detained Suu Kyi in Insein Prison in May 2003, after a pro-government mob attacked her motorcade in Depayin in upper Burma. Scores of Suu Kyi’s supporters were killed in what was clearly a ham-fisted attempt to murder her. After several weeks in Insein prison, authorities sent Su Kyi to her Rangoon home where she has remained in isolation for the last six years.

Suu Kyi’s party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), has been eviscerated by government repression --offices closed, members forced to resign, many thrown in prison or forced into exile, only the old leaders, the ”uncles” allowed to speak to the outside world. Burma’s prisons hold more than 2,100 political activists, a cross section of society incarcerated as an example to deter broader dissent.

The military government continues to deny the NLD freedom to function as a normal opposition. Widespread scepticism is the attitude towards elections that are scheduled for 2010 as part of a tightly scripted sham political process - the generals’ ”Road Map to Disciplined Democracy.” But what role does ‘The Lady’, as she is popularly referred to, have in this sham process of reform designed to ensure future military rule with a civilian veil?

The question of Aung San Suu Kyi’s relevance to Burma’s political future has been clearly answered by the military government’s latest move. If the generals did not think she still embodied a challenge to their rule, they would have released her long ago. Suu Kyi’s remains the symbol of defiance to a rotten system of military rule.

The generals aren’t the only ones impatient with her principles. Lately, some diplomats, aid workers and journalists have criticized Su Kyi’s ”hard-line” approach and lack of compromise in dealing with the generals, and bemoan her support of Western sanctions. But sanctions are hardly to blame for the paranoia and xenophobia of Burma’s generals and socio-economic atrophy. Burma’s dire poverty is a direct result of four decades of military rule, political instability, and economic mismanagement. It cannot be blamed on a woman held in isolation for 14 of the past 20 years.

Su Kyi’s unflinching commitment to peaceful change and rights for all in Burma explains her popularity inside and outside the country and fuels the military’s enmity against her. The generals have proved once again Suu Kyi’s pivotal personification of freedom in Burma. The military government can go through the motions of legal proceedings, but it only shows their mendacity, and boosts her popularity. Burma’s rulers should set her free, and start learning from her example.

David Scott Mathieson is the Burma Researcher for Human Rights Watch

Diplomata diz que Suu Kyi 'estala de energia' em tribunal

Julgamento de líder pró-democracia acusada de violar prisão domiciliar está sendo realizado a portas fechadas.

- A líder pró-democracia de Mianmar, Aung San Suu Kyi, parecia "calma" e "estalando de energia" na audiência de seu julgamento nesta quarta-feira, na capital do país, Yangun, segundo um diplomata britânico que conseguiu permissão para assistir aos procedimentos.

Suu Kyi que passou os últimos quase 20 anos de sua vida é acusada de ter violado os termos de sua prisão domiciliar, depois que um americano, John Yettaw, atravessou a nado um lago para chegar à casa em que ela estava confinada.

Pelas normas da Constituição do país, Suu Kyi deveria ser libertada no dia 27 de maio, depois de seis anos consecutivos de prisão domiciliar. Mas, na semana passada, ela foi presa depois do incidente e levada ao presídio de Insein, na capital.

As autoridades birmanesas permitiram que um pequeno grupo de jornalistas locais e diplomatas estrangeiros pudessem participar do julgamento iniciado na segunda-feira. Não foi autorizado, entretanto, que fossem feitas imagens dos procedimentos.

O diplomata da Grã-Bretanha em Mianmar, Mark Canning, foi um dos que obteve permissão para observar os procedimentos no caso de Aung San Suu Kyi,

"Ela estava contida, ereta, estalando de energia, no comando de sua equipe de defesa. Os procedimentos foram um policial fornecendo várias provas contra o americano que teve acesso ao complexo onde ela estava", disse.

"Após a conclusão da sessão, ela falou rapidamente com os diplomatas que estavam lá, dizendo esperar encontrá-los em uma ocasião melhor", afirmou.

Canning elogiou a decisão do governo de permitir que jornalistas e diplomatas acompanhem o julgamento, que está sendo realizado a portas fechadas. Mas ele afirma que não acredita que o resultado será justo.

"Toda a parafernália de um julgamento está lá, os juízes, a promotoria, a defesa. Mas acho que esta é uma história na qual a conclusão já foi escrita. Então, não tenho nenhuma confiança no resultado", afirmou.

Defesa

O advogado de Suu Kyi insiste que o americano John Yettaw não havia sido convidado para uma visita.

Se for condenada, Aung San Suu Kyi pode ser sentenciada a até cinco anos de prisão - período que abrange eleições planejadas para o ano que vem.

A duração do julgamento é imprevisível. Correspondentes dizem que pode durar poucos dias ou várias semanas - o governo deve chamar até 22 testemunhas de acusação.

Na audiência desta quarta-feira, Suu Kyi se encontrou com três autoridades estrangeiras, o embaixador de Cingapura, e representantes da Rússia (que ocupa a presidência do Conselho de Segurança da ONU), e da Tailândia.

A líder pró-democracia, que tem 63 anos de idade, tem saúde frágil e está detida sem acusação formal por mais de 13 dos últimos 19 anos. Seu julgamento gerou críticas da comunidade internacional.

Encarcera, a Nobel da Paz será julgada Segunda Feira.

Aung San Suu Kyi,63 anos e Nobel da Paz

Aung San Suu Kyi ganhou o prêmio Nobel da paz em 1991. Não pode recebê-lo porque estava presa.

A golpista Junta Militar birmana, - instalada em 1988 e tendo à frente o narco-general Than Shwe-, não permitiu a sua saída do país para receber o prêmio Nobel.

Os generais transformaram a Birmânia num narco-estado. Embolsam o obtido com as vendas de diamantes: a Birmânia tem reserva de diamantes e pedras precisas.

Referidos generais davam sustentação ao recém falecido Khun Sun, conhecido mundialmente como o rei do ópio e das anfetaminas. A Birmânia é responsável pela distribui drogas sintéticas e ópio para toda a Ásia. Ficou conhecida como Narco-estado.

Em 1990 foram realizadas eleições gerais, por pressão internacional.

A vitoriosa foi Aung Suu Kyi, filha de Aung San, o grande herói da independência e que acabou assassinado pelos generais.

o narco-ditador da Birmânia

Suu Kyi tornou-se a líder da Liga Nacional para a Democracia (NLD). Obteve o seu partido, nas eleições parlamentares de 1990, 392 das 485 cadeiras estabelecidas.

Surpreendidos com a derrota, os militares arrependeram-se de terem realizado as eleições. Então, Aung Suu Kyi, além de não assumir a cadeira de premier, acabou presa por suas idéias e liderança.

Antiga colônia britânica, a Birmânia tornou-se independente em 1948.

A primeira ditadura militar teve início em 1962, sob comando do general Ne Win. Ele foi derrubado pela atual Junta Militar, que assumiu o controle do país em 1988, como frisado acima

Nos últimos 19 anos, Aung Suu Kyi passou 13 em prisão, incomunicável. Parte da pena, — por crime político e de exteriorização do pensamento–, ela cumpre, sempre incomunicável e com a casa cercada de soldados, na residência deixada em herança pelo pai, à beira do lago Inya.

Aung Suu Kyi está com 63 anos de idade. É viúva e não recebeu autorização para comparecer ao enterro do marido, com o qual estava impedida de se relacionar.

Na semana passada, Aung Suu Kyi foi colocada no presídio fechado de Insein. Ela corre o risco, no processo criminal que será julgado amanhã, segunda feira, de receber pena que varia de 3 a 5 anos de cárcere.

O motivo da prisão fechada beira o ridículo.

.

Casamento: os diamantes da filha do ditador.

John William Yettaw, –um norte-americano de 53 anos de idade, ex-combatente na Guerra do Vietnã e que está aposentado por problemas mentais–, resolveu atravessar o lago Inya a nado e invadir a casa de Aung Suu Kyi. Sua meta, como adepto da religião mórmon dos EUA, era entregar uma bíblia para Aung Suu Kyi.

William nadou 2 km, invadiu a casa e surpreendeu a Nobel com a entrega da bíblia. No dia seguinte à sua aventura, quando estava no aeroporto para retornar aos EUA, foi interrogado pelas autoridades, em atividade rotineira. Outra surpresa: William contou ter conseguido nadar 2 km e logrado entregar uma bíblia à Nobel da Paz.

Interrogada sobre o sucedido, Aung San Kyi, conhecida na Birmânia como o respeitoso apelido de “A Senhora”, confirmou o sucedido e frisou nunca ter visto antes o intruso William.

A acusação é de ter violado as regras da prisão domiciliar ao receber um hóspede.

PANO RÁPIDO. O general-ditador Than Shwe, –que se notabilizou por ter coberto a filha de diamantes em cerimônia de casamento–, prepara, sob pressão das Nações Unidas, uma outra eleição para 2010. Caso condenada, Aung San Suu Kyi, não poderá participar dela e nem se manifestar.

–Wálter Fanganiello Maierovitch–

EUA exigem que opositora birmanesa possa ver seu médico

WASHINGTON (AFP) — Autoridades americanas exigiram nesta segunda-feira que Aung San Suu Kyi, líder da oposição birmanesa em prisão domiciliar, possa ver "imediatamente" seu médico particular, atualmente preso, e se disseram preocupadas com a saúde da ganhadora do Nobel da Paz.

"Os Estados Unidos estão preocupados com as informações segundo as quais Aung San Suu Kyi está precisando de um acompanhamento médico, e as autoridades birmanesas prenderam Tin Myo Win, seu médico particular", declarou o novo porta-voz do departamento de Estado, Ian Kelly.

"Conclamamos o regime de Mianmar a permitir que Aung San Suu Kyi receba imediatamente cuidados de seu médico particular", acrescentou Kelly durante uma entrevista coletiva.

"Também pedimos ao regime que autorize Aung San Suu Kyi a se encontrar com seu advogado particular imediatamente", prosseguiu.

"Num momento em que está se aproximando o aniversário de sua detenção, tudo isso nos lembra que a prisão domiciliar de Aung San Suu Kyi é injusta", destacou o porta-voz.

"Nós nos unimos aos apelos da comunidade intermacional para pedir sua libertação imediata, assim como a de pelo menos 2.000 prisioneiros políticos do regime birmanês", finalizou.

Aung San Suu Kyi, 63 anos, "não está bem", não consegue se alimentar, está desidratada e com pressão baixa, avisou sábado à AFP Nyan Win, porta-voz da Liga Nacional pela Democracia (LND), o partido da opositora birmanesa.

Prêmio Nobel da Paz em 1991, esta mulher de olhar doce e silhueta frágil, sempre advogou pela não-violência em um país que vem sendo governado por juntas sucessivas a partir de 1962.

Nascida em 19 de junho de 1945, Suu Kyi, filha de Aung San, herói da independência birmanesa assassinada em 1947, teve acesso às melhores escolas de Rangun, prosseguindo seus estudos na Índia - país onde sua mãe foi nomeada embaixadora - e depois seguiu para Oxford.

Assistente da Escola de Estudos Orientais de Londres, ele se casou em 1972 com o britânico Michael Aris, universitário especialista em Tibete e budismo, com quem teve dois filhos.

De volta à Birmânia em abril de 1988 para cuidar de sua mãe doente, Aung San Suu Kyi fez um discurso público pela primeira vez.

Em um país submetido à lei marcial, ele reivindicava a formação de um governo interino e eleições livres antes de fundar, com outros militantes, a Liga Nacional pela Democracia (LND).

Em maio de 1990, seu partido foi muito votado nas eleições pluralistas. A junta, mesmo com o resultado, se negou a deixar o governo. Até hoje os generais continuam no poder.

Mas a líder da oposição birmanesa sempre se disse convencida de ter "o povo ao seu lado", apesar da repressão promovida pela junta.

Suu Kyi teve a prisão domiciliar decretada de 1989 até meados de 1995. Depois disso, chegou a ter um breve período de "liberdade" até 2000. Neste ano, porém, ela foi novamente confinada entre as quatro paredes de sua residência por mais 19 meses.

Presa novamente em maio de 2003, depois de um ataque assassino contra seu carro, ela foi condenada a um terceiro período de prisão domiciliar e, a partir desse momento, sua pena não parou de ser prolongada.

Certa de sua causa e com o apoio ocidental, em particular o norte-americano e o europeu, Aung San Suu Kyi abandonou a queda-de-braço com o governo depois da abertura, no fim de 2000, de discussões históricas sobre a "reconciliação nacional".

Comparada no Ocidente com figuras como Mandela ou Gandhi, Suu Kyi sempre se mostrou confiante de que o tempo jogaria em favor da democracia.

Comentário: Infiltrando-se entre os 'criminosos' em Mianmar

Ditadura birmanesa endurece contra ativistas de direitos humanos.
Repórter fala com ex-presos políticos que dizem correr risco de morrer.

Nicholas D. Kristof
Do New York Times, em Myawaddy, Mianmar

Antes de entrar em Mianmar vindo da Tailândia, você limpa suas malas de qualquer pista de envolvimento em algum mal pernicioso, como espionagem, jornalismo ou pregação de direitos humanos.

Depois, você deixa a cidade tailandesa de Mae Sot e atravessa a cintilantemente branca "ponte da amizade" até o posto da imigração birmanesa no outro lado. Entrando em Mianmar (antes conhecida como Birmânia), você ajusta seu relógio: Mianmar está adiantada em 30 minutos – e, ao mesmo tempo, 50 anos atrasada.

O governo da cidade já era um dos mais brutais do mundo, e nos últimos meses conseguiu se tornar ainda mais repressivo.

Um blogueiro, Nay Phone Latt, foi condenado a vinte anos na prisão. Um conhecido comediante, Zarganar, foi sentenciado a uma pena de 59 anos. Um ex-líder estudantil, Min Ko Naing, sobrevivente de anos de tortura e confinamento em solitárias, recebeu penas de 65 anos até agora, e enfrenta sentenças adicionais que podem atingir um total de 150 anos.

"Politicamente, as coisas estão piorando", disse David Mathieson, especialista em Mianmar do grupo Human Rights Watch, que vive na fronteira entre Tailândia e Birmânia. "Eles acabaram de sentenciar centenas de pessoas que deveriam ser agentes de mudança a longas penas na prisão."


Encontrei dificuldades para entrevistar as pessoas de Mianmar, porque viajava como turista com dois de meus filhos (minha esposa está cansada de eu sempre arrastar nossos filhos comigo para conhecer ditaduras). Porém, fomos parar no hospital Myawaddy, que tinha a equipe tão desfalcada que ninguém nos impediu de caminhar através de alas de pacientes negligenciados.

O negócio mais próspero que vimos no lado birmanês pertencia a um encantador de serpentes que montou uma loja temporária do lado de fora de um templo. No momento que se formou uma multidão, um soldado armado correu alarmado – e então relaxou, ao ver que a única ameaça à ordem pública era uma cobra.

Em Mae Sot, na Tailândia, visitei ex-prisioneiros políticos birmaneses, como o corajoso Bo Kyi. Eles estão sob risco de serem mortos por assassinos do governo birmanês, e mesmo assim continuam sua agressiva campanha por mudanças.

Igualmente inspiradores são os Free Burma Rangers (algo como Soldados pela Libertação da Birmânia), que arriscam suas vidas ao se infiltrarem nas profundezas do país durante meses, para providenciar cuidados médicos e documentar abusos de direitos humanos.

Um corajoso americano trabalhando com o grupo, que pediu que seu nome não fosse usado por razões de segurança, se comunicou comigo por um telefone via satélite, de seu esconderijo no centro de Mianmar. Ele sabe que o governo birmanês o matará caso o capture, e ainda assim permanece em busca de fotos e outras evidências de como os soldados birmaneses arrastam aldeões étnicos karen para trabalhos forçados e estupram mulheres e meninas. Um caso recente, descrito pelos Free Burma Rangers, envolvia uma menina de sete anos estuprada e morta.

A coragem dessas pessoas que buscam uma nova Mianmar é contagiante e inspiradora. Nesta nova administração, vamos ajudá-los – e ver se, com novas abordagens, poderemos finalmente derrubar um dos regimes mais odiosos do mundo.







A verdade é que a abordagem ocidental a Mianmar fracassou. A junta birmanesa governa despoticamente desde 1988, ignorando as eleições democráticas. Desde então, sanções tiveram efeito nulo em moderar o regime.

Tenho um grande respeito por Aung San Suu Kyi, a extraordinária mulher que ganhou um Prêmio Nobel da Paz por enfrentar os criminosos do país. Porém, o melhor uso de sua coragem agora seria aceitar que as sanções comerciais que ela defendia não conseguiram nada além de empobrecer ainda mais seu próprio povo. Assim como aconteceu em Cuba e na Coreia do Norte, isolar um regime corrupto geralmente atinge os inocentes e ajuda os criminosos a permanecer no poder.

Em vez disso, a melhor alternativa seria sanções financeiras que mirem especificamente indivíduos próximos ao regime – e, ainda mais, uma quebra na importação de armas de Mianmar.

"Seria muito difícil conseguir um embargo de armas através do Conselho de Segurança, mas isso é algo que atinge realmente ao coração de qualquer regime militar", diz Mathieson. "Você os priva das ferramentas de seu próprio auto-engrandecimento e da repressão."

O então presidente George W. Bush tentou ajudar os dissidentes de Mianmar, mas não teve nenhum capital internacional. A administração Obama, por sua vez, tem chances de liderar uma iniciativa global para conter as importações birmanesas de armas e trazer o regime à mesa de negociações.

As armas de Mianmar chegam através da China, Rússia, Ucrânia, Israel e Cingapura, e a Rússia está vendendo até mesmo um reator nuclear aos ditadores de Mianmar, diz Mathieson.

Ao atravessar da Tailândia a Mianmar, você cruza uma linha do tempo. Deixa o dinamismo e agitação da Tailândia e encontra uma estagnação de carros antigos e cabanas ao lado de esgotos abertos.

SHOOT ON SIGHT

Video advocates BURMA ISSUES travel deep into the jungles of eastern Burma to document one of the world's most urgent and most forgotten emergencies. (The video was co-produced with WITNESS)The Burmese military has embarked on one of the worst offensives in its 30 year campaign to destabilize the lives of rural ethnic minorities. Half a million live driven from their homes. INTERNATIONAL ACTION IS NEEDED!

Trabalho do ACNUR nos anos 90

Entre 1991 e meados de 1992, mais de 250.000 pessoas fugiram do Myanmar (antiga Birmânia) para o vizinho Bangladesh. Quase todos os refugiados eram Rohingyas, um grupo minoritário muçulmano vivendo num país maioritariamente budista. Apesar de não se encontrarem disponíveis estatísticas rigorosas, crê-se que os Rohingyas constituam pouco menos de metade da população do país, estimada em cerca de 4.5 milhões de pessoas.

Quando se iniciou o êxodo de refugiados, os recém-chegados ao Bangladesh afirmavam que tinham sido sujeitos a uma diversidade de violações dos direitos humanos, por parte das forças de segurança do Myanmar. De acordo com as denúncias dos refugiados, estes abusos tinham lugar no âmbito de tentativas de recrutar carregadores militares e trabalhadores não remunerados para projectos de obras públicas, bem como de esforços visando recolocar a população muçulmana no interior do Estado Rohingya. O Governo do Myanmar tem negado estas acusações.

Desde os primeiros dias do êxodo, tornou-se óbvio que o repatriamento voluntário era a única solução viável para a maioria dos refugiados. Mas antes que o ACNUR pudesse participar no processo de repatriamento, a organização tinha que ter a certeza de que os refugiados desejavam regressar e que, uma vez regressados a casa, a sua segurança e bem-estar poderiam ser verificados.

Papel proactivo

Durante muitos anos, o momento oportuno para o envolvimento do ACNUR nos programas de repatriamento voluntário era, em larga medida, determinado pelos próprios refugiados. Estes decidiam quando queriam regressar e recebiam protecção e assistência da comunidade internacional até ao dia em que optavam por fazê-lo. Contudo, durante os anos 80, o ACNUR começou a desempenhar um papel mais proactivo na procura de soluções, prestando activamente assistência a refugiados no seu regresso e reintegração, assim que a situação no seu país tivesse melhorado substancialmente.

Mais recentemente, a implementação de acordos de paz alargados num conjunto de países, que tinham sido devastados pela guerra, supervisionados por forças de manutenção da paz das Nações Unidas e por pessoal civil, permitiram que o ACNUR pudesse ir um passo mais longe no processo de repatriamento. Assim, em países como o Camboja e Moçambique, os programas de repatriamento da organização têm sido baseados no pressuposto de que a grande maioria dos refugiados será capaz - e deseja - regressar ao seu país e participar na eleição de um novo governo.

A questão da segurança e do carácter voluntário do repatriamento têm sido mais problemáticas em relação à situação dos refugiados Rohingyas. Do lado da fronteira do Bangladesh, o ACNUR não teve inicialmente um acesso total aos campos onde os refugiados tinham sido instalados. No Myanmar, ao contrário do que aconteceu com o Camboja e com Moçambique, a situação política permaneceu inalterada ao nível nacional. Acresce que o ACNUR não tinha uma presença no país e não pôde, por isso, verificar a situação no interior da região de origem dos refugiados.

O repatriamento dos refugiados para o Myanmar foi ainda mais complicada devido a factores de ordem social, económica e jurídica. As pessoas que fugiam para o Bangladesh eram sobretudo camponeses sem terra, com fracas oportunidades geradoras de rendimentos no Estado Rohingya. Devido à leis de nacionalidade do país, os Rohingyas não são, geralmente, reconhecidos como nacionais do Myanmar, nem têm o direito de circular livremente no interior do pais.

A maioria da população do Myanmar olha geralmente os Rohingyas como estrangeiros, o que tem sido reforçado por um conjunto de diferentes factores: a origem persa e árabe dos Rohingyas, a sua lealdade para com os ingleses durante o período colonial, o receio da imigração ilegal do Bangladesh, país muçulmano sobrepovoado e arruinado, bem como a preocupação com a segurança colocada pela existência de dois grupos rebeldes armados Rohingyas que, segundo se afirma, são apoiados por governos estrangeiros. A integração deste grupo após o seu regresso prometia, deste modo, ser uma tarefa difícil.

Apesar de todas estas incertezas, em Abril de 1994, o ACNUR deu início a um programa de repatriamento organizado, que permitiu a muitos milhares de pessoas regressarem a casa sob os auspícios da organização. A manter-se o actual nível de regressos, a vasta maioria dos refugiados regressará ao Myanmar antes do final de 1995.

Opções de longo prazo

A prontidão com que o ACNUR organizou este programa de repatriamento - e a vontade dos refugiados em nele participarem - resulta de diversas considerações.

O Bangladesh é um dos países mais pobres e mais densamente povoados do mundo, não dispondo nem de terra, nem de recursos que permitam absorver tantas pessoas. A integração local neste país não constitui, por isso, uma opção de longo prazo realista.

O programa reúne um conjunto de garantias. De acordo com os actuais procedimentos, os refugiados manifestam a sua vontade de regressar ao Myanmar, inscrevendo-se no programa de repatriamento. Uma vez registados, são livres de mudarem de opinião a todo o momento, qualquer que seja o motivo, antes de atravessarem a fronteira - direito que muitos refugiados têm exercido, normalmente devido a um motivo temporário, nomeadamente por doença de um dos membros da família.

No Myanmar, o governo convidou o ACNUR a estabelecer uma presença, quer na capital, Yangon, quer no próprio Estado Rohingya. Consequentemente, a organização encontra-se agora numa posição que lhe permite supervisionar o bem-estar dos retornados. Ao mesmo tempo, o ACNUR fornece aos refugiados alimentos, subsídios em dinheiro e outras formas de assistência individual, no momento do seu regresso ao Myanmar, e leva a cabo programas de reabilitação baseados na comunidade nas suas regiões de origem. De acordo com o pessoal do ACNUR colocado na região, estas iniciativas têm desempenhado um papel crucial em relação à vontade dos retornados regressarem ao Myanmar. Embora a sua situação no Estado Rohingya possa não ser fácil, os refugiados parecem ter reconhecido que é melhor regressarem a casa e beneficiarem da presença e dos programas do ACNUR, do que permanecerem em campos de refugiados que não lhes podem oferecer qualquer futuro.

O Regresso involuntário

O envolvimento do ACNUR no regresso de refugiados ao Myanmar tem assumido um significado particular em face dos acontecimentos que antecederam o lançamento do programa de repatriamento da organização. Em Abril de 1992, os governos do Bangladesh e do Myanmar assinaram um acordo bilateral, sem a participação do ACNUR. Cinco meses depois iniciou-se o repatriamento de refugiados para o Myanmar e, em Outubro de 1992, o ACNUR recebeu formalmente autorização para entrevistar os refugiados e avaliar a natureza voluntária do seu regresso. Contudo, a organização renunciou rapidamente a este papel, devido às dificuldades de acesso aos refugiados, bem como a denúncias generalizadas de que estes estaríam a ser sujeitos a abusos por parte de funcionários dos campos e de que estaríam a ser forçados a regressar ao Myanmar.

O ACNUR e outros membros da comunidade internacional protestaram vigorosamente contra estes desenvolvimentos, tendo as violações subsequentemente cessado e os funcionários em questão sido demitidos das suas funções. Ao mesmo tempo, o ACNUR negociou novos acordos com as autoridades do Bangladesh, que concederam à organização um melhor acesso aos campos, permitindo que o pessoal do ACNUR entrevistasse potenciais retornados.

Em Novembro de 1993, após o regresso de quase 50.000 refugiados, ao abrigo do programa de repatriamento bilateral, as autoridades do Myanmar concederam ao ACNUR acesso também ao Estado Rohingya. Subsequentemente, a organização foi autorizada a circular livremente na região (apesar de tal poder ser difícil em termos logísticos), bem como a supervisionar a situação dos retornados. Os esforços do ACNUR para ajudar os retornados na sua reintegração no Myanmar, através de projectos nos sectores do abastecimento de água, saúde, educação e projectos geradores de rendimentos, oferecem outros meios de promover e supervisionar o bem-estar de ex-refugiados. Em meados de 1995, o ACNUR não tinha encontrado quaisquer provas que sugerissem que os retornados tivessem sido sujeitos a perseguição ou discriminação, apesar de terem ocorrido alguns incidentes, envolvendo a detenção e recolocação de antigos refugiados.

Apesar destes resultados encorajadores, duas importantes questões continuam por resolver. Em primeiro lugar, um número desconhecido de refugiados, mas ao que tudo parece relativamente pequeno poderá optar por não regressar ao Myanmar, devido às suas actividades e alianças políticas. Outra categoria de "casos residuais", cujo futuro terá que ser determinado, integra refugiados residentes em campos e que imigraram ilegalmente do Bangladesh para o Myanmar antes de 1991 e que, consequentemente, não têm o direito de regressar ao Estado Rohingya.

Uma segunda e talvez mais significativa questão diz respeito à prevenção de futuros êxodos ou expulsões do Myanmar para o Bangladesh. Para prevenir quaisquer futuras ocorrências deste tipo, será necessário desenvolver esforços para oferecer à minoria muçulmana do Myanmar uma maior segurança, protegendo os seus direitos humanos, melhorando o seu estatuto social e político e oferecendo-lhes maiores oportunidades geradoras de rendimentos. Embora o ACNUR procure actualmente abordá-las, em última análise, a responsabilidade por estas questões deve ser assumida pelo país de origem.

Myanmar: Rohingya face rising food insecurity

Source: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)

Date: 01 Apr 2009

LAY YWAR, 1 April 2009 (IRIN) - Food insecurity is nothing new for many Rohingya in northern Rakhine State, most of whom live in abject poverty, but this year is particularly bad.

Of the state's almost one million inhabitants, about 85 percent are Rohingya, an ethnic, linguistic and religious minority that are de jure stateless in line with the country's laws. According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), they are denied citizenship and subject to strict restrictions on movement, employment and religious freedoms.

Much of the food shortage can be attributed to a poor agricultural season in 2007 and 2008, rising food and agricultural inputs, and declining employment opportunities for the landless poor.

The price of rice, a staple, was 75 percent higher in June 2008 against 2007, prompting many Rohingya families to forgo one meal a day.

"Our recent field reports indicate a similar, if not worse, situation as regards household food insecurity in the early months of this year, largely due to growing levels of debt, a reduced harvest in the main 2008-2009 agricultural season, coupled with declining opportunities for wage labour," Chris Kay, country director of the UN World Food Programme (WFP), told IRIN in Yangon, the former Burmese capital.

Exacerbating the problem is the significant drop in village rice stores recorded last month compared with levels typical for this time of year, Kaye explained.

In addition, more Buddhist Rakhine families, as well as other ethnic households in the area, require assistance than before. Until recently food assistance was largely targeted at the Muslim population.

Restrictions

However, according to rights activists, restrictions imposed by authorities on the Rohingya make their plight particularly dire.

As the government insists they are Bengali and do not have the same rights as ordinary citizens, they are routinely subject to controls aimed at extracting heavy payments, as well as other forms of discrimination.

Permits are required for everything from renovating their homes to marriage and travel. Even within Rakhine, Rohingya must apply for permission when travelling from one city to another.

When it comes to education, it is costly and often impossible. At the same time, there are virtually no job opportunities once they finish.

"I doubt that education will help us escape poverty," one Rohingya graduate told IRIN. "We can't use it to escape the poverty."

With little or no employment opportunities, most Rohingya have no choice but to rely on themselves. Many choose to leave and more than 200,000 live in neighbouring Bangladesh, while scores continue to flee to other countries in the region, including Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia.

"There is a critical need to stabilise the situation in [Rakhine]. This can be achieved by increasing the current level of humanitarian and development assistance while actively supporting efforts to normalise the citizenship status of those currently excluded," Kaye said.

Additional challenges

However, that could prove difficult.

WFP faced significant funding and commodity restraints in 2008, forcing the agency to cancel its Food-for-Education programme in northern Rakhine for the 2008/2009 academic year.

Although donations from the European Union and the UN are expected, they have yet to be received and the overall funding outlook for 2009 remains uncertain.

WFP needs $16 million to support its planned food assistance activities in Myanmar, including seven programmes in Rakhine, this year.

lm/ds/mw A selection of IRIN reports are posted on ReliefWeb. Find more IRIN news and analysis at http://www.irinnews.org

Une sélection d'articles d'IRIN sont publiés sur ReliefWeb. Trouvez d'autres articles et analyses d'IRIN sur http://www.irinnews.org

This article does not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations or its agencies. Refer to the IRIN copyright page for conditions of use.

Cet article ne reflète pas nécessairement les vues des Nations Unies. Voir IRIN droits d'auteur pour les conditions d'utilisation.

New mine victims reinforce the need for treaty

Regional Meeting on Landmines Opens in Bangkok

(Bangkok: 2 April 2009) Continued landmine casualties in a number of Asian countries reinforce the need for these states to ban the weapon, said the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) today at the opening of a regional meeting on landmines.

Almost half of the countries worldwide that still have not banned antipersonnel mines are in the Asia-Pacific region; a total of 16 governments from the region remain outside the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (China, India, North Korea, South Korea, Lao PDR, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, Myanmar/Burma, Nepal, Pakistan, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vietnam). Worldwide, a total of 156 governments have joined the agreement, which celebrated ten years since its entry into force on 1 March 2009.

“The ongoing mine use in Burma stands in stark contrast to the complete rejection of mine use that we see elsewhere in the world,” said Fred Lubang of Nonviolence International Southeast Asia, a leading ICBL member. “We call on all parties to the conflict in Burma to cease mine-laying and undertake urgent measures to clean up the weapon and assist victims.”

Worldwide in recent years only Myanmar (Burma) and a few rebel groups have laid significant numbers of antipersonnel mines. In 2007, at least 438 new casualties caused by mines or explosive remnants of war were recorded in Myanmar (Burma), but the number of casualties is greatly underreported.

“Cambodia, Thailand and other affected states have made commendable progress in meeting the treaty’s obligations, but this is no easy task,” said Tamar Gabelnick, ICBL Treaty Implementation Director. “The ICBL strongly encourages all states to provide new commitments of cooperation and assistance in 2009, be it financial, technical, or in-kind support.”

Government representatives from more than 17 countries are participating in the “Bangkok Workshop on Achieving a Mine-Free South-East Asia” this week. The workshop is the second in a series of regional meetings convened in the lead-up to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty’s Second Review Conference, which will take place in Cartagena, Colombia in the week of 30 November 2009. The ICBL delegation includes landmine survivors from Afghanistan, Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam.

The Mine Ban Treaty comprehensively bans all antipersonnel mines, requires destruction of stockpiled mines within four years, requires destruction of mines already in the ground within 10 years, and urges extensive programs to assist the victims of landmines. The ICBL, 1997 Nobel Peace Laureate, is a global coalition of more than 1,000 non-governmental organizations in 70 countries.

CONTACT:

Ms. Shushira Chonhenchob, Handicap International/TCBL. Tel. +66-87-098-9379 or shushiraSPAMFLTER@SPATMFLTERgmail.com

Ms. Mary Wareham, Human Rights Watch/ICBL. Tel. +66-2255-2930 x 1114 or +64-21-996-905, mediaSPAMFLTER@SPATMFLTERicbl.org

Resenha de Filme: VJs de Mianmar - Notícias de um País Fechado

Está passando no festival "É Tudo Verdade - It's all True":

Munidos com apenas pequenas câmeras de mão os vídeo-jornalistas na Birmânia mantêm o fluxo de notícias do seu país fechado arriscando serem pegos, torturados e passarem uma vida na prisão. Portar uma câmera na ditatorial Mianmar equivale a arriscar uma sentença de morte sem julgamento, sequer. Foi o que ocorreu ao jornalista japonês Kenji Nagai, 50 anos, morto pela polícia em setembro de 2007, quando cobria os protestos dos monges budistas contra a junta militar que governa aquele país.

Joshua, de 27 anos, se torna um líder tático desse grupo de repórters durante a impressionante manifestação dos monges budistas. Todas as equipes estrangeiras de TV foram banidas do país, então cabe a Joshua e sua equipe manter a revolução viva nas telas do mundo. Quando a Inteligência do governo começa a entender o poder da câmera, os VJs se tornam os principais alvos - o que não esmorece a disposição dos que, do lado de fora, lutam por um mínimo de liberdade de expressão.




Aos interessados, essas são as próximas exibições:

CENTRO CULTURAL BANCO DO BRASIL (RIO DE JANEIRO - RJ) - 02/04 - 14H30
OI FUTURO (RIO DE JANEIRO - RJ) - 04/04 - 15H00
CENTRO CULTURAL BANCO DO BRASIL (BRASÍLIA - DF) - 19/04 - 16H30
CENTRO CULTURAL BANCO DO BRASIL (BRASÍLIA - DF) - 21/04 - 14H30

Burma: Capitalizing on the gains

Source: Refugees International (RI)

Date: 18 Mar 2009


Policy recommendations

- The United States should join other donor nations in making a significant appropriation for humanitarian aid in Burma. It should allocate $30 million for FY10, with plans to increase its contribution to $45 million in FY11 and $60 million in FY12.

- The United Nations should stengthen its support for the Burma Country team by hiring a Senior Humanitarian Advisor to work with the RC/HC and ensure that teams in Bangkok and New York are providing adequate guidance and support.

- ASEAN should look to apply the Tri-Partite Core Group model for use in the discussion of other issues of concern with Burma, such as the Rohingya.

In the past year, humanitarian assistance to Burma has been primarily focused on victims of Cyclone Nargis, which struck the Irrawaddy delta on May 2, 2008. Though the initial delivery of assistance was hampered by government obstruction, the aid programs that have since developed in the delta have benefited from an ease of operations unseen in other parts of the country. Relief work in the delta is progressing smoothly, but attempts to expand access to the rest of the country are struggling. Nonetheless, to capitalize on the existing gains, the U.S. should provide significant funding for programs throughout the country.

Operations Inside the Delta

Since June 2008, international aid organizations have expanded their operations to an unprecedented level inside Burma in order to respond to emergency needs created by the cyclone. Because of the small number of agencies working in the country prior to the storm, many that did not have emergency experience have modified their operations to provide relief. These changes, combined with the self-reliance of delta residents, have been largely successful in meeting the immediate needs of cyclone victims.

Agricultural production has revived, temporary housing has met the shelter needs of most residents, and income generation programs are beginning to address the economic needs of cyclone victims. In addition, the number of international NGOs in the country has doubled from 40 to almost 80, greatly increasing the capacity to support longer-term stabilization activities. Similarly, there has been a tremendous growth in the formation of local NGOs providing humanitarian assistance in the delta region.

Despite the impressive results of this first phase of recovery activities, NGOs and delta residents still identify three priorities for the near future. First, the availability of clean water continues to be a challenge. Because many reservoirs were salinated due to the storm surge, they were not able to collect sufficient rainwater during the last rainy season. As a result, many organizations are considering trucking water into communities to ensure adequate supply. Agencies are working furiously to ensure that as many reservoirs as possible are cleaned before the upcoming rainy season begins in May. Second, many families are now living in temporary shelters that are only expected to be habitable through this year's rainy season. Again, agencies are rushing to complete as much permanent housing as possible before the rainy season halts construction. Finally, restoring productive livelihoods to delta residents is the key to the sustainability of recovery operations.

One of the largest challenges to livelihood work in the delta is the impact of the global financial crisis on local markets. Since recovery work began, the markets for rice, pulses, and fishery products have dropped 30% - 40%, making it more difficult for delta residents to earn the income needed to re-establish their lives. Access to credit has shrunk, especially as farmers and fishermen who took loans for last season's crops in anticipation of pre-slump prices cannot repay those loans based on current prices for their products. With savings – whether in cash, livestock, or goods – wiped out during the cyclone, many delta families cannot access credit for the upcoming year. Continued livelihoods assistance from the international community will be needed to ensure that delta residents can fully recover from the effects of Cyclone Nargis.

Funding for international operations in the delta is further complicating the ability of organizations to adequately respond to needs in the region. Much of the funding for the emergency phase of delta relief is winding up as the one-year anniversary of the storm approaches. Many agencies are now in a process of consolidating their work to the townships and villages in most need and shutting down offices in less affected areas as a response to the constrained funding environment. While many agencies are looking to the newly established Livelihoods and Food Security (LIFT) Trust Fund – a pooled fund being established by the European Community, Britain, and Australia – to continue funding livelihood programs in the delta, these funds may not begin to flow until June or July, leaving a gap in funding. Donors should examine the need for bridge funding to ensure that agencies are not left without funding between the time their emergency relief grants run out and the LIFT funds are available.

Finally, many delta residents and implementing agencies at the field level report a concern over the psychological impacts of Cyclone Nargis on delta residents as the rainy season approaches. While long-term plans for work in the delta incorporate disaster risk reduction into their work – such as building storm-resistant shelters, elevating roads, and reinforcing bridges – much of this work has yet to be completed. As a result, there is a fear that without adequate communications in the delta to inform people about impending storms the approach of even a small storm with strong winds could send delta residents fleeing to the few regional towns in search of safety. Refugees International could not identify any contingency plans for temporary shelter, feeding, and schooling in the event of this type of migration. Similarly, plans to prepare the government for such a possibility or to manage orderly returns to villages do not seem to be in place. Operational agencies and the UN should prepare contingency plans immediately for the possibility of substantial migrations this rainy season and in the future until risk reduction programs are completed.

Access Needed Outside the Delta

Though Cyclone Nargis forced many international NGOs to temporarily relocate staff and resources from other parts of Burma to the delta in order to mount an effective disaster response, most agencies have quickly refocused on serving needs throughout the country. In addition to returning to other areas with crises brewing, new NGOs are looking strategically at how to expand their presence outside the delta, a potential gain from the access granted to them in cyclone areas.

Northern Rakhine State, home of the Rohingya Muslim minority (see Rohingya: Burma's Forgotten Minority [1], December 18, 2008), continues to be the area of greatest concern. Deteriorating living standards, news of increased forced relocations, continued restrictions on all aspects of normal life, and the expulsion of Rohingya refugees from asylum countries in the region have focused the attention of the international aid community there.

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has recently announced that $3 million from the Central Emergency Response Fund will be made available for operations in Northern Rakhine State, and the UN Country Team is also coordinating a donor mission to the region, planned for this spring. Despite the growing attention, there is a need for strong, consistent engagement with the Government of Burma on increasing access to this region and relaxing government restrictions on the Rohingya population. Given the recent attention to Rohingya boat people throughout Southeast Asia, ASEAN should look at ways to facilitate this conversation, possibly using the success of the Tripartite Core Group as a model.

In addition to the needs in Northern Rakhine State, NGO actors cite a number of other areas in need of immediate attention. An ongoing food crisis due to bamboo die-offs in Chin State, particularly in the southern part, continues to require an expanded international response. Similarly, drought in the country's central dry zone – running through Magwe, Mandalay, and Bago Divisions – requires additional resources. In the southeast, areas with high levels of internal displacement due to conflict continue to be off-limits to agencies based in the country. Other areas of increased attention include the Wa and Kokant regions of Shan State, where agencies are attempting to increase resources for alternative agriculture projects for former opium poppy farmers. These initiatives, along with innovative projects in other regions, should be supported by the international community.

While funding for delta operations could face challenges in the upcoming months, humanitarian work throughout the rest of Burma is seeing a growth in funding sources. Britain, the European Commission, and Australia lead the donor community in Burma, and all continue to increase their budgets significantly. Additionally, newer donors such as Norway, Sweden, and Denmark are helping to support operations throughout the country. The establishment of the LIFT fund is an additional boost to funding for countrywide projects, and is currently drawing the attention of additional non-traditional donors. Plans to set up a new Education Trust Fund will further expand the pool of resources available for humanitarian work throughout the country.

The one glaring exception to the growing consensus on the need for increases in humanitarian aid to Burma, especially given its prominent role in funding cyclone relief operations, is the United States. Though a $15 million contribution is currently in process for 2009 delta operations, U.S. funding for countrywide programs is still an insignificant part of international funding.

Despite the renewed focus and increased funding for countrywide operations, international NGOs are keenly aware that the upcoming year could pose potential complications given proposed national elections in March 2010. Agencies have not reported any restrictions on their work in anticipation of the elections, but all indicated that this could change. Special attention was placed on areas where ceasefire groups or ethnic minority groups may boycott elections, such as Mon State and the Wa region of Shan State. However, agencies indicated that operating constraints in these areas could be expected not only from the government, but from ethnic-based boycott groups looking to exert greater control over their territory. Donor governments and the UN need to ensure that planning is developed to maintain clear boundaries that minimize the impact of political concerns on humanitarian operations.

The UN should take the primary lead in resisting government restrictions on aid agencies' operations in the run up to the 2010 elections. Indeed, it is already playing an important role in drawing attention to humanitarian needs outside the delta and discussing the expansion of aid activities nationwide with the government. The UN Country Team is increasingly composed of new leaders, however, and collectively they are still learning how to operate effectively within the complex political dynamics of Burma.

It is surprising, therefore, that senior UN officials in New York have backed away from plans to maintain high-level in-country support for strategic guidance and back-up on humanitarian matters. As a result, the UN as a whole has weakened its ability to face the challenges of the upcoming year. The Secretary-General and the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs should revive plans to provide a Senior Humanitarian Advisor to the Yangon-based Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator, and they should re-evaluate staffing at the Bangkok and New York levels to ensure that the Burma Country Team receives robust support.

Recognizing ASEAN's Leadership Role

Adhering to the principles of democracy, the rule of law and good governance, respect for and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms…and to place the well-being, livelihood and welfare of the peoples at the centre of the ASEAN community building process.

- Preamble to the charter of the Association of South East Asian Nations

In the immediate aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, ASEAN was thrust into a new leadership role, serving as a broker between the Burmese government and the international community. Its response has exceeded expectations, and the subsequent development and implementation of the Tri-Partite Core Group (TCG), the mechanism established to work on logistics and develop policies governing the humanitarian response program in the Irrawaddy delta, have been an unquestionable success. The TCG continues to play a vital role in ensuring access to cyclone affected areas, obtaining visas for international staff, and resolving disputes or obstacles that emerge. This model should be replicated as a way towards resolving other challenges inside Burma.

The original mandate of the TCG was for one year, and was set to expire in May 2009. In a positive sign, it was recently renewed for an additional year at the February 2009 ASEAN summit in Thailand. The extension of the TCG for the delta will allow ASEAN to maintain high-level contact with the Burmese government, and provide it with the opportunity to deepen its capacity for international diplomacy through the Secretariat.

Though the renewal of the TCG is a positive development, the inability of the international community to leverage access outside of the delta is a setback. ASEAN should evaluate how best to propose such an extension to the Burmese government during a year that will be fraught with political sensitivities. In the meantime, it should evaluate its experience with the TCG to determine the best form for a proposed expansion. More broadly, the international community should recognize the unique role that Burma's neighbors have in negotiating greater humanitarian access, and should support ASEAN's increasing efforts to convince the Burmese government to allow desperately needed humanitarian activities to take place throughout the country.

ASEAN's new charter includes a multitude of human rights provisions and responsibilities. With its inclusion of Burma, ASEAN will be challenged to find creative ways to ensure that Burma lives up to its commitments under the charter. This should happen through the internal dialogue mechanisms of the regional alliance, as well as through bilateral engagement on the part of Burma's neighbors and regional partners. Indonesia, as the largest country in the region, as well as Thailand and Malaysia, as Burma's immediate neighbors, have a responsibility to engage with the Burmese government to encourage greater adherence to the ASEAN charter.

While ASEAN is learning to adapt to the new mandates in its charter, it has been thrust into the spotlight recently with the coverage of the Rohingya boat crisis. This scandal has demonstrated that humanitarian emergencies inside Burma are fundamentally regional issues. ASEAN members can no longer disregard the internal affairs of Burma, as they have severe and identifiable ramifications for all ASEAN countries, specifically in terms of arrival of refugees.

ASEAN must look to develop and implement a comprehensive regional response to the Rohingya crisis. This response must look simultaneously at conditions inside Northern Rakhine State, as well as protection and assistance conditions in host countries, so that the policies implemented are in accordance with international humanitarian law and do not result in undesirable pull factors. Much like the formation of the TCG, the management of the Rohingya issue will set a precedent for how the Association plans to engage its most difficult member.

Moving Forward

The past year has demonstrated the ability of the humanitarian community to work effectively in the constrained Burmese operating environment. They have responded effectively to the Cyclone Nargis disaster, retooled their programs to meet the most pressing needs, successfully trained thousands of new Burmese staff in humanitarian operations, and negotiated with the Burmese government for increased opportunities to operate freely. These accomplishments have been supported by a renewed commitment to fund these activities by the international community.

International NGOs are now poised to begin the difficult work of translating their experience in the delta into improved operations throughout the country. Despite the challenges of upcoming elections, these agencies have shown that they are up to the task, and donor nations have demonstrated their commitment to supporting that vision.

Burma is still a country in a state of slow-motion collapse. The global financial crisis has only served to underline the dysfunction of the country's economic system, and the laundry list of impending regional crises highlights the vulnerability of the Burmese people. Though Burma continues to present serious challenges to the independence and integrity of humanitarian agencies, the need is clearer than ever, and the ability to operate accountably and transparently has been adequately demonstrated. If donor governments, ASEAN, and international agencies can present a united front on the imperative of meeting humanitarian need, they may allow actors inside the country to capitalize on the gains of the past year.

Congressional Advocate Jake Kurtzer assessed the humanitarian situation inside Burma in February 2009.

Refugiados muçulmanos podem voltar a Mianmar

(Folhapress) - Mianmar (antiga Birmânia) vai permitir a volta de refugiados da etnia muçulmana rohingya ao país se eles puderem provar que são parte dos bengalis, grupo étnico reconhecido em Mianmar, informa o ministro das Relações Exteriores da Tailândia. Segundo a CNN, o acordo foi firmado entre os ministros das Relações Exteriores da Tailândia e Mianmar durante encontro de países do sudeste asiático.

Milhares de refugiados rohingya foram para a Tailândia ao longo dos anos, dizendo que são perseguidos pelo governo militar linha-dura de Mianmar. Cerca de 20 mil migrantes rohingya já vivem na Tailândia, segundo seu ministro de Relações Exteriores.

De acordo com a CNN, as provas incluiriam a confirmação de parentes, uma prática comum em um país com pouca documentação. Os refugiados, contudo, resistem em voltar para Mianmar, dizendo que eles seriam mortos no país. Nos últimos meses, autoridades tailandesas vêm sendo acusadas de interceptar carregamento de navios dos rohingya e de abandonar os birmanes no mar sem comida.

BAN WELCOMES AMNESTY IN MYANMAR AS ‘FIRST STEP’ TOWARD DEMOCRATIZATION

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon today <"http://www.un.org/apps/sg/offthecuff.asp?nid=1266">welcomed an amnesty announced by the Government of Myanmar, which reportedly includes some 23 political prisoners, as a “first step” toward release of all such detainees and further progress on democratization.

“This is the time for Myanmar to seize the opportunity before it to send positive signals,” he said following a meeting with his Group of Friends on Myanmar, which includes neighbouring countries of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other concerned States.

Citing further steps to be taken, Mr. Ban reiterated his call for the release of the hundreds of political prisoners still in detention, including opposition leader and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and the resumption of dialogue between the Government and the opposition “without delay and without preconditions.”

Today’s meeting follows a briefing last week in which Mr. Ban’s Special Advisor, Ibrahim Gambari, told the Security Council that there was some movement toward “tangible outcomes” from his 31 January to 3 February visit to Myanmar as part of the Secretary-General’s good offices mandate.

After being updated Mr. Gambari, the Group of Friends expressed its unified support for the continuation of the good offices efforts, Mr. Ban said, adding that “our Myanmar interlocutors have also indicated the importance they attach to the good offices’ work.”

The Special Adviser is prepared to extend the UN’s political facilitation with both the Government and the opposition to build on previous efforts, he noted.

Asked by correspondents whether he himself is considering another visit to the South-East Asian nation, the Secretary-General replied that he will try to go, but nothing yet has been discussed in terms of timing and agendas.

“As a matter of principle, I am telling you that I am willing to make a return visit to build upon what I had discussed last May, including political issues,” he said, adding that there would not have to be preconditions for his visit.

“This is a part of ongoing consultation and negotiations and efforts by the international community, and also entrusted to me by the General Assembly,” Mr. Ban explained.

In regard to further discussions with the Group of Friends, he added: “We have a unity of support. But at the same time I would like to see some unity of approaches among members. This is what we are now continuing to consult with the countries concerned.”
________________

UN ENVOY AWAITS ‘TANGIBLE’ OUTCOMES FROM LATEST MYANMAR VISIT

New York, Feb 20 2009 4:10PM

The United Nations envoy for Myanmar told the Security Council today his latest visit to the South-East Asian nation, the fifth in the past year and a half, has not yet yielded any concrete results.

“I informed the Council that, so far, we have not seen tangible outcomes of my visit,” Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s Special Adviser Ibrahim Gambari told reporters after a closed-door briefing to the 15-member body.

“But there seems to be some movement in that direction,” added the envoy, who was in Myanmar most recently from 31 January to 3 February as part of the good offices mandate entrusted to the Secretary-General by the General Assembly.

During the visit, Mr. Gambari met with Government officials such as Prime Minister Thein Sein, as well as opposition and other political parties, including detained pro-democracy leader and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and members of her National League for Democracy (NLD).

“As I told the Government, now is the time to demonstrate Myanmar’s commitment to addressing concretely the issues of concern to the international community, particularly the release of political prisoners and the resumption of dialogue between the Government and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi,” Mr. Gambari stated.

The Myanmar Government has reportedly announced today it will free some 6,000 prisoners beginning tomorrow. Mr. Gambari said he has not received any official communication on this from the authorities and is waiting to see who is among those that will be released.

“At the same time, I believe it’s fair to welcome the release of prisoners, particularly political prisoners,” he noted.

Last year the Government said it will hold multi-party elections in 2010. Both Mr. Ban and his Special Adviser have repeatedly said it is in Myanmar’s interest to ensure that the elections are as credible and inclusive as possible and to engage without delay in dialogue with Ms. Suu Kyi.

“Our position has not changed. We’re not advocating elections in 2010 or any time. It is up to the Government and people of Myanmar to decide but we continue to advocate conditions that are conducive to free and fair elections when they do take place,” said Mr. Gambari.

Feb 20 2009 4:10PM

UN HUMAN RIGHTS EXPERT TO VISIT MYANMAR

The independent United Nations expert on the situation of human rights in Myanmar will begin a six-day visit beginning tomorrow to assess developments in the South-East Asian nation since his previous mission last year.

Special Rapporteur Tomás Ojea Quintana, who was appointed to his post in May 2008 by the Geneva-based UN Human Rights Council, made his first visit to Myanmar last August.

In a report issued following that visit, Mr. Quintana proposed that four core human rights elements be implemented: the revision of domestic laws that limit fundamental rights, the progressive release of the estimated 2,000 prisoners of conscience still in detention, the reform and training of the military so that it conforms with human rights, and changes to the judiciary so that it is fully independent.

These four elements must be completed before national elections are held in 2010, he added.

The Special Rapporteur will discuss the implementation of these four elements with relevant officials during his 14-19 February mission.

He has requested to meet in private with a number of prisoners of conscience as well as leaders of political parties, and also intends to travel to Rakhine, Kayin and Kachin states.

Angelina Jolie declara apoio aos refugiados na Tailândia

A estrela de Hollywood e Embaixadora da Boa Vontade das Nações Unidas, Angelina Jolie, viajou para Tailândia para promover a liberdade de dezenas de milhares de refugiados, que estão confinados há anos em campos temporários depois de terem escapado do vizinho Mianmar.

Ontem, Jolie passou o dia de conversando com refugiados do norte da Tailândia sobre as dificuldades enfrentadas durante as duas décadas em que vivem em campos fechados. “Fiquei triste ao conhecer uma mulher de 21 anos, que nasceu em um campo de refugiados do qual nunca saiu e agora o seu próprio filho está sendo criado no local”, disse depois de visitar o campo Ban Mai Nai Soi, que abriga mais de 18 mil refugiados, sendo a maioria da etnia Karenni. “Não há previsão deles voltarem a Burma (Mianmar). Precisamos achar um modo de ajudá-los a trabalhar e se tornarem auto-sustentáveis”.

De acordo com o Alto comissariado das Nações Unidas para Refugiados (ACNUR), mais de cem mil refugiados estão abrigados em nove campos ao longo da fronteira Tailândia-Mianmar. Eles não podem deixar o local e consequentemente não estão preparados para se desenvolverem profissionalmente ou para receberem educação de alta qualidade.

Durante o ano passado, houve um fluxo regular de refugiados vindos de Mianmar em direção a Ban Mai Nai Soi e três outros campos de refugiados localizados na mesma província, a maioria fugindo de trabalho escravo e abusos de direitos humanos em seu país.

Última Atualização ( sexta, 06 de fevereiro de 2009 )

Fonte: UNICRIO

MYANMAR: UN LAUNCHES POST-CYCLONE RECOVERY PLAN

Speaking at the launch of a plan to rebuild the lives of millions in Myanmar affected by last year’s Cyclone Nargis, the top United Nations official to the region today stressed that strong foundations need to be in place to move beyond emergency relief to restoring economies and social services.

The three-year Post-Nargis Response and Preparedness Plan (PONREPP) provides the blue-print for the reconstruction of communities devastated by the cyclone, which battered the country in early May, leaving around 140,000 dead or missing and displacing 800,000 from their homes.

“Strong institutions, effective mechanisms and accountable processes are needed to plan and orchestrate the various components of the recovery effort,” said Noeleen Heyzer, Executive Secretary of the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (<"http://www.unescap.org/">ESCAP).

Noting that the process of recovery, from humanitarian relief to economic development, would take several years, Ms. Heyzer said the importance of the right “architecture” could not be overemphasized.

“The PONREPP provides us with a framework for the medium- and long-term post-Nargis recovery effort, including the priorities of supporting food security and livelihood recovery, improving public health, restoring economic and social infrastructure, and integrating disaster risk reduction into the recovery process,” she said.

The recovery plan was developed by the Tripartite Core Group (TCG) which consists of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Government of Myanmar and the UN.
To ensure that the Plan translates into real support for the survivors of Cyclone Nargis, “the continued engagement of the international community is essential,” Ms. Heyzer stressed in her message delivered at ESCAP headquarters in Bangkok.